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Abstract: Government contract awardees in United States (US) industries produce toxic releases 
in addition to producing public goods and services. Industries that the government buys many 
products from and that have high environmental footprint are where procurement decisions have 
the most impact. This dissertation examines what factors predict variation in contractor facility 
environmental performance indicated by reported pollution control technology and 
environmental releases to inform guidance for revising procurement policy. The research 
question is: How are government contractors that mange toxic materials different in their 
environmental management behavior than noncontractors? Data from the US Environmental 
Protection Agency’s Toxics Release Inventory, a public dataset of chemical management 
information for industry, are combined with US Federal Government spending data on agency 
contracts and procurement to see how pollution by awardees has changed over time. Three 
factors explaining variation in environmental performance are explored here. The first is 
payment method to identify if facilities with contracts incentivizing cost reduction have different 
environmental performance than other contractor facilities. The second is the Federal agency 
that awards the contract with interest in how defense contractors are different due to exemptions 
from environmental purchasing standards. The last factor is variation in competition between 
bidding firms, which could lead to different outcomes related to management of chemicals by the 
facilities. This dissertation contributes to the socio-environmental frameworks of ecological 
modernization, environmental disproportionality, and the Porter Hypothesis on environment and 
competition. Quantitative models are estimated for each of the three factors of interest using both 
linear mixed models and Bayesian Hierarchical models. Findings support expanded use of 
incentive type contracts, while also identifying that defense spending as being linked to the 
majority of contractor pollution. Findings also show that competition intensity leads to more 
pollution when the chemical is not a component in the manufacturing process. 
 
Keywords: Contract bidding; pollution prevention; Bourdieu; manufacturing; Toxics Release 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Manufacturing firms and their facilities make decisions based on multiple factors 
influencing their daily operation (Gonzalez-Benito & Gonzalez-Benito, 2010). One under-
researched factor in the realm of industrial environmental activity is how United States (US) 
Federal Government procurement from firms impacts the environmental activity of the vendors 
(the firms and their facilities) (Williams, 2015). Most firms contracting with the Federal 
Government are for-profit organizations, and I focus on firms that own facilities engaged in 
manufacturing operations. This topic is also important because government spending is the third 
largest contributor to the US economy (Figure 1) (BEA.gov, 2019), and recent research has 
shown that government contract awardees engaged in industrial activities are disproportionately 
high in their pollutant releases (Hill et al., 2020). Together, these two factors form the basis for 
further investigation into the environmental performance of this group of industrial firms.  
 The relationship between the Federal Government and the entities that it purchases from 
is of interest on many levels, but the roots of the investigation provided here are embedded in 
understanding the nuances of industrial environmental activity, when the facility is both 
regulated by and does business with the government. In the US, this relationship is governed by 
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) (FAR, 2020). The FAR has been updated over the 
years to reflect new policy goals of reducing the environmental impact of the Federal 
Government by making purchases with sustainability and long-term environmental benefit in 
mind (Brookhaven National Laboratory, 2020; OFEE, 1999). Consequently, how the facilities 
perform when doing business with the government becomes increasingly more important both to 
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know if the FAR’s directives are being carried out as intended and because understanding facility 
environmental activity is an important part of improving environmental regulation.  
 
Figure 1: Percent of total economic value added by industry to the U.S. economy in 2019; 
government spending was the third largest industry with 12.4 percent of total value added (BEA, 
2019). 
The primary units of analysis in this dissertation are firms that have been awarded US 
Federal Government contracts fulfilled at the firms’ facilities during the period 2001 to 2012. 
Such firms and their facilities are referred to here as “contractors” and “contractor facilities”; 
facilities associated with firms that were unsuccessful in their bids for US Federal contracts or 
never received awards because they did not compete are referred to here as “noncontractors.” 
When using the term firm, it will always be about the owners of manufacturing facilities, and 
when using the term facility, it will be about the physical locations where the manufacturing 
process happens. Sometimes firms will have multiple facility locations, but most facilities that 
are studied here are the sole facility operated by a firm for which reporting to the US 
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Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) is required. TRI 
facilities are industrial plants engaging in activities that store, manage, or otherwise use one or 
more hazardous chemicals required to be reported annually to the EPA (EPA 2019). These 
facilities report how the chemical is used and the quantities that travel through various waste 
streams at the facility, which include recycling, air releases, and landfill disposal. More details 
on these firms, their TRI facilities, and their waste management are provided throughout the 
dissertation. 
The research I present examines three aspects, or explanatory variables, of US Federal 
procurement contracts and their relationship to facility environmental activity, as indicated by 
reported pollution control technologies and quantity of hazardous waste managed. The three 
explanatory variables are the type of purchasing award issued to the facility, which US Federal 
agency issued the award, and interfirm competition for the award. Each of these are examined, in 
turn, in the form of journal article manuscripts, with methodological consideration for their 
influence on the other variables. This introductory chapter presents an overview of the three 
manuscripts, with consideration for the literature, theory, and methods used in each.  
 
Statement of the problem 
US Federal contract awardees are disproportionately high emitters of toxic wastes 
relative to other firms within their industries (Hill et al., 2020). Understanding this disparity is at 
the root of this doctoral dissertation, with specific interest in answering the question: How are 
government contractors that manage toxic materials different in their environmental 
management than noncontractors? Status as a US Federal Government contractor comes with 
some characteristics that distinguish the firm’s facilities from other facilities. These 
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characteristics include: a business relationship with the Federal Government with some payments 
tied to facility economic performance; ties to political and military operations of the nation 
through contracting agencies such as Department of Defense (DOD); and varying degrees of 
competition with other firms and their facilities within the industry. Green purchasing has been 
US Federal Government policy for decades (GSA, 2013; Kendall, 2014; Rainville, 2017), but the 
focus of scholarship has been on supply chain resiliency with limited evaluation of green 
purchasing policy goals (Testa et al., 2016) or the roles these policies have on firm 
environmental activity (Rainville, 2017).  
Government spending is also a significant part of the economy in the US, averaging 10 to 
20 percent of GDP (Rainville, 2017) and it was the third largest contributor in 2019 to the entire 
US economy in terms of total value added (Figure 1). Total federal expenditures in 2018 were 
just over four trillion dollars with $1.4 trillion of this being spent on discretionary spending 
(agency operating costs and Federal procurement) to operate the government (Amadeo, 2019). 
The result is that government purchasing makes up a significant portion of overall consumption, 
and some argue a disproportionate share of market consumption (Harris et al., 2003). Federal 
spending is very high in several sectors and if there can be an understanding of how this 
spending might result in higher environmental impacts, targeted changes within specific sectors 
could have an impact on toxic pollution by: “selecting products or services that have a lesser or 
reduced effect on human health and the environment compared with competing products or 
services that serve the same purpose” (Executive Order 13101 - Greening the Government 
Through Waste Prevention, Recylcing, and Federal Acquisition, 1998). Government contracting 
is a specific type of procurement and is regulated in the US under the FAR. The FAR requires 
agency procurement be competitive among firms and that the award go to the lowest bid 
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(Edquist et al., 2015; Khan, 2018; OECD, 2003). Each of the characteristics mentioned, type of 
purchasing method used, the Federal agency issuing the award, and competition, are examined 
individually with their own research question and hypothesis.  
There are three primary objectives. They are: 
1. Link purchasing data from US Federal Government agencies to Toxic Release 
Inventory (TRI) facilities, 
2. Evaluate the activity of contractor TRI facilities by comparing the number of 
reported pollution control actions, its effectiveness at reducing toxic waste, and 
comparing total toxic releases between contractor facilities, and 
3. Apply socio-environmental theory to: explain motivations for contractor 
environmental actions, understand exemptions granted to defense agencies from 
following green purchasing directives, and to contribute to theory on competition 
and the environment. 
These aims are accomplished by conducting three separate investigations, each answering 
different questions with associated literature, methods, and results.  
The first question is: Do US Federal contractors receiving contract awards that have 
additional incentives to reduce costs have different waste management practices than contractor 
facilities without these incentives? The hypothesis is that facilities receiving incentive type 
contracts make a greater investment in pollution control technology because the savings on waste 
management helps the contractor to meet low-cost objectives of incentive type awards. The 
association between greater investment in pollution control and greater efficiency of the 
contractor is conceptualized using an ecological modernization theoretical frame where the 
government, via regulation and green purchasing, moves the private sector from higher to lower 
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pollution (Mol & Sonnenfeld, 2014). The second study in this dissertation moves from looking at 
the award type to a research question about the agency issuing the award. 
The second question is: Do firms with facilities that are awarded US Federal 
Government contracts from agencies that are exempt from green purchasing requirements (e.g., 
the DOD) produce more hazardous waste releases than other contractor facilities? The 
hypothesis is that agencies that are exempt from following green purchasing policy guidance 
would not change the contractors that they purchase from based on environmental criteria 
because they are not required to. This results in sustained contracting at facilities with lower 
environmental standards and higher pollution releases than similar facilities. Exemptions are 
granted to agencies engaged in activities that are perceived as necessary to US Federal 
Government operation and include military and defense activities with persistent fear that new 
environmental standards will hamper the ability of agencies engaged in these activities to meet 
their policy objectives (Ramos et al., 2007; Zippel, 2013). The continued granting of exemptions 
over multiple administrations and new policy directives is an example of habitus in US Federal 
contracting policy; habitus is what Pierre Bourdieu (1971, 1977) describes as default behavior of 
individuals that relies on experiential knowledge to make decisions when new guidance is not 
available. This concept is applied at the organization level as other scholars have done 
(DiMaggio, 1979; Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008) to understand the established norm that certain 
activity, such as defense spending, must be exempt from new environmental policy. Further, the 
continued contracting of exempt agencies with higher polluting facilities might lead to 
disproportionate environmental outcomes with far more hazardous releases tied to exempt 
agencies than non-exempt. The concept of habitus, its connection to disproportionality, and 
policy decisions are explored briefly below with more detail in the second chapter. After 
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exploring the relationship between award type, Federal Agency, and facility environmental 
activity, the final study in this dissertation examines the connection between competition and 
environmental performance. 
The third question is: As competition for US Federal contracts increases between 
potential awardees, do chromium releases increase because increasing competition may be 
driving investment in pollution control downward? An examination of government contract 
competition and its connection to facility releases provides insight into the ongoing debate 
regarding whether competition leads to reduced environmental impact of industry or greater 
release of environmental externalities (López-Gamero & Molina-Azorín, 2016). One chemical, 
chromium (Cr) is the focus of a case study of how chemical usage and competition might 
interact, resulting in different facility environmental performance. The hypothesis is that as 
competition increases, releases of Cr will also increase because facilities “race to the bottom” for 
short term gains from contracts, but this association will be weaker for facilities that use Cr as a 
component in their manufacturing process. Facilities using Cr as a component seek to reduce 
releases to save on both new inputs of Cr and management costs of Cr waste. While the Porter 
Hypothesis argues that competition leads to reduced environmental externalities (M. E. Porter & 
Van der Linde, 1995), a more complex association between competition and environmental 
performance is explored balancing the contribution of the Porter Hypothesis with the “race to the 
bottom” scholarship including the pollution haven hypothesis (Cole et al., 2017). In the next 
section, each question is explored regarding essential supporting concepts in the literature. This 




Overview of scholarly literature and important concepts 
 The research questions presented here contribute to several fields of socio-environmental 
research. These fields are ecological modernization theory, the field of environmental 
disproportionality, and the field of environment/competition scholarship situated in the political 
economy research of the Porter Hypothesis. Environmental disproportionality scholarship is 
further supported by inclusion of the political sociology theories of Pierre Bourdieu specifically 
his concept of habitus (Bourdieu, 1990). Below, an overview of each field is provided along with 
specific connections to the research questions and the topic of environmental performance of US 
Federal contractors. 
Incentive contracting and ecological modernization 
The first research question’s hypothesis takes the position that US Federal contracts with 
incentives for cost reduction will result in recipients integrating more pollution control 
technology in their production processes. Incentive contracts include a cost-sharing agreement 
between the government and the contractor where a cost underrun is rewarded by a bonus 
incentive fee based on a pre-negotiated formula, and if the contractor goes over-budget, a portion 
of the overrun is taken out of the contractor’s fee (FAR, 2020). Therefore, if a contractor wants 
to earn the incentive bonus, they must find ways of coming in under their negotiated price 
(Kimura & Morimitsu, 2018). One way to reduce costs is to modify production processes to 
reduce waste, save on material inputs, and lower waste management costs (Clelland et al., 2000; 
Goldsmith & Basak, 2001). These activities provide a triple benefit for contractors with incentive 
type awards: return on investment from reduced spending on waste removal (Gray & 
Shadbegian, 1995), the incentive award bonus (Lewis & Bajari, 2014), and savings on material 
inputs that were once wasted (Wong et al., 2020). Taken together, each of these elements 
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provides motivation for improving environmental performance and is a direct result of 
government policy moving industry toward sustainable production process —, a hallmark of 
ecological modernization theory.  
 The increase in sustainable production with reduced environmental externalities is 
conceptualized by one of the leading theories in socio-environmental science: ecological 
modernization. Ecological modernization is a theory articulating how industry can move toward 
a harmonious relationship with the natural world and reduce negative environmental impacts 
with the aid of government regulatory guidance (Buttel, 2000; Mol & Sonnenfeld, 2014). This 
guidance has been shown to come in many forms such as green purchasing policy (Hausknost, 
2020), minimum pollution standards (Gray & Shadbegian, 2005), and incentive based policies 
(Lemprière, 2016). Incentive contracting falls within the policy framework that ecological 
modernization describes because the foundations of incentive contract theory include the core 
element of greater economic efficiency (Lewis & Bajari, 2014; McAfee, 1988; Scherer, 1964).  
Economic efficiency does not always lead to positive environmental outcomes and can 
lead to issues, such as more intensive resource use (Alcott, 2005). Despite this drawback, 
incentive-based policies have shown success in improving environmental performance in the 
private sector (Shen & Lin, 2020). The first research question of this dissertation seeks to 
examine whether incentive contracts lead to the desired outcomes described by ecological 
modernization theorists. The broad push toward reduced environmental impact of industry can, 
however, be impeded by bureaucratic norms such as providing exemption from new 
sustainability standards to some industrial actor; this is where the concepts of habitus and 




Habitus, disproportionality, and defense spending 
 Government agencies are guided by laws and policies outlining what the agency should 
do in given situations, including guidance for making purchases. The policy guidelines 
governing purchasing in the US are collected in the FAR and the guidelines have been updated 
by congressional acts over the years (Federal Acquisition Regulation Subpart 23, 2021), new 
administrative edits (Brookhaven National Laboratory, 2020), and presidential executive orders 
that in recent decades have outlined environmentally preferred purchasing policies (OFEE, 
1999).  
The executive orders have included specific goals of increasing purchases to be 
environmentally preferred including recommendations for toxic materials standards, energy 
recovery, and water-saving production processes all currently outlined in FAR Part 23, Subpart 1 
(Federal Acquisition Regulation Subpart 23, 2021). Each executive order, going back to 1993 
with President Clinton’s first executive order on the issue (he later signed a second order with 
more guidance in 1999), also included specific exception for military purchases and eligibility 
for exemption for defense and national security agencies (Brookhaven National Laboratory, 
2020; OFEE, 1999). These exemptions were included because of persistent fear that new 
standards would hamper defense and other agencies ability to achieve their mission (Ramos et 
al., 2007). The unique treatment of defense agencies regarding their environmental impact has 
been linked to the power of the military-industrial complex as an explanation for differences in 
regulation (Jorgenson, 2016). The consistent inclusion of these exemptions with new 
administrations, new standards, and new policies is also an example of how government resorts 
to habitual behavior when faced with new decisions and is an exemplary case of Pierre 
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus (Bourdieu, 1971, 1977).  
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Habitus is a set of “durable, transposable dispositions…principles which generate and 
organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes” 
(Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53). It is habitus that guides individuals and organizations down default 
paths when making decisions with limited guidance and are “adapted to,” and, as Bourdieu 
states, are “durable” and “transposable,” meaning the dispositions persist in and of themselves 
(Bourdieu, 1990). This persistence can also be described as normative behavior and can be 
likened to how a person’s lived experience provides them with the ability to act and do what 
“feels right” for any given situation (Bourdieu, 1971, 1990). Similarly, when applied to policy 
writing, each time green purchasing standards were updated, the same policy language was 
included to exempt military and other agencies from following the new standards. The decisions 
reflect the powerful connection between industry and the military (Jorgenson, 2016) and 
followed what has always been done, thereby creating actions that are path dependent (Pierson, 
2000). Path dependence, a related concept from political science, is when policy actions become 
impossible to reverse creating preordained paths for a new policy to follow (Erridge & Greer, 
2002; Pierson, 2000). Habitus can help to build understanding for why the same policy decisions 
continue to be made regarding government spending and environmentally preferred purchasing. 
The importance of this subject becomes evident when examining how this persistent policy 
position has contributed to disproportionate environmental impact from US Federal contractors. 
William Freudenburg (2005) was the first to write about environmental 
disproportionality, or the “strikingly unequal patterns of privileged access to environmental 
rights and resources” (W. R. Freudenburg, 2005, p. 89), made possible by a diversion of 
attention through privileged accounts or explanations of why the inequality exists. 
Disproportionality is a micro-scale framework for understanding observed disproportionate 
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impacts of a minority of actors (Davidson & Grant, 2012). While disproportionality has been 
applied to disaster studies (Freudenburg, Gramling, Laska, & Erikson, 2008), much of the 
research on hazards has focused on sources and impacts. The impacts literature is predominately 
within the field of environmental justice. Within environmental justice literature, there has been 
some focus on proportional comparisons of impacts versus economic outcomes such as 
employment (Ash & Boyce, 2018). Community disproportionate proximity to hazards, such as 
coal waste impoundments, is another focus (Greenberg, 2017, 2018). Environmental 
disproportionality has been applied to many areas of research on the impact of pollution 
production with the other major area of focus for disproportionality being production of 
pollution.  
Studies on the electricity production sector around the world show support for 
disproportionality in CO2 production in general (Jorgenson, 2016), within the  coal power plant 
group specifically (Galli Robertson & Collins, 2019), and some households disproportionate 
contributors to greenhouse gases (Kennedy et al., 2014). Energy consumption has also been 
studied with some work on the information technology sector as disproportionately consuming 
electricity (Greenberg & Bugden, 2019). Studies that connect production and impacts bring the 
environmental justice frame together with identification of disproportionate contribution by toxic 
pollution as well (Collins, Munoz, & Jaja, 2016). The study of disproportionate toxic release 
production suggests that the issue has been going on since collection of these data began in the 
late 1980s suggesting even earlier origins (Collins et al., 2020). The focus on pollution has 
resulted in the use of several descriptive terms for disproportionate polluters, such as egregious 
polluters (Kennedy et al., 2014), hyper-polluters (Grant et al., 2018), and super-polluters (Collins 
et al., 2020). Disproportionality has been observed by government contractors in the US, with 
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significantly higher releases coming from recipients of US Federal award dollars in many 
industries (Hill et al. 2020). Further, the majority of all spending in the US comes from DOD 
purchases (Amadeo, 2019; Carril & Duggan, 2020) meaning that the green purchasing rule 
exemptions held by DOD could be an explanation for this observed disproportionality.  
By examining agency spending at facilities that report environmental pollution, the 
second research question in this dissertation examines the connection between these exemptions 
and disproportionate pollution. Both Bourdieu’s concept of habitus and Freudenburg’s 
disproportionality help to explain inequality in the risks related to industrial pollution and help 
identify inroads to change. The last area of literature drawn upon is competition and 
environmental performance.   
 
Porter Hypothesis and the “race to the bottom” debate 
Another aspect of US Federal procurement policy is that government contracts are 
awarded via competitive bidding procedure where the award goes to the lowest satisfactory 
bidder (Edquist et al., 2015; Khan, 2018). Competition can affect how a firm might structure a 
bid. For example, with increases in competition, a firm will strive to decrease costs to keep 
prices of goods low and outcompete peer firms. This occurs in different ways based on 
characteristics of the firm; for example high labor industries reduced and replaced labor forces 
from the 1960s to the 1990s in the U.S., replacing employees with technology and chemical 
substitutes to compete with growing numbers of international competitors (Schnaiberg et al., 
2002).  
A second way that firms might alter activity in the face of competition is through 
reducing inputs into their production process through waste minimization. This has been found to 
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result in less chemical byproducts released into the environment through increases in firm-level 
efficiency (Clelland et al., 2000). Pressure to reduce or replace chemical inputs also comes from 
government regulation and evidence suggests that reductions in pollution can make a firm more 
competitive (Delmas & Toffel, 2008; Donnan et al., 2005; May, 2005). The Porter Hypothesis 
describes how firms, when able to meet or surpass regulatory standards, become more 
competitive by lowering of operational costs and, as a result production processes are more 
efficient (M. E. Porter, 1991; M. E. Porter & Van der Linde, 1995).  
The Porter Hypothesis has had mixed results in the empirical literature. There has been 
significant support for the premise that Porter and Van der Linde proposed (Albrizio et al., 2017) 
as well as many studies with null findings (Hull & Rothenberg, 2008; Link & Naveh, 2006) and 
other research suggesting that firms and the facilities they own instead “race to the bottom” 
(Rasli et al., 2018). The “race to the bottom” hypothesis takes the opposite stance to the Porter 
Hypothesis arguing that competition results in an upward push on environmental pollution with 
less spending on pollution control technology and movement of industry to regions with lax 
environmental standards (Cole et al., 2017). This movement of industry is known as the pollution 
haven hypothesis and just like the Porter Hypothesis there is research supporting the argument 
(Millimet & Roy, 2016; G. Porter, 1999) and research that does not support it (McConnell & 
Schwab, 1990; Sjöberg & Xu, 2018). The debate will likely continue in the literature and the 
third question of this dissertation does not provide a definitive position on either side. Instead, 
the third question explores the nuances of competition and environmental activity by looking at a 
micro-scale example of one chemical and how competition might interact with how the chemical 
is used at industrial facilities. The results of the third manuscript (Chapter 4) support current calls 
for the Porter Hypothesis and the “race to the bottom” to be considered together and applied 
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situationally (Zhou et al., 2017). Chapter 4 calls for further research into disaggregated 
explorations of competition and environmental activity with support for variation in study 
findings based on circumstance. Each research question is explored using similar data, although 
the methodological approaches differ.  
 
Research methods 
 The methods in each manuscript employ procedures for retrieval of secondary data from 
public and private sources. In addition, data preparation, merging, and cleaning are similar and is 
described below. Specific statistical methods are then described for each manuscript. 
 Data for all studies required extensive synthesis to format the data into usable structures. 
Four datasets are used in each study and synthesis methods are shared for each study question. 
The first dataset is the TRI, which is mentioned above. The TRI was created in 1986 under 
Section 313 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA) and 
requires facilities in qualifying industries to annually report chemical management and release 
data (EPA, 2019). The research presented here uses data from 2001 to 2012. 
 Facility business statistics are from the National Establishment Time Series (NETS) that 
contains annually reported Dun and Bradstreet data on sales, employment, and ownership (Walls 
and Associates, 2015). The 2013 version of these data are used under a licensing agreement with 
the data owners and contains data from the years 1989 to 2012 for TRI facilities that have been 
matched to establishment Duns Numbers. Using the crosswalk provided, the NETS data are 
merged to the TRI data for the same years resulting in a final dataset of 22,521 unique facilities 
and 92.7 percent merge success allowing for examination of nearly entire TRI reporting sectors. 
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Government contractors are the group of industrial actors of primary interest to the research 
questions and required additional data. 
 The US collects Federal spending information in the Federal Procurement Data System 
and these data are available from the public-facing website, USASpending.gov (USASpending, 
2020). These data are at the transaction level for 2001 to 2012; the year 2001 was the first year 
these data were made publicly available. The NETS Duns Number to TRI facility crosswalk is 
used to subset the annual transaction data for TRI recipients and then data are aggregated to the 
award level and summarized to each facility. Data on award bids, total award value, issuing 
agency, award type, green purchasing criteria included, and number of awards is used. There are 
3,266 government contractor facilities identified. A final dataset provides important covariates 
on regulatory standards for the studies. 
 The Enforcement and Compliance History Online (ECHO) collects summary data on 
facility compliance and I include data from 2007-2012 (EPA, 2020a). Total inspections at each 
facility is used as an indicator for regulatory oversight along with two environmental justice 
indicators: proximity to a Native American Tribe, and whether the facility is an EJScreen facility 
(EPA, 2020b). Each research question uses the merged dataset created by bringing each of these 
data sources together with specific methods varying for each project. 
 
Manuscript 1 
The first research question examining the role of payment type on environmental 
performance takes the results of the data synthesis and builds a generalized linear mixed model 
(GLMM) of four case subsectors using their North American Industrial Classification System 
(NAICS) numbers with case subsectors each having a high number of incentive contractors 
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(Figure 2). The case industries are NAICS 325, chemical manufacturing, NAICS 332, fabricated 
metal manufacturing, NAICS 334, computer and electronic product manufacturing, and NAICS 
336, transportation manufacturing.  
 
Figure 2: Number of facilities by 3-digit NAICS code that are contractors and the type of 
contract they received. Transportation manufacturing, fabricated metal manufacturing, computer 
and electronic product manufacturing, and chemical manufacturing are selected because they 
have the greatest number of facilities. 
 
The GLMM modelling method is used because the response variable is reported number 
of pollution control actions (also known as pollution prevention or source reduction actions) 
from each facility from 2001 to 2012. This is an integer variable requiring a Poisson distribution 
and therefore a generalized linear model. The mixed model is used so that random intercepts for 
each industry are calculated allowing facility observations to be grouped within industries. In 
addition, pollution control actions are evaluated for short-term and long-term success by 
including integer indicators for the number of actions successful after one year, after five years, 
and actions with a 25 percent reduction or more after five years. The evaluation of actions 
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reported in 2012 required the use of TRI data from 2013 to 2017. This research question is the 
only one in this dissertation to utilize data beyond the 2001 to 2012 study timeframe. The second 
research question also uses a mixed modelling approach. 
 
Manuscript 2 
 A linear mixed model (LMM) is fit to evaluate facility hazardous releases from industrial 
pollution in the second manuscript (Chapter 3) to examine the influence of green purchasing 
exemptions granted to the defense agency on the environmental performance of facilities the 
agency contracts with. A linear model is used because the response variable is continuous, and 
the mixed model allowed for a hierarchy of facilities within industries as well as inclusion of a 
fixed effect for agency issuing the award. This makes comparison between agencies possible to 
assess hazardous waste releases linked to agency spending. Facility releases are linked to 
agencies by apportioning releases. First, the proportion of sales at the facility that is from US 
Federal contracts is used to establish the estimated percentage of releases from contracts at the 
facility. Then, each awarding agency’s proportion is calculated using the contract release value 
to apportion releases to specific agencies. Hazardous waste releases are determined by using the 
Risk Screening Environmental Indicators (RSEI) data. The RSEI is derived from the TRI and 
allows for summation of pollution releases across chemicals by accounting for relative toxicity 
of the chemicals (EPA, 2018). Results include agency contribution to environmental releases as 
well as facility characteristics that are used to predict variation in contractor facility releases. The 





 The third question uses a Bayesian hierarchical model to examine contractor facility 
chromium (Cr) releases and the interaction between bids and how Cr is used at the facility. The 
Bayesian approach allows for the same mixed modelling capability in a more intuitive way and 
allows for integrating complexity into the model that is grounded in prior understanding of the 
data structure. Bayesian models, while not commonly used in studies like this, provide a clear 
methodological foundation for examining the complex relation between contractor bids, Cr 
releases, and how Cr is used at the facility. This study provides a case for future use of this 
method as well as clear policy recommendations about facility and chemical regulation in the 
context of government contracts.  
 
Closing thoughts 
 Varied ideas are explored in this dissertation with scholarly background spanning several 
theories and debates, but the topic of government contractor-based environmental pollution 
brings them all together in new and innovative ways. The research presented has significant 
policy implications and each question explores these outcomes, and the conclusion of the 
dissertation includes thoughts on how they all connect.  each study individually in detail, with 
separate background, methods, results, and discussion sections. Further connections between the 
three manuscripts and their contributions to the field of environmental policy are discussed in the 
concluding chapter with consideration also for future projects and broader implications of the 
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Chapter 2: US Federal Contracting and Pollution Prevention: How Award Type Affects 
Adoption of Source Reduction Techniques in Four Manufacturing Sectors1 
 
Abstract: There is reason to believe that hazardous emissions generated by industrial actors that 
have been awarded government contracts may engage in different pollution prevention activity 
compared to those that have not be awarded government contracts. This is important because 
pollution prevention actions are a key inroad to alleviation of environmental contamination. 
Specifically, we find that as US Federally driven incentives to reduce costs are offered, industrial 
polluters tend to respond by making efficiency improvements. This research relies on publicly 
available purchasing, toxics release, and pollution prevention data from 2001 to 2012 for 
458,081 transactions and 9,010 facilities. We investigate the impact of contract award structure 
on facility environmental performance. We fit regression models to understand more about how 
the number of reported voluntary pollution prevention actions and reductions in total hazardous 
waste managed at each facility are connected to three types of contract awards. We find that 
industrial actors that have been awarded incentive contracts report more pollution prevention 
actions and these actions are more likely to result in pollution reduction. Results inform US 




ecological modernization, toxic releases, incentive contract; government procurement; corporate 
voluntarism; manufacturing 
 
1 Authored by Dustin Hill, Michael Petroni, and Mary B. Collins. A version of this manuscript is under review at 




Experts estimate that 10 to 20 percent of many nations’ gross domestic product (GDP) 
comes from government purchases (Rainville, 2017). In the United States (US), government 
expenditure is the third largest industry, by total value added to the US economy, behind real 
estate and professional services and ahead of manufacturing, finance, and retail (BEA, 2019). 
Thus, government purchasing makes up a significant portion of overall consumption, and a 
disproportionate, yet perhaps necessary, share of market consumption (Harris et al., 2003). 
Government contracting is a specific type of procurement, which is regulated in the US under the 
US Federal Acquisitions Regulation (FAR). The main policy goals of the US Federal 
procurement are cost savings and competition among potential vendors (Edquist et al., 2015). In 
addition, procurement has environmental impacts resulting from production of goods. With 
government being a high proportion of GDP (Audet, 2001) and a large consumer within defense, 
construction, shipbuilding, energy, and transportation industries (OECD, 2003) government 
purchasing polices have environmental impacts (Testa et al., 2016). 
We measure the impact of US Federal purchasing by identifying the hazardous waste 
managed by contract awardee facilities using the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) 
Toxics Release Inventory (TRI). Tracking the environmental performance of suppliers in this 
way has been used in studies of public procurement in the past (Handfield et al., 2002; Hill et al., 
2020). Such associations found hazardous waste produced by firms that have been awards US 
Federal Government contracts, which they fulfilled at their respective facilities (hereafter 
contractors), was higher than non-contractors and that this trend sustained over time (Hill et al., 
2020). By linking US Federal purchasing and hazardous waste disclosure data, we assess 
whether facility waste management practices are linked with the type of contract award. For 
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example, US Federal Government contractors can be paid via three primary methods: a fixed-
price contract, a cost-plus contract, or an incentive contract. The last method, the incentive 
contract, links the fee for the product or service to the efficiency of the contractor; if the 
contractor is more efficient and comes in under budget, they receive a portion of the residual as 
additional profit and if they come in over budget, the contractor must pay a portion of the 
overage (FAR, 2020c). By linking the fee to the performance of the contractor, the incentive 
contract encourages cost reduction and efficient operation (Lewis & Bajari, 2014).   
Our research question is: Do US Federal contractors receiving contract awards with 
additional incentives to reduce costs have different waste management practices than contractor 
facilities without these incentives? We examine whether contractors with incentive contracts are 
different regarding the number of waste management practices implemented (measured via 
reported pollution prevention actions) than other contractors and noncontractors. One way to 
conceptualize this difference is ecological modernization theory where the government, via 
regulation and green purchasing, moves the private sector from higher to lower pollution. The 
objective of this paper is to test for an association between one method of government guidance, 
namely incentives in contracting, and more sustainable environmental performance through 
greater installation of voluntary pollution control technology. Our paper begins with a discussion 
of contracting types and connects the incentive contract to ecological modernization theory 
proposing a mechanism by why incentives in government contracting might alter activity of 
polluting facilities. Then we present our analysis using US TRI data on reported pollution 
prevention technology at privately owned contract facilities. Our paper ends with a discussion of 





US Federal Government purchasing and incentive contracts 
The three types of contracts used in the US are cost-plus, fixed-price, and incentive 
(FAR, 2020a). Cost-plus contracts are when the government agrees to pay the base price for the 
contracted goods or services plus any overage of unexpected costs; this type is used for high risk 
endeavors and for research and development (Legal Information Institute, 2020). In a fixed-price 
contract, the government pays the base price plus a fixed fee, which is the profit for the 
company; this type is used most often because it involves the least amount of upfront negotiation 
between vendors and the contracting agency, and it is ideal for most “off the shelf” purchases 
(FAR, 2020b). Finally, incentive contracts are when the government and contractor enter a cost-
sharing agreement (FAR, 2020c). The government will cover a percentage of the overage if the 
contractor is over budget; however, if the contractor comes in under budget, they may keep a 
percentage of the residual added to their fee as additional profit. The percentages are based on a 
pre-negotiated formula. The potential for additional profit “[provides] motivation for excellence 
in contract performance” (FAR, 2020c). The US Federal Government does not observe 
contractor costs, but the contractor can report a cost underrun. Cost underruns demonstrate 
efficiency, which the US Federal Government awards by sharing a portion of this underrun with 
the contractor (FAR, 2020c; McAfee, 1988). The incentive contract is designed to encourage 
efficient operation of contractors (Välilä, 2020). Understanding the differences in contract type 
can lead toward identifying ways that facilities receiving US Federal Government incentive 
contracts might be different from other recipients. 
 Public procurement focuses on “delivery of quality and timely services to citizens 
through public programs and projects” (Khan, 2018, p. 1). Cost savings and competition are the 
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primary goals of US Federal procurement policy (Edquist et al., 2015) and are the reasons why 
incentive contract options were developed (McAfee, 1988; Scherer, 1964). Incentive contracts 
balance efficiency and competitive fairness against essential contractor profitability. Incentive 
contracts result in several benefits including reduced spending costs of the US Federal 
Government and increased economic efficiency of the producer; reasons that support the 
growing advocacy of using incentive contracts (Kendall, 2014, 2015; Thomas, 2019). 
Contractors fulfilling incentive contracts might seek to lower their costs through reduction of 
material inputs, including hazardous materials, and reduction of waste that often involves costly 
management (Gray & Shadbegian, 1995). According to the US Census Bureau’s Annual Survey 
of Manufacturers, in 2018, the cost of refuse removal services (including hazardous waste) 
topped four billion dollars for chemical manufacturing and reached nearly a billion dollars each 
for the transportation, fabricated metals, and electronic products sectors (DOC, 2020). The cost 
savings of reducing material inputs, less spending on waste removal, and the earnings through 
incentives are all reasons that these types of contractors might be more environmentally efficient. 
We conceptualize the connection between economic costs and environmental impact using 
ecological modernization theory. 
 
Ecological modernization theory 
Ecological modernization theorists envision the advancement of cleaner industrial 
production through the integration of good business practices, ecological concerns, and capitalist 
practices (Mol & Sonnenfeld, 2014). Proponents find this theory plays out in highly capitalized, 
international oriented industries that face pressure from overseas markets with environmental 
consumers (Mol & Sonnenfeld, 2014). The antithesis to this argument comes from Treadmill of 
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Production theorists who argue that economic activity occurs on a never-ending conveyance of 
resources that degrades the environment (Schnaiberg et al., 2002). According to treadmill 
theorists, halting environmental degradation requires a fundamental change in the capitalist 
system (Schnaiberg, 1980). Ecological modernization theorists argue that capitalism can be 
reformed at least in part through green industrialism (Gibbs, 2006). Industrial structures and 
processes need to change while market relations and liberal democratic institutions can remain 
(Spaargaren & Mol, 1992). These ecologically modernizing transformations can arise through 
super-industrialization with support from environmentally-oriented government decision making, 
and cleaner production technology (Buttel, 2000).  
Super-industrialization, the continued expansion of economies and industries through 
increased use and integration of information systems, closed-loop systems, and dematerialization 
will lead to less resource intensive production processes (Buttel, 2000). As society and 
technology advance, competitive industries must reduce pollution and natural resource strain by 
producing more efficiently with cleaner production technology (Spaargaren & Mol, 1992). 
Huber (2004) states that the intent is not to use less but to make industrial metabolism 
compatible with natural metabolism at optimum efficiency. Implementation of technology for 
pollution prevention is a key part of industry’s progress toward an ecologically modern 
production process as this allows producers to operate with greater efficiency and reduced 
impact on the environment (Hart, 1995; Hart & Dowell, 2011).  
A moderating factor is that industrial actors are limited in their ability to implement new 
technology based on their environmental management capability; in other words, their ability to 
improve performance on environmental issues (Wong et al., 2012). Private sector 
implementation of green technology and pollution prevention can happen voluntarily but state 
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funded programs and incentives increase green technology offerings and result in increased 
implementation (Lemprière, 2016). Thus, super-industrialization leads to pollution reduction and 
as technology advances, government policy complements this advance. 
Ecological modernization includes government actors as an essential component of the 
push toward an economy with reduced environmental impact through: green purchasing  
(Hausknost, 2020; Heinrichs, 2019; Heinrichs & Laws, 2014), technical assistance 
(Bartholomew et al., 2008; Bierma & Waterstraat, 2008), grants (Galli & Fisher, 2016), 
incentives (Xie et al., 2019), and regulatory pressure (Ambec et al., 2013). Facilities may also be 
induced to implement clean technology by government oversight. Shimshack and Ward  (2005) 
found that EPA enforcement actions at one facility resulted in other facilities becoming over-
compliant. In addition, the government wants facilities to comply in order to continue operation 
and provide economic growth (Gray & Shimshack, 2011). Also, facility owners sometimes 
preemptively invest in pollution prevention technology ahead of proposed legislative or policy 
changes to give them a competitive advantage (Millimet et al., 2009). Advances in clean 
technology can also occur voluntarily by the facility (Kanashiro, 2020).  
Corporate environmental voluntarism is “voluntary management and/or process changes 
adopted by [industrial actors] to reduce or mitigate environmental impacts arising from 
manufacturing” (Press, 2007, p. 318). In the US, one law encouraging voluntary action is the 
Pollution Prevention Act (PPA) of 1990 (EPA, 2020c). Pollution prevention, as defined by the 
PPA, is “any practice that reduces, eliminates, or prevents pollution at its source, also known as 
source reduction” (EPA, 2020c). Under the PPA, any activity that is a source reduction 
undertaken at a TRI facility must be reported if the action occurs on a chemical that the TRI 
covers. Such activities include, but are not limited to, technology modifications, process 
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modifications, substitution of chemicals or component materials, and updates to inventory 
control (EPA, 2020c).  Pollution prevention is important because of its ability to reduce impacts 
on human health and save operators money on materials and waste management  by reducing the 
use of a chemical at its source (Moss, 2008; Zarker & Kerr, 2008). Pollution prevention actions 
at TRI facilities are voluntary, unless required by a different regulation, but if an action is 
undertaken, it is required that the action be reported. Though voluntary actions have been 
critiqued as “greenwashing” because there is limited accountability for industry to meet stated 
reduction targets (Ramirez Harrington, 2013), there are several examples of success (Ranson et 
al., 2015). Clelland and colleagues (2000) found that waste minimization practices have 
immediate and long-term operational benefits for facility owners. In addition, substitution of 
inputs with less toxic components can reduce hazardous waste (Johnson et al., 2008). Benefits of 
cost savings are also felt by facilities as their productivity increases because of reduced waste 
management costs associated with disposal of hazardous materials (Garcia-Marco et al., 2020). 
Other studies have found pollution prevention can result in reductions of toxic releases by up to 
50 percent per chemical (Harrington et al., 2014) and on average a reduction of 9 to 16 percent 
during the implementing year (Ranson et al., 2015).  
Gains have been made in some sectors such as automotive manufacturing (Gaona et al., 
2020). One potential problem of the PPA and other laws regulating reduction of chemical 
releases is the focus on specific media; sometimes reductions in air pollution actually result in a 
shift of pollution from air to land or water releases (Bi, 2017). Thus, successes in pollution 
prevention should be marked by reduction in total production related waste for a chemical 
(Ranson et al., 2015) and we took this consideration into account in our analyses. Super-
industrialization, role of government, and corporate voluntarism all play a role in facility-level 
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decisions to implement pollution prevention technology. Studying influences on a manufacturing 
facility’s implementation decisions regarding voluntary pollution prevention practices can 
provide valuable insights into the effectiveness of various policy tools and can contribute to 
theory and rulemaking. 
 
Research question and hypotheses 
To understand how different types of US Federal Government contract payment might be 
impacting the environment and how this is related to voluntary waste management 
implementation, we ask: Do facilities that receive incentive contracts have greater investment in 
voluntary pollution control technology than facilities that do not receive incentive contracts? We 
hypothesize that facilities fulfilling contracts with incentives for cost reduction will have more 
voluntary pollution prevention technology because they will be looking at the entirety of their 
operating costs to find ways to reduce expenditures. This will include reducing expenditures on 
material costs and waste management which can be accomplished by implementing pollution 
prevention actions. Facilities are incentivized to reduce costs to increase profits and therefore 
will increase investment to minimize or more efficiently utilize material inputs and reduce 
waste.  Capitalist actions resulting in environmental benefit is a key part of ecological 





Hazardous waste data 
 Data on hazardous waste are from the US EPA TRI for the years 2001-2017. The TRI 
includes annually reported chemical management data from qualifying facilities that manage, 
release, or otherwise use a listed chemical above a specific threshold (EPA, 2019). The database 
is mandated by the Emergency Community Planning and Right to know Act (EPCRA) and 
includes information on reported pollution prevention activities (process modifications, chemical 
substitutions, etc.) on the reported chemicals; this information is known as pollution prevention 
or P2 data. Not all TRI facilities are government contractors, so we use two other datasets to 
narrow our sample to subsectors with contractors. 
 
Facility business statistics 
 The first dataset for government contract and other facility level business statistics we use 
is the National Establishment Time Series (NETS), which is a proprietary time-series dataset 
with facility level characteristics including sales and employment for individual facilities across 
the US (Walls and Associates, 2015). The license for use of the data came with a TRI facility ID 
to Duns Number crosswalk that allowed pairing of TRI to NETS data. Merging the data results 
in a 92.7 percent match success. Researchers have shown the effectiveness of this data for 
longitudinal studies of the TRI because of its ability to provide facility-level  covariates for size 
and ownership (Berchicci et al., 2012; Collins et al., 2020; Hill et al., 2020). In addition, a field 
in the data indicates if the facility received government contracts and narrows the sample of 




Contract award data 
 The second dataset provides information on government contracts and comes from the 
US General Services Administration (GSA) public facing website USASpending.gov, which 
provides access to a time-series collection of all US Federal transactions from 2001 up to the 
present (USASpending, 2020). Data are at the award transaction level per year using the list of 
TRI facilities and their Duns Numbers, we identify the facilities that receive government 
contracts, the award amount, reported bids, number of awards, agency issuing the award, and 
green purchasing criteria included. We use transaction data from 2001 to 2012 and sum to the 
award-year level based on award ID.  
 
Sample selection and case subsectors 
 Data are merged at the facility-year level following established protocols for TRI/NETS 
data cleaning laid out by Collins et al. (2020), which includes checking for duplicate records,  to 
ensure the greatest disaggregation of data for facility level characteristics from the TRI and the 
NETS data. This yields in a dataset of 241,247 facility-year observations for all matched TRI-
contractor facilities and TRI-non contractor facilities within the same 3-digit North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS) subsector. Four subsectors are in this study: chemical 
manufacturing (NAICS 325), computer and electronic product manufacturing (NAICS 334), 
fabricated metals manufacturing (NAICS 332), and transportation manufacturing (NAICS 336). 
These subsectors are selected for the following criteria: each subsector had contractors of all 
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three types for all study years, the highest contractor-to-noncontractor ratio (see Table 1) and 
provide products to several different agencies. 
 Chemical manufacturing includes the formation of products through the transformation of 
organic and inorganic raw materials through a chemical process (EPA, 2020a). This subsector 
contains a wide variety of specialized industries from basic feedstock chemical manufacturing to 
specialized pharmaceutical manufacturers. Industries in the computer and electronic product 
manufacturing subsector includes facilities that manufacture computers, computer peripherals, 
communications equipment, and similar electronic products, and establishments that 
manufacture components for such products. The design and use of integrated circuits and the 
application of highly specialized miniaturization technologies are common elements in the 
production technologies of the computer and electronic subsector (BLS, 2020a).  This industry 
comprises sectors including semiconductor, optics, communications, and computer 
manufacturing.   
 
Table 1: Case sub-sectors and the number of facilities of each contract type. 
 Cost-plus Fixed-price Incentive No contracts 
Chemical manufacturing 13 349 16 3,034 
Fabricated metal manufacturing 11 507 15 2,942 
Computer and electronic compone
nt manufacturing 
59 364 41 1,064 
Transportation equipment manuf
acturing 
23 259 39 1,174 
Total 106 1,479 111 8,214 
 
Industries in the fabricated metal product manufacturing subsector transform metal into 
intermediate or end products, other than machinery, computers and electronics, and metal 
furniture, or treat metals and metal formed products fabricated elsewhere. Important fabricated 
metal processes are forging, stamping, bending, forming, and machining, used to shape 
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individual pieces of metal; and other processes, such as welding and assembling, used to join 
separate parts together (BLS, 2020b).  This industry comprises metal manufacturers from 
machine shops turning out nuts and bolts to wire and shipping container manufacturing. 
Industries in the transportation equipment manufacturing subsector produce equipment for 
transporting people and goods. Transportation equipment is a type of machinery. An entire 
subsector is devoted to this activity because of the significance of its economic size in all three 
North American countries. Establishments in this subsector utilize production processes like 
those of other machinery manufacturing establishments - bending, forming, welding, machining, 
and assembling metal or plastic parts into components and finished products. However, the 
assembly of components and subassemblies and their further assembly into finished vehicles 
tends to be a more common production process in this subsector than in the machinery 
manufacturing subsector (BLS, 2020c).  This industry also includes sectors including ship and 
boat building, motor vehicle manufacturing and aerospace. The final dataset contains 109,844 
facility-years and 9,910 total TRI facilities. Of these, 1,696 are contractors and 8,214 never 
receive any contracts during the study years (Table 1).  
 
Pollution prevention success indicators 
We include all pollution prevention (P2) actions reported at facilities from 2001-2012 as 
a variable for the total number of actions. We also include three additional indicators to 
determine if pollution prevention activity is successful. First, we determine whether a reduction 
in total pounds of production related waste of the chemical occurs one year after the reported 
action. We normalize the change in total production related waste using the reported production 
ratio for each chemical. The production ratio is the level of increase or decrease from the 
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previous year of the production process or activity that the chemical is used. We utilize the 
normalization formula provided by Gaona (2018) determining if a net reduction occurs at the 
facility. The reason we normalize by production ratio is because after a pollution prevention 
action occurs, production output may change at a facility changing the intensity that the chemical 
is used. Normalization controls for this potential change. The formula for a one-year reduction 
takes the following format: 





Where t is the base year when the pollution prevention action is reported, and production waste 
is the total production related waste for the chemical that the action is completed for at the 
facility. The production ratio is a chemical specific ratio. 
 Second, whether the reduction is sustained is tested by comparing the TRI pounds for the 
chemical five years after the action is implemented to see if the reduction continues. The formula 
for a five-year reduction is: 
 5 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑡 − 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑎𝑑𝑗 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑 𝑤𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑡+5 [2] 
 
Where the ratio adjusted production waste is determined by: 
 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑎𝑑𝑗 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑 𝑤𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑡+5 = (𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑡+1 ∗ … 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑡+5) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑 𝑤𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑡+5  [3] 
 
To obtain the adjusted production waste for t+5 years after a pollution prevention action, the 
cumulative product of the ratios is multiplied by the production waste t+5 years after the action 
as described by Gaona (2020). 
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Also, some reductions can be small, so to determine if an action is of greater success, 
reported actions that resulted in a 25 percent reduction or more in TRI pounds after five years are 
included as an indicator of success. The formula for calculating the 25 percent reduction is: 
 25𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 5 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − (0.25 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑡) [4] 
 
For each of the indicators, a net decrease is indicated by a negative value, and a net 
increase in production related waste is indicated by a positive value. The total number of actions 
with a net decrease for each indicator is aggregated for each facility from 2001 to 2012. Though 
data exists outside these years, we limit our analysis to this timeframe because of limitations in 
some of our data sources; USASpending data do not begin until 2001 and the NETS data version 
we use ends in 2012. To test for reductions, we include data from 2013 to 2017; pollution 
prevention actions reported from during this later period are not included in the sample.  
 
Covariates 
 Several covariates are included to control for different predictors of facility 
environmental activity. Contractor characteristics from USA Spending (USASpending, 2020) 
include the agency that issued the contract; in this case we used a bivariate dummy variable for 
Department of Defense (DOD) contractors or non-DOD as defense contracts sometimes come 
with exemptions to meeting environmental statutes in the US (Legal Information Institute, 2019). 
We also use the average number of bidders each facility competed against for awards received 
from 2001-2012 as a proxy for competition.  
From the NETS data we include both corporation size and facility size. Corporation size, 
which has been observed to impact a facility’s environmental activity (Wong et al., 2012), is 
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measured as the number of establishments that report the same parent company as the facility 
(see Lenox and Nash, 2003; Lannelongue et al., 2015 for studies using the same metric). Number 
of establishments owned by the managing firm is also indicative of corporation complexity 
which is an important component in understanding firm activity, coordination among owned 
plants, and environmental performance (Perrow, 1986; Prechel et al., 2016). Our data include 
5,287 facilities with parent companies and 4,623 facilities that are single firm facilities. 
Sensitivity analysis is conducted to test if there are differences between these two groups. 
Facility size, also associated with management of pollution (Maung et al., 2016), is measured 
from two variables: log adjusted average annual sales and log adjusted average employment per 
facility, each from 2001-2012. We determined to use both variables because each measure 
something slightly different about facility size. Sales is a good indicator for ability to implement 
pollution prevention, while employment average also serves as an estimate of labor costs and 
potential of hazardous exposure to workers. Both variables might influence firm decisions to 
implement pollution control technology. Also, while these variables are correlated with one 
another, they were not correlated in ways that negatively impacted model estimation with a 
variance inflation factor (VIF) of 3.43 for sales and 3.32 for employment. Both were below the 
threshold of 10 indicating no multicollinearity issues with the models so each is included in each 
model. 
A variable for the number of years each facility reported information is determined based 
on the number of years the facility reported as “open” to the NETS data, which goes back to 
1989. This variable indicates which facilities have been reporting longer and therefore may have 
adopted more pollution control technology during the study years. Ownership type has also been 
shown to be related to facility environmental activity  (Sampson & Zhou, 2018; Wang & Jin, 
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2007) and we include bivariate variables for whether the facility is publicly or privately owned 
as well as one for foreign ownership status.  
In addition, two green purchasing covariates are included from the USA Spending data. 
The first is the average annual proportion of contract dollars from 2001-2012 that the facility 
receives that require use of EPA designated products. EPA publishes a list of products that 
awarding agencies may require the vendor to use when they fulfill the award and include things 
like using recycled paper and Energy Star products (EPA, 2020c). The second variable is the 
average proportion of annual award dollars from 2001-2012 and that also include clauses for 
sustainability. This variable indicates whether the award includes certain requirements for 
resource conservation and recovery minimizing waste and other hazardous materials.  
 Covariates are also from the Enforcement and Compliance History Online (ECHO). 
These include whether the facility is reported to be releasing discharges in impaired waterways. 
Also, we include an indicator for if the facility is an EJScreen facility, which indicates the 
facility is in a block group of the 80th or higher national percentile of one of the primary 
environmental justice indexes of EJScreen, EPA’s screening tool for environmental justice 
(EPA, 2020b). We also include whether the facility is within ten miles of a Native American 
tribe, and the number of inspections the facility had during the time frame. The EJScreen and 
tribal proximity variables are included because research in the field of environmental justice has 
shown that facilities that release the most toxic waste tend to be in the most poor and vulnerable 
communities (Collins et al., 2016; Mohai et al., 2009) and that Native American lands face 
disproportionate impact from hazardous waste and defense contractors (Hooks & Smith, 2004). 
Therefore, inclusion here aids in determining the relative contribution of all predictor variables 
on a facility’s pollution prevention activity as well as how US Federal purchasing might be 
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linked to community health and well-being. Lastly, a covariate for the number of chemicals 
reported is included to control for the greater likelihood of a facility reporting actions with the 
more chemicals that they manage. Descriptive statistics for all quantitative variables grouped by 
contract type are listed along with counts of factor variables are included in Appendix A. 
 
Statistical analyses 
 A generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) is fit to the data for each of the four 
dependent variables: total number of P2 actions, number of years with a P2 action that resulted in 
a decrease in net production related waste within one year, number of P2 actions that resulted in 
reduction after five years, and number of actions that resulted in a 25 percent or more reduction 
after five years. The data are over-dispersed with the variance being much higher than the mean 
violating the assumption of a traditional Poisson regression and so we used a quasi-Poisson 
model. The model statement is: 
 𝑌𝑡𝑖~ 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑠𝑖 − 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛(𝑿𝑡𝑖𝜷𝑡𝑖 + 𝜽𝑡 +  𝜀 ) [5] 
 
Where Y is an integer response variable for the ith observation (facility) for each t subsector. 𝑿𝑡𝑖 
is the matrix of predictors for each i facility in each t subsector. 𝜷𝑡𝑖 is the vector of coefficients 
for each i facility in each t subsector. 𝜽𝑡 is the vector of random intercepts for each subsector t. ε 
denotes the error term. 
 The models are fit using a top-down approach fitting a full model first. Fixed effects for 
bivariate dummy variables are included for contract type. Our models include both contractors 
and non-contractors. We also test for influential points and goodness of fit. We fit the models 
excluding outliers and coefficient estimates did not change significantly. Lastly, we conducted a 
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post-hoc test comparing the estimated marginal means for the interaction of contract type and 
subsector in a generalized linear model where we remove the random intercept for subsector and 
replace it with subsector as a fixed effect. We compare the contrasts of the estimated marginal 
means using the Tukey HSD method from the “emmeans” R package (Lenth, 2020). This also 
allows for comparison between contract types within subsector. We conducted all analyses using 
R statistical software version 4.0.0 (R Core Team, 2020). Models are fit using the “lme4” 




Pollution prevention and contract type 
         Over time, all subsectors are declining in the total number of TRI facilities per year 
(Figure 3). While facilities with government contracts are a small subset of total subsector 
facilities, the number of TRI facilities that are contractors has stayed relatively constant (Figure 
4). In addition, total pollution prevention actions are declining over time in the subsectors along 
the same pattern as the decline in number of facilities except for computer and electronic 
component manufacturing that has steady reporting of actions (Figure 5). Contractors also report 
a steady number of pollution prevention actions per year with increased reporting over time in 
computer and electronic products manufacturing (Figure 6). In addition, incentive contractors are 
reporting a larger number of overall actions in computer and electronic product manufacturing, 
and in transportation manufacturing relative to the total number of facilities in those subsectors 
(Figures 4 and 6). This suggests an association between incentive contractors and their pollution 





Figure 3: Number of facilities over time by subsector. There has been a decline in number of 
TRI facilities reporting each year. 
 
Figure 4:Number of contractors over time. Fixed-price contractors are the most common type in 
each subsector and in general, the number of contractors per year is stable. 
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Figure 5:Number of pollution prevention actions reported each year. There has been a decline in 
total reporting for the subsectors studied except for computer and electronic component 
manufacturing that only began to decline more recently. 
     
 
Figure 6: Number of pollution prevention by contractors over time. Reporting of actions by 
contractors has been stable with incentive contractors reporting a large proportion of total actions 
in both computer and electronic product manufacturing and transportation manufacturing.  
 
Sensitivity tests revealed no outliers, constant error variance, and no multicollinearity 
with no predictors with a variance inflation factor above 10. No significant differences were 
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observed between single facility firms or multi-facility firms, so all data are included in the 
model. We find support for greater reporting of pollution prevention by incentive contract 
awardees in our GLMM results. We find that if a facility receives incentive contracts, they report 
2.85 times as many actions (β = 0.822, p <0.001) as non-contractors from 2001 to 2012 (Figure 
7) and this result is statistically significant (Table 2). Facilities that receive incentive contracts 
are 2.17 times (β = 0.773, p <0.01) more likely than non-contractors to report actions with a net 
reduction in production related waste of the chemical after one year (Figure 7) and this result is 
statistically significant (Table 2). Incentive contractors also report 1.96 times (β = 0.675, p < 
0.05) as many actions as noncontractors that have sustained net reductions after five years and 
they report 1.99 times (β = 0.690, p < 0.05) as many actions that have net reductions of 25 
percent or more after five years (Figure 7). These results are also statistically significant (Table 
3). 
For the other contract types, we find that cost-plus contractors on average report 1.58 
times (β = 0.463, p <0.05) as many pollution prevention actions as noncontractors (Figure 7) but 
the effect is not as strong as for incentive contractors (Table 2). In addition, cost-plus contractors 
report more actions that achieve net reductions after five years but not more actions with 
reductions one year later (Figure 7). We do not find that fixed-price contractors report 
significantly more or less pollution prevention actions than noncontractors for any of the 




Figure 7: GLMM results for all four models. Incentive contractors tend to report more actions 
overall and more successful actions after one year, five years, and actions with a twenty-five 
percent reduction or greater after five years than non-contractors. The effect is also stronger than 
for fixed price contracts.  
Covariates 
         We also find that several facility level predictors besides contract type are associated with 
variation in pollution prevention reporting from 2001 to 2012. If a facility receives contracts 
from the Department of Defense, we find that they report on average 43.8 percent (β = -0.575, p 
<0.05) fewer pollution prevention actions than non-DOD facilities with a net reduction of 25 






For facility size, average sales do not have any significant association with pollution 
prevention reporting, however, average employment does with a greater number of employees 
being associated with greater number of pollution prevention actions and more successful actions 
(Figure 7, Tables 2 and 3). Corporation size and complexity is associated with reduced reporting 
of pollution prevention actions that are successful after five years; with each additional 
Table 2: Model results for GLMM for total pollution prevention actions, and number of years 
with a net reduction in production related waste one year after reporting pollution prevention.  
 
 Total actions 1 yr reduction  
Estimate z value 95% CI Estimate z value 95% CI 
Intercept -0.361 -0.611 (-1.518,0.796) -1.268 -1.951 (-2.542,0.006). 
Incentive 0.822 4.231 (0.441,1.202) *** 0.773 2.732 (0.219,1.328) ** 
Cost-plus 0.463 1.979 (0.004,0.921) * 0.438 1.314 (-0.215,1.091)  
Fixed-price 0.127 1.480 (-0.041,0.295) 0.182 1.510 (-0.054,0.418)  
Mean bids 0.003 0.151 (-0.041,0.048) 0.012 0.437 (-0.042,0.065)  
DOD contractor -0.300 -1.403 (-0.72,0.119) -0.391 -1.261 (-0.998,0.217)  
Corporation size 
and complexity 
-0.003 -0.939 (-0.01,0.004) -0.012 -1.564 (-0.027,0.003)  
Mean sales 0.022 0.679 (-0.041,0.084) -0.010 -0.223 (-0.097,0.077)  
Mean 
employment 
0.139 3.541 (0.062,0.216) *** 0.185 3.300 (0.075,0.295) ** 
Corporate 
ownership 
-0.096 -1.480 (-0.223,0.031) -0.096 -1.010 (-0.281,0.09)  
Foreign owned 0.034 0.473 (-0.108,0.177) 0.091 0.854 (-0.117,0.299)  
Number of 
reporting years 




0.598 3.015 (0.209,0.986) ** 0.425 1.511 (-0.126,0.977)  
Proportion EPA 
required 
-0.410 -1.925 (-0.827,0.007). -0.294 -0.964 (-0.892,0.304)  
Impaired water 0.072 0.850 (-0.094,0.238) 0.221 1.852 (-0.013,0.455). 
EJScreen -0.108 -1.967 (-0.216,0) * -0.046 -0.571 (-0.202,0.111)  
Tribe proximity 0.148 2.183 (0.015,0.281) * 0.172 1.765 (-0.019,0.364). 
Number of 
chemicals 
0.003 17.606 (0.002,0.003) *** 0.003 11.909 (0.002,0.003) *** 
Inspections 0.027 4.186 (0.014,0.039) *** 0.032 3.443 (0.014,0.05) ** 
Overdispersion 
parameter 
21.333   15.588   
AIC 93662.396   42403.959   
BIC 93806.420   42547.983   
n 9910.000   9910.000   
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establishment owned by the corporation, the facility reports 1.7% fewer actions with a 25 percent 
reduction after 5 years (β = -0.018, p<0.05). Number of reporting years is also associated with 
more pollution prevention reporting; with each additional year a facility is operating, they report  
1.5 percent more actions (β = 0.015, p<0.01) (Figure 7). Older facilities also report 2.1 percent (β 
= 0.021, p <0.05) more actions with a net reduction after one year (Table 2) and 2.4 percent (β = 
0.024, p <0.05) more actions that have sustained reductions over five years for each additional 
year they have been reporting (Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Model results for GLMM for pollution prevention actions with a reduction after 5 
years and for actions with a reduction of 25 percent or more.  
5yr reduction 25 percent reduction  
Estimate z value 95% CI Estimate z value 95% CI 
Intercept -1.739 -1.649 (-3.806,0.328). -1.947 -2.231 (-3.658, -0.237) * 
Incentive 0.675 2.144 (0.058,1.293) * 0.690 2.580 (0.166,1.214) ** 
Cost-plus 0.650 1.970 (0.003,1.297) * 0.734 2.722 (0.206,1.263) ** 
Fixed-price 0.138 0.986 (-0.136,0.412)  0.124 1.013 (-0.116,0.364)  
Mean bids 0.013 0.447 (-0.043,0.068)  0.008 0.302 (-0.043,0.058)  
DOD contractor -0.609 -1.795 (-1.273,0.056). -0.575 -1.993 (-1.14, -0.01) * 
Corporation size 
and complexity 
-0.019 -1.843 (-0.039,0.001). -0.018 -2.032 (-0.035, -0.001) * 
Mean sales -0.015 -0.292 (-0.114,0.085)  -0.002 -0.043 (-0.088,0.085)  
Mean 
employment 
0.240 3.678 (0.112,0.367) *** 0.213 3.786 (0.103,0.323) *** 
Corporate 
ownership 
-0.178 -1.589 (-0.398,0.042)  -0.146 -1.514 (-0.336,0.043)  
Foreign owned 0.094 0.751 (-0.151,0.339)  0.184 1.742 (-0.023,0.392). 
Number of 
reporting years 




0.681 2.190 (0.072,1.291) * 0.717 2.726 (0.202,1.233) ** 
Proportion EPA 
required 
-0.227 -0.683 (-0.88,0.425)  -0.218 -0.763 (-0.778,0.342)  
Impaired water 0.323 2.333 (0.052,0.595) * 0.088 0.677 (-0.167,0.344)  
EJScreen -0.091 -0.959 (-0.276,0.095)  -0.137 -1.670 (-0.299,0.024). 
Tribe proximity 0.265 2.402 (0.049,0.481) * 0.249 2.617 (0.063,0.435) ** 
Number of 
chemicals 
0.003 10.549 (0.002,0.003) *** 0.003 11.880 (0.002,0.003) *** 
Inspections 0.041 3.960 (0.021,0.061) *** 0.040 4.390 (0.022,0.058) *** 
Overdispersion 
parameter 
17.577   9.822   
AIC 39947.902   30400.432   
BIC 40091.926   30544.456   
n 9910.000   9910.000   
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Of our green purchasing variables, greater award proportion including sustainability 
criteria does result in more reporting of actions overall, more actions with a reduction after 5 
years, and more pollution prevention actions with a 25 percent net reduction after five years 
(Figure 7). For each additional percentage of contract dollars that includes sustainability criteria, 
a facility reports 82 percent (β =0.98, p<0.05) more pollution prevention actions that are 
successful after five years (Table 3). The proportion of award dollars that require use of EPA 
designated products is not associated with reporting more successful pollution prevention actions 
(Figure 7).  
While we do find an association between EJScreen facilities and reduced reporting of 
pollution prevention actions with EJScreen facilities reporting 10.3% fewer actions than non-
EJScreen facilities (β =-0.108, p < 0.05). There is no difference found for the effectiveness of 
actions 1 year and 5 years after reporting, but EJScreen facilities report 12% fewer actions with a 
25% reduction or more after 5 years and this estimate is moderately significant at α = 0.1 (β = -
0.137, p <0.1). Facilities that report more chemicals report more pollution prevention actions 
(Figure 7) and more successful actions (Table 2). Lastly, facilities that are inspected more often 
report more actions and more successful actions (Figure 7) and this association is statistically 
significant at α = 0.05 for all our models (Tables 2 and 3). For each additional inspection, a 
facility reports 2.7 percent (β = 0.027, p <0.001) more pollution prevention actions (Table 2) and 
3.25 percent (β = 0.032, p<0.01) more actions that result in net reductions in production related 
waste in their first year (Table 2). In addition, for each additional inspection, a facility reports 4.2 
percent (β = 0.041, p<0.001) more actions that resulted in a net reduction after five years (Table 
3) and 4.1 percent (β = 0.04, p<0.001) more actions that resulted in a net decrease of 25 percent 




In chemical manufacturing, these facilities are most often awarded fixed-price contracts 
for paint, dope, varnish and related products, preservative and sealing compounds, laboratory 
equipment and supplies as well as drugs and biologicals. Cost-plus contracts are most often 
awarded to research and development as well as exploratory biomedical and fuel products. In 
addition, results of the post-hoc marginal mean comparison for the interaction of subsector and 
contract type show no significant difference between type of contract and number of actions or 
number of successful actions reported in this subsector (Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8: Results for the interaction of contract type and subsector. Significant differences in the 
reporting of pollution prevention are observed in computer and electronic products 
manufacturing and transportation manufacturing with incentive contractors reporting more 
pollution prevention.  No significant association is observed in the chemical manufacturing or 




In computer and electronic product manufacturing, these facilities have most often 
awarded US Federal fixed-price contracts to produce communication equipment and antennas, 
laboratory equipment, and electrical connectors. Incentive contracts tend to focus on more 
service-oriented contracts for engineering support and development of high-tech aircraft, 
nautical, and spaceflight equipment.  Cost-plus contracts are most awarded to research and 
development as well as exploratory products. Results of the marginal mean comparison show 
that compared to noncontractors, incentive contractors report 3.46 times as many actions as 
noncontractors, (marginal mean =  1.242, p <0.05), 3.62 times as many  actions that are 
successful after one year (marginal mean = 1.287, p <0.05), 3.66 times as many actions  that are 
successful after five years (marginal mean = 1.305, p <0.05), and 3.32 times as many actions that 
achieve a 25 percent or greater reduction after five years (marginal mean = 1.200, , p <0.05)  
(Figure 8). Fixed-price contractors report half (54.7 percent, marginal mean = -0.791, p <0.05) as 
many actions and half as many (55.2 percent, marginal mean = -0.804, p <0.05) actions with a 
reduction of 25 percent or more after five years in this subsector than incentive contractors, 
however, no significant difference in reporting is evident between cost-plus and incentive 
contractors (Figure 8). In addition, as labor costs rise for this subsector, more pollution 
prevention is implemented and incentive contractors on average report increasingly more actions 
(Figure 9). 
In fabricated metal manufacturing, these facilities are awarded US Federal fixed-price 
contracts to produce bearings, hand tools, ammunition, and guns. The production of nuclear 
reactors comprises 90 out of 113 incentive contracts in this sector. Cost-plus contracts are 
awarded for research and development. Fabricated metal manufacturing exhibit slight association 
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between incentive contractors and greater reporting of total pollution prevention actions (Figure 
9), however, no significant difference in reporting of successful actions is observed (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 9: Marginal pairwise outcomes for number of P2 actions within each sector. As 
employment increases, more P2 is implemented with incentive contractors more likely to report 
more P2. The association is strongest in computer and electronic product manufacturing and 
transportation manufacturing subsectors. 
 
In transportation manufacturing, these facilities are awarded US Federal fixed-price 
contracts to produce components for aircraft, vehicles, and engines. Incentive contracts tend to 
focus on the production and repair of destroyers, submarines, and aircraft carriers. Cost-plus 
contracts focus on research and development products as well as engineering and technical 
services. Results of the marginal mean comparison show that compared to noncontractors, 
incentive contractors report 2.44 times as many pollution prevention actions (marginal mean = 
0.893, p <0.05), and 2.31 times as many actions with a net reduction after one year in this 
subsector (marginal mean = 0.841, p <0.05). Fixed-price contractors report half as many (49.5 
percent, marginal mean = -0.703, p <0.05) total actions than incentive contractors with no 
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difference in number of successful actions reported at α = 0.05 in this subsector (Figure 8). 
Lastly, this subsector also exhibits greater pollution prevention implementation as labor costs 
increase with incentive contractors also implementing more actions than other facilities of 
similar size (Figure 9). 
 
Discussion 
Our analysis indicates that US Federal contract payment method does influence 
sustainable manufacturing practices. In two of the four manufacturing subsectors, facilities 
respond to incentives contracts, in part, with pollution prevention strategies. Incentive 
contractors report on average more than two actions for every action reported by noncontractors 
and, within computer and electronic products manufacturing, report more than three actions for 
every action reported by noncontractors and two actions for every one reported by fixed-price 
contractors, holding all other variables constant. Within transportation manufacturing, incentive 
contractors report more than two actions for every one reported by noncontractors. These results 
suggest that manufacturing facilities with US Federal incentive contracts work harder to address 
hazardous waste through technological innovation. Incentive contractors are implementing more 
pollution prevention actions than fixed-price recipients and noncontractors suggesting that the 
difference might be linked to the added cost incentives built into the contracts.  
Ecological modernization theorists argue that when waste is reduced there are economic 
and environmental benefits including cuts in production and waste costs, and reduction in 
hazards associated with waste disposal (Gibbs, 2006; Mol & Sonnenfeld, 2014). US Federal 
incentive contracts focus on production costs when the contract is negotiated, and the results in 
our study suggest that facilities with incentives to reduce costs might be looking at their 
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hazardous material inputs and waste on top of other factors when determining ways to reduce 
expenses. This is akin to how green taxes can lead to positive environmental outcomes 
(Andersen 1999) and how government can encourage technological advancement (Huber 2004). 
In addition, actions reported by incentive contractors are more likely to be successful at reducing 
hazardous waste of the chemical in the years following. Overall, incentive contractors on average 
report nearly two (Figure 7) pollution prevention actions for every action reported by 
noncontractors with reductions of 25 percent or more. In computer and electronic product 
manufacturing, this value increases to more than three actions for every one reported by 
noncontractors and more than two for every action reported by fixed-price contractors. 
Further, our finding that defense contractors report fewer pollution prevention actions 
might be a signal that the special treatment that defense contractors receive under various US 
Federal regulations including exemptions for environmental statutes (Ramos et al., 2007; Zippel, 
2013) is hampering the potential advancement that could be made through environmental 
innovation that we saw in the incentive contractors. Our findings for facility size support 
concepts of economies of scale being related to technology advancement regarding pollution 
prevention. Also, the finding that facilities employing more people are correlated with greater 
pollution prevention could indicate that facilities with higher labor costs are implementing more 
P2 to reduce operating costs (Figure 9). In addition, our findings facility reporting years indicate 
that facilities operating longer report more pollution prevention actions. The finding could be 
indicative of mechanization of industry and the modernization of technology at TRI facilities as 




We also find evidence that TRI facilities that are contractors and receive awards with 
sustainability criteria report more pollution prevention actions. There could be a coordinated 
impact of combining incentive contracting and green purchasing by US Federal agencies; 
looking more closely at how these two interact could benefit green purchasing policies going 
forward and enhance our understanding of how government can play an active role in ecological 
modernization (Heinrichs & Laws, 2014). Our finding for EJScreen facilities doing potentially 
fewer pollution prevention actions is concerning, and these facilities should be encouraged to do 
more pollution prevention to reduce their impact on vulnerable communities. Incentive 
contracting might be a way to move these facilities from extensive hazardous material inputs and 
waste toward better performance. Finally, the role of government oversight continues to play an 
important role in encouraging facilities toward voluntary reduction as we also find that more 
inspections lead to greater pollution prevention (Gray & Shimshack, 2011).  
         When looking within subsectors, we find that the association between type of 
government procurement contract and pollution prevention reporting is strongest for computer 
and electronic product manufacturing and transportation manufacturing. We do not find any 
association between contract type and pollution prevention within the subsector chemical 
manufacturing and only weak association with fabricated metal manufacturing. The lack of 
association within chemical manufacturing may be related to the products they produce that are 
largely not end-use products but rather components and inputs for other manufacturers to use. 
This suggests a few possibilities including that incentive contracts do not have the same effect in 
each subsector. Another possibility is that there are simply not enough incentive contracts 
utilized in these subsectors for a significant difference to be seen in pollution prevention 
reporting. Incentive contracts are used infrequently and recipients of fixed-price contracts, which 
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are the dominant form of procurement in the US, report fewer actions than incentive contractors 
in computer and electronic product manufacturing and transportation manufacturing. Dominant 
use of fixed-price purchasing, which has no significant association with greater reporting of 
pollution prevention, combined with exemptions or reduced green purchasing could lead to 
fixed-price contractors having more intensive use of hazardous material inputs. The results of 
this study offer support for calls to increase the use of incentive contracts (Kendall, 2015; Lewis 
& Bajari, 2014) because in addition to saving taxpayer dollars, there are potential environmental 
benefits to this method of procurement in line with sustainable consumption goals of policy 
(Hausknost, 2020) both in the US and elsewhere. 
         There are a few limitations to our study and the extent that the results can be generalized. 
Incentive contracts, as mentioned above, are used far less frequently than fixed-price contracts. 
The contracts we include in this analysis for the incentive type represent all that could be 
obtained to match a TRI facility ID from 2001 to 2012 and are a subset of all contractors and all 
TRI facilities. This does not lessen the significance of the findings but does put into perspective 
the fact that the study results characterize a small portion of US Federal contractor TRI facilities 
(6.25 percent of our sampled contract facilities are incentive contractors). Future studies might 
look solely at fixed-price purchases to deduce differences relevant to environmental US Federal 
purchasing. In addition, the results we find are most relevant to the four subsectors that are 
included and may not translate to other subsectors.  
The lack of a significant association between type of contract and pollution prevention in 
chemical manufacturing and fabricated metal manufacturing is possibly because there are too 
few incentive contracts issued to TRI facilities in those subsectors during the years to deduce an 
effect. Future research might seek to use simulation modelling to test for differences between 
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smaller subsectors, or perhaps group facilities with different indexes such as Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes. 
The TRI does not cover all facilities or all contractors; therefore, the associations we find 
are most relevant to TRI qualifying facilities. Generalization beyond TRI facilities is discouraged 
until similar associations can be tested. Synthesizing the contract spending data with other public 
databases like the US National Emissions Inventory (NEI) could expand this area of research to 
include smaller facilities and other pollutants.  
The findings might not translate to other technologies or environmental policies such as 
the Clean Air or Clean Water Acts (CAA and CWA), but associations between contracting and 
these other laws should be examined in the future. Also, the pollution prevention actions we 
study were all undertaken voluntarily while the CAA and CWA rely on technology standards so 
research designs seeking to test for similar effects should be modified appropriately. 
Lastly, pollution prevention reporting is voluntary and there might be underreporting 
because of the lack of enforcement for reporting pollution prevention actions through the TRI 
program. It is also possible that incentive contractors are better at reporting their environmental 
activity and is in line with their goals of securing future incentive contracts. More in-depth 
qualitative studies of contractors might help illuminate this and other possibilities.      
 
Conclusion 
         Our study has three primary conclusions. When incentivized by US Federal Government 
procurement contracts, manufacturing facilities are increasing their efficiency by implementing 
more pollution prevention technology. These sustainable upgrades are reported more frequently 
by contractors that have received US Federal incentive-type awards. The awards incentivize 
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manufacturers to save on material input costs and waste management leading to lower operating 
costs and higher incentive bonus earnings. The incentive motivates the additional work by these 
facilities so that they can increase their profitability with marginal reductions in costs; because of 
the incentive bonus, the marginal savings are higher as the bonus is added to the return on 
investment of the pollution prevention technology. These facilities save on waste management, 
reduced material costs, and receive a bonus from the US Federal Government for excellent 
performance making it a triple win for these facilities. Incentives in government contracting are 
correlated with the performance of contract recipients. These incentives encourage contractors to 
lower their costs and are associated with increased implementation of successful waste 
management practices, potentially leading to higher production efficiency.  
Second, results from this study support key concepts of ecological modernization theory 
including that governmental policy can guide industry toward positive environmental activity via 
incentives. This study provides evidence that industry, responding to government policies to 
incentivize greener performance, can achieve reduced material inputs and reduced waste while 
also meeting production demands, and that positive environmental action is complementary to 
financial performance. In addition, sustainable consumption by US Federal agencies can have 
important benefits and if combined with incentive contracting, there could be continued 
reductions in hazardous waste.  
Finally, voluntary pollution prevention, when linked to incentives, leads to more 
successful actions being implemented even if those incentives are not tied to the pollution 
prevention actions themselves, but rather to the entire operating costs of the facility. Our findings 
support the continued expansion of US Federal Government incentive contracting to move 
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manufacturing toward better economic and environmental performance while also fulfilling the 
procurement needs of government agencies. 
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Chapter 3: Linking Toxic Waste Releases Along the Defense Contractor Supply Chain: US 
Federal Spending as a Contributing Factor to Industrial Pollution Releases, 2001-20122 
 
Abstract: By connecting United States public and private data on manufacturers and public 
procurement, hazardous releases can be linked to a Federal agencies’ purchasing from these 
facilities. These data can then help identify agencies that could benefit from expanded green 
purchasing requirements and agencies that may be leading the way. Using Pierre Bourdieu’s 
concept of habitus to help understand how decisions are made using lived experience and 
perception of what is necessary, we examine how exemptions to following green purchasing 
guidelines that have been granted to defense agencies might lead to disproportionately high 
hazardous releases in comparison to other agencies. We link industrial facility characteristics to 
variation in pollution production with defense contractors’ pollution declining at significantly 
slower rates than other contractors. Results can inform new guidance for procurement and 
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The United States (US) Federal Government and its constituent agencies procure 
products and services worth billions of dollars annually and current procurement guidelines 
encouraging environmentally preferred or green purchasing practices. These guidelines 
recommend procurement from entities that have lower toxic chemical content, greener products 
(e.g. recycled materials), and more sustainable business practices (Manuel & Halchin, 2013). 
The US Federal Acquisitions Regulation (FAR) is the guidance that regulates US Federal agency 
purchasing. The FAR clearly states that agencies “shall advance sustainable acquisition by 
ensuring that 95 percent of new contract actions … are …environmentally preferable” (US 
Federal Acquisition Regulation Subpart 23, 2021, pp. 23.1-1). Each update to the FAR, via 
executive order, has granted agency heads the authority to exempt purchases from complying 
with the new green purchasing standards. Agencies that most commonly receive such 
exemptions include those engaged in law enforcement, military, and defense acquisitions. 
Exemptions are typically in response to fears that green purchasing would hamper the ability of 
agencies, such as the Department of Defense (DOD), to fulfill their stated mission and maintain a 
ready stance (Ramos et al., 2007; Reno, 2020; Zippel, 2013).  
We argue that continuing to grant exemptions to defense agencies from following new 
environmental purchasing standards is an example of habitus, a concept articulated by Pierre 
Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1971). Habitus is the idea that what organizations (and individuals) do over 
time is replicated and reified until it becomes routine and is undertaken without question nor 
consideration of its roots. Continuing to exempt agencies from following new policies for green 
purchasing has created a procurement trend where the same firms are awarded contracts, rather 
than seeking out new vendors that might be able to provide the same or a better product with 
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lower toxic chemical content. Firms win awards and if they are in manufacturing industries, they 
complete the production process at facilities they own. For clarity, when we refer to the firm, we 
are discussing the company that owns manufacturing facilities, and when we refer to the facility 
it is in the context of the physical location where production occurs. In addition, with each new 
update to the FAR, exemptions for these same agencies were included (Brookhaven National 
Laboratory, 2020) despite evidence that defense and military operations are linked to the greatest 
production of environmental harm (Hooks & Smith, 2005; Jorgenson & Clark, 2009). 
Continuing to offer exemptions to defense agencies, a policy guideline we will argue has become 
habitus, could be resulting in different environmental performance at firms awarded defense 
contracts (hereafter contractors).  
Herein, we answer the following research question: Do firms with facilities that fulfill US 
Federal Government contracts from agencies exempt from green purchasing (e.g., the DOD) 
have greater hazardous waste releases than counterpart contractor facilities? We examine this 
issue empirically linking US Federal Government contracts to the facilities that receive those 
contracts, and then linking those facilities’ toxic pollution releases back to the US Federal 
agencies that issued the award. This is the first step toward linking the hazardous waste released 
during the manufacture of products to US Federal agencies that procured those goods where 
environmental pollution is variable. We have two objectives. The first is to connect Bourdieu’s 
concept of habitus to elaborate upon the reasons for environmental disproportionality. 
Disproportionality is the continuing observation that environmental rights and resources are not 
distributed equally and we explain further below (Freudenburg, 2005). The second objective is to 
determine what facility level factors contribute to variation in releases at contractor facilities and 
if defense contractors’ releases were higher than non-defense contractors. 
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We begin with a review of the relevant policies and guidelines for procurement in the US. 
We then connect these policies, particularly the exemptions granted to defense agencies, to 
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus. We link the continued decision to exempt some agency awards 
from following new standards to current scholarship on environmental disproportionality 
(Collins et al., 2020; Freudenburg, 2005; Galli Robertson & Collins, 2019) to understand 
observed disproportionality by the DOD and how that is connected to US Federal agency 
purchasing. We assess the variation in defense contractor releases by comparing them to other 
contractor facilities during the years 2001 to 2012. We connect the results of our empirical 
investigation to the idea of habitus, identify avenues for change in both US Federal procurement 
methods and policy, and present ideas for further research to understand disproportionality.  
 
Review of relevant literature 
 To understand the state of procurement during the study years, 2001 to 2012, we review 
the policies governing US Federal purchasing with specific attention to the policies granting 
exemption to defense agencies. The continued granting of exemptions over multiple 
administrations and new policy directives is an example of habitus in US Federal contracting 
policy that Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1971, 1977) describes as default action of individuals that relies 
on experiential knowledge to make decisions when new guidance is not available. The continued 
exemption of agencies from following green purchasing guidelines might be leading to 
disproportionate patterns in environmental pollution linked to exempt agencies than non-exempt. 
US Federal purchasing policy, the concept of habitus, its connection to disproportionality, and 




US Defense procurement policy and green purchasing 
 Defense contracting is an enormous domestic industry in the US making up most of 
discretionary spending with an annual budget that continues to increase (Audet, 2001; Carril & 
Duggan, 2020). Purchasing in the US is governed by the FAR, a set of policies guiding 
purchasing by US Federal agencies, which has undergone modification with regards to green 
purchasing including with Executive Order 13101 signed by President Clinton in 1998. 
Executive Order 13101 included guidance for reducing use of chemicals and toxic waste as well 
as implementation of environmental management systems within US Federal agencies 
(Executive Order 13101 - Greening the Government Through Waste Prevention, Recylcing, and 
US Federal Acquisition, 1998). Further updates were signed by President Bush in 2007 
(Executive Order 13423 - Strengthening US Federal Environmental, Energy, and Transportation 
Management, 2007) and President Obama in 2009 (Executive Order 13514 - US Federal 
Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Perfomance, 2009) with guidance to make 
purchasing more sustainable including purchasing less-toxic products (Brookhaven National 
Laboratory, 2020). Each executive order included new purchasing exceptions for military 
spending and the ability for agencies engaged in defense and law enforcement to request 
exemption from the policy. 
The FAR, which these executive orders updated, covers green purchasing under Part 23 
and includes three sections where military and defense agencies can obtain exemption. The first 
is under Subpart 23.104 - Sustainable Acquisition Policy – Exceptions; here purchase of weapon 
systems are specifically excluded from this policy (US Federal Acquisition Regulation Subpart 
23, 2021). The second section is also under Subpart 23.105 - Exemption Authority; here the head 
of an agency may grant exemption to: “intelligence activities…law enforcement 
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activities…military tactical vehicle fleets…[and] agency activities and facilities in the interest of 
national security” (US Federal Acquisition Regulation Subpart 23, 2021). The last exemption is 
under Subpart 23.4 – Use of Recovered Materials and Biobased Products and it states that the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) may provide categorical exemption to military vehicles 
from being covered under this policy (US Federal Acquisition Regulation Subpart 23, 2021). 
With broad exemption authority granted to agency heads and specific exception to defense 
purchases, these exemptions may be preventing green purchasing from having the desired impact 
because defense spending makes up two-thirds of all contract expenditure by the US Federal 
Government (Carril & Duggan, 2020). Defense procurement occurs primarily through contracts 
that are competed through submission of bid proposals where the contract is awarded to the 
lowest bid for government cost-savings purposes (Edquist et al., 2015; Khan, 2018). Despite this 
goal, competition generally has fallen short of expectations. 
Competition between vendors has been declining in the US, with bidding participation 
falling in recent years. Fewer and fewer firms are competing for the increasing defense budget 
(Carril & Duggan, 2020; Kendall, 2015). Therefore, the same contractors continue to win the 
DOD contracts and procurement officials are increasingly reliant on contractors with offices 
located in Washington, D.C. (Hiatt and Kim 2018). The lack of diversity in any industry has long 
been associated with stagnations in innovation (Ambec et al., 2013; Chang & Sam, 2015) 
including environmental technology innovations (Amore & Bennedsen, 2016). Continuing to 
contract with the same firms and limited competition is further complicated by the continued 
exemptions of certain US Federal agencies from following new guidelines for green purchasing.  
Green purchasing can lead to greener supply chains (Marron, 2004; Walker et al., 2009), 
reduced resource use (Williams, 2015), and improved public health outcomes resulting from 
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lower toxic releases (Darnall et al., 2008). Organizations, like government agencies, can have 
larger impact than individual consumers when greening their purchasing (Green et al., 2000). 
These are all reasons that the official policy directive to all US Federal agencies is that they 
reduce spending on vendors with toxic chemical releases to reduce the public health risks of 
public procurement of products containing hazardous materials. The FAR specifically requires 
agencies to increase their sustainable acquisitions and this includes making purchases with non-
toxic or less toxic alternatives (US Federal Acquisition Regulation Subpart 23, 2021). The 
combination of defense spending being the bulk of US Federal spending and the agency’s 
exemption from green purchasing requirements is an obvious barrier to success. As a result, there 
is a set of rules that are weakened and unable to adequately ensure gains in environmental 
performance. Further, the solution does not combat ongoing critique of green purchasing policy 
as an instrument for environmental change (Georghiou et al., 2014). Thus, breaking the cycle of 
continual buying from the same group of suppliers via new green purchasing standards is not 
operational because the policy exempts the most relevant agencies, leaving the link between the 
biggest spender and its suppliers unchanged. This habitual contracting paired with the 
exemptions granted agencies following new purchasing guidelines exemplifies Bourdieu’s 
concept of habitus.  
 
Habitus: Policy exemptions as default action 
Pierre Bourdieu contributed many ideas to political sociology including the one of 
habitus, which he defines as: 
“A system of lasting, transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, 
functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions and 
makes possible the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks, thanks to analogical 
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transfers of schemes permitting the solution of similarly shaped problems” (Bourdieu, 
1971, p. 83 emphasis in original). 
 
Habitus is the set of experiences that individuals and organizations have that are drawn upon 
when working to complete tasks. Originally used to explain how individuals within different 
social classes “differ in their socialization” and behave (DiMaggio, 1979, p. 1464), we apply the 
concept to organizations instead of individuals mirroring strategies undertaken by other scholars 
in education (Jeon, 2019) and political sociology (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008; Erridge & Greer, 
2002). By linking past activity and decisions to current and future situations, the habitus allows 
organizational units, like US Federal agencies, to make routine procurement choices as they 
always have (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008). Habitus is formed over time as similar experiences 
and actions shape an organization’s body of knowledge that it pulls from when encountering new 
situations. 
Bourdieu describes how political claims are justified and reified through discourse and 
that claims become doctrines whether they are supported by observations or actual occurrences. 
This “path dependence” directs bureaucratic decision-makers when they make purchasing 
decisions (Erridge & Greer, 2002; Swartz, 2013). Path dependence is the idea that a “particular 
course of action, once introduced, can be virtually impossible to reverse” (Pierson, 2000, p. 251). 
In the case of public procurement, granting exemptions to defense spending is just such an action 
that has been included in every major policy change attempting to make purchasing more 
sustainable via less toxic alternatives (Brookhaven National Laboratory, 2020; OFEE, 1999). 
The policy has become path dependent because no change in exemption authority has been 
initiated creating a habitus of actions. Habitus is one concept that can help understand why these 
exemptions continue to be included. 
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Policy makers and other bureaucrats are beholden to their individual and group 
knowledge and experience. “[T]he practices produced by the habitus [are] the strategy-
generating principle enabling agents to cope with unforeseen and ever-changing situations” 
(Bourdieu, 1977, p. 72). The decisions and actions that agencies undertake every day build on 
each other creating a system of normative procedures that can be called upon to direct action 
when no new guidance is available. As updates to the FAR did not substantially change guidance 
for DOD spending, the agency operated as usual relying on known practices. Lizardo (2004), 
writing about Bourdieu’s habitus, distinguished between two uses of the idea: one is habitus as a 
perceptual and classifying structure and the second is one of generative structure of practical 
action. The latter use of the term is where habitus is a way to understand the structure of actions, 
how the actions play out over time. The regulations in the FAR that specify that agencies may be 
exempted from new purchasing standards are guidelines relying upon the established norm, the 
path dependent policy, that some agencies needed these exemptions to maintain their ability to 
function. For defense spending, the recurring justification is the idea of removing obstacles from 
defense procurement that might impact national security (Ramos et al., 2007). The exemption 
existed in previous executive orders and earlier versions of the FAR, and it carries over into 
updated policy with little or no modification. The second area where habitus is relevant to US 
Federal Government contracts is that without new directives to agencies, the decisions of 
purchasing officials does not change. The result is a default to the same practices that are already 
established in the agency; continuing to purchase from known sources regardless of their 
environmental impact, and a maintenance of the status quo.  
Bourdieu’s focus on why institutions operate a certain way provides an understanding of 
the “less visible aspects in the actual functioning of political institutions” (Swartz, 2013, p. 16) 
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and the “fundamental presuppositions for operating” (Swartz, 2013, p. 16), rather than explaining 
day-to-day activities. It is not the individual purchases that are important, but the collective 
purchasing norms that an agency has accumulated over time form the habitus and is drawn upon 
when new actions are undertaken. These norms have led to the same firms being selected for 
contracts with research showing the same firms winning defense contracts (Hiatt & Kim, 2018) 
and the consolidation of the defense industry in the US to a smaller group of firms (Carril & 
Duggan, 2020). Previous research has also shown that US Federal Government contractors tend 
to have disproportionately higher pollution production than noncontractors (Hill et al., 2020). 
Hill et al. (2020) argues an ideologically based explanation for higher pollution by contractors is 
that the government prioritizes their productivity over environmental protection relying on 
theoretical work by Louis Althusser . Althusser (2008) argued that the government maintains its 
power by supporting the economic base; one way it does this, Hill et al. (2020) argues, is through 
issuing contracts that support growth of industry and economic activity. While Bourdieu was 
critical of Althusser’s theory of the government and his lack of “empirical indicators of state 
structure or practices” (Swartz, 2013, p. 20), Althusser’s concepts remain salient. Combined with 
Bourdieu’s habitus, we begin to understand the mechanisms that result in unequal application of 
policy and might have led to unequal environmental impact by agencies and their contractors. It 
is well established that not all polluters produce pollution equally (Collins et al., 2020; Galli 
Robertson & Collins, 2019; Jorgenson, 2016) and understanding this disproportionality through 




Environmental disproportionality and public procurement 
Disproportionality is a focused area of inquiry in environmental inequality research 
(Berry, 2007; Davidson & Grant, 2012). William Freudenburg published the first definition of 
the concept of environmental disproportionality that involves two parts or diversions: a diversion 
of resources and a diversion of attention. Freudenburg describes the concept in the following 
way: 
"The first diversion involves strikingly unequal patterns of privileged access to 
environmental rights and resources, or disproportionality: although environmental 
philosophers see the planet's resources as being intrinsically public, actual 
patterns of access to natural resources, including access to nature's capacity for 
absorbing wastes, tend to be highly skewed, bringing profits to very few 
beneficiaries, while largely bringing costs to the rest of society"  (Freudenburg, 
2005, p. 89).  
 
The second diversion is that “rather than being called into question, the inequalities and 
disproportionalities are almost universally unchallenged, being so widely taken for granted or 
‘naturalized’ that they are perhaps best seen as privileged accounts” (Freudenburg, 2005, p. 90, 
emphasis in original). These privileged accounts support the diversion of resources to a few 
individuals or groups, resulting in disproportionate environmental outcomes (Freudenburg, 
2006). For example, sometimes economic benefits are overstated in situations creating a 
diversionary reframe or narrative to push an economic project (Kulcsar et al., 2016). We see this 
double diversion evident in contracting policy where guidelines for green purchasing have been 
laid out, but exemptions are included based on arguments for ensuring some agencies not be 
inhibited by the new policy. The exempt agencies thereby hold a privileged position with 
unequal access to resources because they do not face the same green purchasing criteria. 
Diversionary reframing allows for economic projects that might be harmful to go unquestioned 
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because the arguments in favor of them crowd out the objections and provide fertile environment 
for inequality to grow. 
Inequality in pollution production is widespread (Galli Robertson & Collins, 2019; 
Heede, 2014) and scholars posit it as the norm rather than the exception (Collins et al., 2020). 
Further, governments, as organizational units, have been observed to be disproportionate actors 
(Jorgenson & Clark, 2009) and the military organizations within governments have been 
identified as the organizations most often responsible (Jorgenson & Clark, 2016). Further, within 
the US, disproportionality has been observed between private facilities that are also government 
contractors across industries (Hill et al., 2020). One salient conclusion of disproportionality 
research is that targeted solutions might lead to greater success in lowering emissions than broad 
based policies (Ash et al., 2009). This risk-based targeting approach may direct ways to prioritize 
inspections, for example, (Collins, 2011) or in identifying ways to reduce emissions in specific 
industries (Tong et al., 2018). Thus, altering disproportionality might need targeted approaches 
toward regulating the highest polluting facilities, and perhaps targeted changes in purchasing by 
agencies to restrict issuing awards to these high polluters. Integration of the added theoretical 
component of Bourdieu’s habitus as an explanatory mechanism of why disproportionality has 
persisted among contractors is an important contribution in increasing our understanding of 
inequality. 
The exemptions granted to defense agencies from following green purchasing guidelines 
may limit the effectiveness of these policies and potentially lead to differences in the 
environmental activity of defense contractors from other contractors. We formulate our 
hypotheses for our empirical investigation, presented below, based upon the link between 
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exemptions for defense agencies and inequality in environmental outcomes. We hypothesize 
that,  
I. the defense contracting industry will be responsible for the bulk of toxic releases 
linked to US Federal contracting,  
II. facilities receiving contracts from the DOD will be higher polluters, and  
III. average pollution will not be declining as quickly for defense contractors.  
Methods 
 For our study, we synthesize data from several public and private sources. These data are 
described below along with the statistical models that test for associations between 
environmental pollution and US Federal contracting.  
 
Data sources and preparation 
 Data on facility pollutant releases are from the US Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) for the 
years 2001 to 2012 (EPA, 2019a). The year 2012 is the terminal year for this analysis because 
other data in our analyses ended in that year. TRI data is annually reported chemical 
management and release information from qualifying facilities that handle specified chemicals. 
We aggregate releases by facility for each year across chemicals. To account for varying toxicity 
impacts of different chemicals, we use the Risk Screening Environmental Indicators (RSEI) data 
(EPA, 2018). The RSEI data include a unitless hazard score for each chemical release based on 
toxicity as determined by toxicology studies. This enables summation of chemical releases to get 
one facility RSEI hazard total for all the releases reported by the facility for each year. We also 
use the reported 6-digit North American Industrial Classification Code (NAICS) to group 
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facilities by industry in our statistical modelling (described below). We limit our analysis to 
NAICS within the manufacturing sectors (2-digit codes 31-33). 
 Business statistics are from the National Establishment Time Series (NETS); a database 
of annually reported business statistics on establishments across the US (Walls and Associates, 
2015). We use data from 2001 to 2012 with 2012 being the most recent accessible NETS 
information. The NETS includes information on annual sales, employment, and ownership 
status. We also use number of establishments as a metric for firm size (Lannelongue et al., 2015) 
and complexity (Perrow, 1986). Number of reporting years is included as a control for facilities 
that have reported longer and is calculated by taking the last year a facility reports as “in 
business” and subtracting the first year of reporting going back to 1989. The data also include a 
crosswalk between TRI facility identification number and establishment Duns Number. This 
crosswalk links the two datasets following procedures outlined by other researchers including 
quality control checks for duplicate records (Collins et al., 2020). We successfully match 92.7 
percent of TRI facilities to the NETS data resulting in a dataset for most of the TRI reporting 
facilities for those years.  
 Government contract data are from USASpending.gov that collects US Federal 
purchasing data as reported by the US Federal Procurement Data System into annual summaries 
at the award and transaction level (USASpending, 2020). We link transaction data for each year 
to our list of reporting TRI facilities by their Duns Number matched using the NETS crosswalk. 
Data are aggregated to the award level per year and then linked to the facility. Additional 
covariates from these data include agency issuing the award, total award amount, number of 
bids, type of contract, and number of awards. 
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 Additional covariates are from the US Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) 
Enforcement and Compliance History Online (ECHO) for the number of inspections that were 
conducted at each TRI facility during the study years, a known predictor of pollution variation 
(Gray & Shimshack, 2011). ECHO data also include whether the facility is proximate to Native 
American Tribal land, and whether the facility is an EJScreen facility (EPA, 2020). EJScreen is 
the EPA’s screening tool for environmental justice and indicates if the facility is in a block group 
of the 80th or higher national percentile of one of the primary environmental justice indexes of 
EJScreen. Environmental justice (EJ) research is a well-established field where scholars have 
convincingly shown that the highest polluters are in segregated communities with (Collins et al., 
2016; Mohai et al., 2009) and that Native American communities are disproportionately 
impacted (Hooks & Smith, 2004). Inclusion of these covariates is relevant for a more complete 
understanding in variation of facility environmental releases. Details on the data are collected in 
Tables 4 and 5.  
The total number of TRI facilities that are contractors and are also manufacturers is 2,809 
and consist of 10,509 facility-years (i.e., a facility reporting to the TRI once during the study 
years would have one facility-year, a facility reporting twice would have two facility-years, and 
so on). Of those facilities, 2,091 received at least one award from the DOD and 718 received 
awards from other agencies. We do not examine the role of parent company (firms owning 
multiple facilities) because 85.5 percent of the facilities we examine are single establishment 
firms. Testing a random effect for parent company did not find the effect to significantly 
contribute to the models and sensitivity analysis leaving out facilities with parent companies did 




Table 4: Descriptive statistics for quantitative variables  
Variable Defense 
Contractor 
n Mean Standard 
deviation 




No 1992 21.570 4.887 1.000 24.000 24.000 




No 1992 372.347 739.028 10.000 160.000 10000.000 





No 1992 0.093 0.632 0.000 0.000 19.000 
Yes 8539 2.108 8.750 0.000 0.000 231.000 
Inspection 
count 
No 1992 2.360 2.960 0.000 1.000 36.000 





No 1992 0.062 0.212 0.000 0.001 1.000 








No 1992 4.827 15.757 0.000 1.000 280.000 
Yes 8539 5.771 40.366 0.000 1.000 1031.000 
Average bids No 1992 3.108 6.933 0.000 1.000 51.000 
Yes 8539 2.445 4.810 0.000 1.526 221.500 
Total number 
of awards 
No 1992 3.879 11.085 1.000 1.000 206.000 
Yes 8539 17.568 61.853 1.000 3.000 1860.000 
Sales (dollars) No 1992 5.600 x 107 1.153 x 108 517.240 2.284 x 107  1.618 x 109 
Yes 8539 6.949 x 107  1.545 x 108  191.000 2.770 x 107 2.030 x 109 
RSEI releases No 1992 4.649 x 108 5.267 x 109  0.000 63,355.700 1.812 x 1011 
Yes 8539 8.198 x 108  2.024 x 1010  0.000 31,531.500 1.617 x 1012 
Total award 
dollars 
No 1992 3.379 x 106 3.071 x 107 0.000 21,634.000 6.002 x 108 











Contract type  Cost-plus Incentive Fixed-price 
No 8 25 685 
Yes 125 125 1841 
     
EJScreen facility  No Yes 
No 475 1293 
Yes 243 798 
     
Foreign ownership  Domestically owned Foreign owned 
No 595 123 
Yes 1757 334 
     
Corporate 
ownership 
 Privately owned Corporately owned 
No 528 190 
Yes 1360 731 




 Further than 10 miles 
from a Native American 
tribe 
Within 10 miles of a 
Native American tribe 
No 535 183 
Yes 1689 402 
 
Apportioning facility releases to agencies 
 To determine the relative contribution of each US Federal agency to RSEI releases, we 
develop a method for apportioning the hazardous releases. We calculate agency proportion of 
RSEI using the following method: 
𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑆𝐸𝐼 =  
𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
∗ 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑆𝐸𝐼 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 
This provides a proportional estimate for annual RSEI releases a facility produces that is 
attributed to the production of goods being purchased by the agency. The agency proportion of 
RSEI is then summed annually to determine the relative proportion of releases that are from 
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agency purchases for a given year, and further summed to all the years to obtain a cumulative 
estimate over time.  
 
Statistical analyses 
 To test our hypothesis that defense contractor environmental releases are different than 
other contractors, we test three models. The first model is an ordinary least squares linear model 
(hereafter linear model) that includes a fixed effect indicator if facilities are defense contractors 
or not as well as interaction between the indicator variable and other predictors. The model 
statement is: 
 𝑦𝑖 =  𝜷𝑖𝒙𝑖 +  𝜀 [1] 
 
Where 𝑦𝑖 is the response variable for total RSEI releases for each i facility, 𝜷𝑖 is the vector of 
coefficients, 𝒙𝑖 is the matrix of predictor variables, and 𝜀 is the normally distributed error vector. 
This model is as a comparison point but is not ideal for modelling the repeated measures data for 
facilities over time because it does not control for between year variation within facilities.  
The second model for the data uses a linear mixed model with a random intercept for 
facilities, a random intercept for industries, and a random intercept for agency replacing the fixed 
effect (hereafter agency random intercept model). Facilities receiving awards from more than 
one agency are grouped in a multi-agency category. The model statement is: 
 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 = 𝜷𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 𝒙𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 +  𝜽𝑗𝑘𝑙 + 𝝓𝑘𝑙 +  𝝀𝑙 +  𝜀 [2] 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙  is the response variable for total RSEI releases in each i year of each j facility in 
each k agency, grouped within each l 6-digit NAICS industry group. 𝜷𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙  is the vector of 
coefficients and 𝒙𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 is the matrix of predictor variables.  𝜽𝑗𝑘𝑙  is the vector of random intercepts 
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for each facility, 𝝓𝑘𝑙 is the vector of random intercepts for each agency, and 𝝀𝑙 is the vector of 
random intercepts for each industry. This model allows for agency level inference to test if there 
is measurable variation between agencies through the agency intercept, however, because there 
were so many more defense contractors, we also test whether the intercept for agency was 
necessary.  
We did this by fitting a third model that removes the agency level intercept and replaced 
it with a fixed effect indicator variable for defense contractor status (hereafter agency fixed effect 
model); this indicator is like the fixed effect indicator for model [1]. The model statement is:  
 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑙 = 𝜷𝑖𝑗𝑙𝒙𝑖𝑗𝑙 +  𝜽𝑗𝑙 +  𝝀𝑙 +  𝜀 [3] 
This model is the same as model [2] except it removes the random intercept for agency and adds 
a fixed effect indicator variable to the vector of predictor variables for when a facility is a 
defense contractor or not. We also test for interaction between this fixed effect and other 
predictors. We compare all three of our models using Akaike information criteria (AIC) and 
Bayesian information criteria (BIC) to select the best model for interpreting the data. 
We log transform the total RSEI releases per facility as our dependent variable because 
we want to test for what predictor variables are associated with variation in releases of contractor 
facilities. We also calculate a proportion of total sales from contracts as a covariate by taking the 
total award from all agencies a facility received and dividing it by the total sales for the facility. 
This estimates total proportion of sales from contracts.  Each model is fit using a top-down 
approach, fitting the full model first. We conduct tests for influential points, non-constant 
variance, and multicollinearity. All analyses are completed using R statistical software version 
4.0.1 (R Core Team, 2020) with models fit using the “lme4” package (Bates et al., 2015). The 





 Aggregating proportional releases in relation to contracting US Federal agencies provides 
a way to rank agencies based on their contribution to toxic pollution releases from 
manufacturing. Of all RSEI releases reported by contractors and apportioned to agencies from 
2001 to 2012, 91.4 percent of those releases are from DOD purchases with the remaining 8.6 
percent spread out amongst 26 other agencies (Table 6 reports results for the top ten agencies by 
RSEI proportion). The second highest agency by proportional contribution to contractor releases 
is the Department of Justice (DOJ) at 2.5 percent followed by the General Services 
Administration (GSA) at 2.2 percent. In addition, the proportional contribution to total 
procurement from TRI facilities by the DOD is 76.8 percent of all award dollars being issued to 
TRI facilities followed by 10 percent being issued by the GSA and 3 percent being issued by the 
DOJ (Table 6). EPA green purchasing requirements are included in 9.7 percent of DOD contracts 
going to TRI facilities (Table 6). When looking at defense contractors versus other contractors 
over time, defense contractors are over 80 percent of all contractor releases from 2001 to 2012 
compared to all other agencies, which are less than 20 percent for those same years (Figure 10). 
 
 Some manufacturing sectors receive many more contracts than others. Fabricated metal 
manufacturing has the most TRI facilities that are contractors with over 400 facilities receiving 
contracts (Figure 11). Transportation manufacturing, computer and electronic products 
manufacturing, chemical manufacturing, and machinery manufacturing also are high with each 











Proportion of spending that 




0.914 0.768 0.097 
Department of 
Justice (DOJ) 













0.011 0.005 0.155 
Department of The 
Treasury (TREAS) 




0.003 0.001 0.041 
Department of The 
Interior (DOI) 




0.001 0.015 0.264 
Department of 
Energy (DOE) 





Figure 10: Hazardous waste releases by contractors only 2001-2012. Defense contractors release 




Figure 11: Number of TRI facilities in each sector that are also contractors (2001-2012). 
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 After fitting our three models, we test their goodness of fit. No outliers are detected and 
using variance inflation factor (VIF), no multicollinearity is detected. In addition, constant error 
variance is true for all three models. Both the agency random intercept model and the agency 
fixed effect model are superior to the linear model with lower AIC and BIC (Table 6). The 
agency random intercept and agency fixed effect models are close to one another in their model 
fit, however, the agency fixed effect model has the lowest AIC of 59,521.96 and lowest BIC of 
59,702.596 (Table 6). This suggests that while the agency random intercept model provides 
comparison between multiple agencies, the variation between agencies was lower than variation 
within agencies. Also, inclusion of an agency random intercept did not significantly improve the 
model over the agency fixed effect model. Variance for the random effect of agency was 0.002 
suggesting that agencies do not vary consistently across our predictors and the random effect 
added unnecessary complexity to the model (Table 7). Therefore, we base our analyses on the 
agency fixed effect model. 
Table 7: Model selection criteria 
Model AIC BIC 
Linear model 70,000.393 70,167.373 
Agency random intercept 59,529.179 59,746.978 
Agency fixed effect 59,521.096 59,702.596 
 
Table 8: Variance for the random effects in the linear mixed models. Variation explained by 
the agency random effect is less than 0.01 percent. 
 Agency random intercept 
model 
Agency fixed effect model 




Facility 31.509 5.613 30.005 5.478 
Industry 8.564 2.926 7.065 2.658 




 The agency fixed effect model finds that on average, defense contractors have 22 percent 
higher RSEI releases during the study years than other contractors, but this is not statistically 
significant for α = 0.05 (β =0.201, p =0.171, Table 9). In addition, contractor RSEI releases 
declined significantly from 2001 to 2012, dropping on average 47 percent for each one standard 
deviation increase in the year variable (β = -0.634, p <0.01, Table 9). The interaction between 
year and defense contractor is also significant with defense contractors’ RSEI releases declining 
at a significantly slower rate of 33 percent for each one standard deviation increase in the year 
variable (β = 0.067, p=0.026, Table 9, Figure 12). Two other interactions have moderate 
significance on defense contractor releases. The first is average bids with a one standard 
deviation increase in the log of average bids resulting in a decline in RSEI releases by 18.4 
percent for other contractors (β = -0.203, p = 0.005, Table 9, Figure 13), but defense contractor 
releases are declining at a lower rate of 5.1 percent for the same change in average bids (β = 
0.151, p = 0.083, Table 9, Figure 13). The other interaction that is moderately significant is for 
total award dollars. For a one standard deviation increase in the log of the award value, other 
contractor’s RSEI releases decline by 19 percent (β = -0.211, p = 0.035, Table 9), but for defense 
contractors the decline is 1.7 percent for the same change in average award dollars (β = 0.194, p 









Table 9: Linear mixed model with agency fixed effect results. Coefficients are scaled. 
Variable Estimate(β) Standard 
Error 
z value 95% 
LL 
95%UL p-value 
Intercept 8.279 0.301 27.501 7.689 8.869 0.000*** 
Defense contractor 0.201 0.147 1.370 -0.086 0.488 0.171 
YEAR -0.634 0.093 -6.796 -0.817 -0.451 0.000*** 
Avg bids -0.203 0.073 -2.781 -0.347 -0.060 0.005*** 
Total award dollars -0.211 0.100 -2.113 -0.406 -0.015 0.035** 
Proportion of sales from 
contracts 
0.068 0.067 1.008 -0.064 0.200 0.314 
Total number of awards 0.058 0.069 0.828 -0.079 0.194 0.408 
Number of awards with 
EPA requirements 
0.116 0.057 2.053 0.005 0.227 0.040** 
Cost-plus contractor -0.646 0.554 -1.167 -1.732 0.439 0.243 
Incentive contractor 0.593 0.527 1.125 -0.441 1.627 0.261 
Sales -0.140 0.112 -1.248 -0.359 0.080 0.212 
Employment 0.211 0.104 2.020 0.006 0.416 0.043** 
Corporation size and 
complexity 
0.174 0.158 1.098 -0.136 0.484 0.272 
Number of reporting 
years 
-0.043 0.111 -0.384 -0.260 0.175 0.701 
Foreign owned 0.125 0.332 0.376 -0.525 0.774 0.707 
Corporately owned 0.369 0.269 1.375 -0.157 0.896 0.169 
Inspection count 0.453 0.038 11.836 0.378 0.528 0.000*** 
Proximate to Native 
American Tribe 
0.556 0.284 1.960 0.000 1.112 0.050* 
EJ Screen facility 0.298 0.239 1.247 -0.170 0.766 0.213 
Year:Defense contractor 0.228 0.103 2.224 0.027 0.429 0.026** 
Avg bids:Defense 
contractor 




0.194 0.110 1.762 -0.022 0.411 0.078* 
n 10,509      
n facilities 2,809      
n Primary NAICS 334      
AIC 59503.512      
Notes: * α < 0.1, ** α <0.05, *** α <0.01 
Influence diagnostics test revealed no outliers with Bonferroni studentized residuals of p <0.05. No VIF 
> 10 (no multicollinearity), and model displayed constant error variance. 
Coefficient estimates can be interpreted as one standard deviation increase in predictor x is associated 
with (eβ -1) * 100 percent increase in RSEI releases if β is positive, and (1 - eβ) * 100 percent change in 





Figure 12: Linear prediction for the interaction between year and defense contractor. Defense 
contractors RSEI releases declined at a significantly slower rate, 33s% each one standard 
deviation change in the year variable, while other contractors declined by 47% for the same 
change in years. 
 
 Other covariates are also associated with variation in contractor RSEI releases. The 
model results show that the more awards a facility receives with EPA requirements, the more 
RSEI releases they report with a one standard deviation increase in awards associated with a 12.3 
percent rise in RSEI releases (β = 0.116, p = 0.04, Table 9). Employment was also associated 
with changes in RSEI releases with a one standard deviation increase in employees associated 
with a 23.1 percent rise in RSEI releases (β = 0.211, p = 0.043). In addition, with each one 
standard deviation increase in the inspection count variable, a facility had 57 percent higher 
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releases (β = 0.453, p < 0.001, Table 9). Lastly, contractor facilities that are proximate to a 
Native American Tribe have 74 percent higher releases (β = 0.556, p = 0.05, Table 9). Other 
predictors tested are not significantly associated with contractor RSEI releases for α = 0.05.  
 
Figure 13: Linear prediction for the interaction between average bids and defense contractors. 
Defense contractors’ RSEI releases decreased on average 5.1 percent for each one standard 
deviation increase in log average bids while other contractors decrease by 18.4 percent for the 




Figure 14: Linear prediction for the interaction between total award dollars and defense 
contractors. Defense contractors’ RSEI releases decreased on average 1.7 percent for each one 
standard deviation increase in log award dollars while other contractors’ RSEI releases decreased 
on average 19 percent for the same change in log award dollars. 
 
Discussion 
Findings for proportionate contribution from agency procurement to government 
contractor RSEI releases support our hypothesis that the DOD is disproportionately linked to 
most contractor manufacturer releases; more than all the other US Federal agencies combined 
(Figure 10, Table 6). While this can be explained partially by the disproportionate share of 
spending with the DOD having the greatest number of contractor TRI facilities (Figure 11) and 
the agency’s larger budget (Carril & Duggan, 2020), DOD awards do not include proportional 
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spending that includes EPA green purchasing standards. This is evidence that the lack of 
pressure on DOD to enact these requirements in its award processes. In addition, the FAR 
provision that military systems and defense agencies be exempt from green purchasing standards 
avoids the primary source of US Federal agency contribution to RSEI releases and results in a 
policy that has been ineffective at making US Federal purchasing more sustainable regarding 
toxic releases. These exemptions could be why, in our model, contractors that receive awards 
from the DOD had different patterns of RSEI releases. 
 While TRI facilities receiving awards from the DOD are higher in their RSEI releases, it 
is on average not a significant difference across the industries studied (Table 9). Also, during the 
years studied, there is a significant decline in RSEI releases from TRI facilities that are 
contractors, reflecting a trend among TRI facilities that has been observed before (Ard, 2015; 
EPA, 2019b). TRI facilities with defense contracts are not declining as quickly and this supports 
one of the hypotheses of this paper. DOD awarded facilities decline on average 12 percent 
slower for the same duration than other agency contractors (Figure 12). We also find two other 
moderately significant interactions between predictor variables and whether the TRI facility 
received contracts from the DOD. More bids are associated with less RSEI releasees, suggesting 
that competition leads to greater efficiency except for TRI facilities with defense contracts; their 
RSEI releases are less impacted by greater competition than other contractors (Figure 13). In 
addition, the greater the award amount a facility received is associated with significantly lower 
RSEI releasees unless that facility received its awards from the DOD; then, the increase in award 
amount has almost no effect (Figure 14).  
 Regarding green purchasing totals, we include a predictor indicating the number of 
awards the facility received with EPA green purchasing requirements. These requirements 
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compel the contractor to purchase products, where possible, from a list the EPA prepares of 
items that contain a minimum recovered material content (usually recycled materials). Our 
model results suggest that facilities with more awards requiring these products had higher RSEI 
releases (Table 9). This could mean that facilities with higher releases are more often required to 
use EPA designated products, which would be a positive policy outcome, but it could also mean 
that EPA designated product purchasing does not affect facility environmental releases. Rather, 
this metric might not be a good indicator for testing the efficacy of green purchasing policy on 
manufacturers’ releases but better for understanding their overall environmental management 
activity. One other association of note that we found is that contractors with higher releases tend 
to be located closer to Native American Tribal lands than contractors with less releases and this 
is consistent with current environmental justice scholarship (Collins et al., 2016; Hooks & Smith, 
2004; Mohai et al., 2009) and could be a metric for determining future standards for contracting 
with TRI facilities. Reducing the burden of toxic chemicals on minority and segregated 
communities could become a policy goal of green purchasing with evidence presented here 
suggesting it might be worth considering.  
Limitations of our findings include a focus on agency proportion of spending at an 
aggregate level; individual spending decisions are often made at the sub-agency level with 
individual procurement officials administering awards. Future investigators might take a 
qualitative approach where agency procurement operations are observed on a more granular level 
to understand micro-scale operation and how specific agencies behave differently.  
Second, while RSEI releases are a good estimate of total potential hazard generated by a 
facility and is comparable between facilities, there could be utility in individual chemical 
analyses and perhaps linking certain chemicals to certain agency purchases. This might help with 
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targeted approaches toward breaking habitual contracting with the same facilities. New guidance 
could be coordinated with other policies targeting reduced purchasing of products containing 
certain chemicals like mercury. Future research might take a chemical level analysis approach. 
Also, the RSEI hazard value is a summation of chemical toxicities which is a widely used 
method, though it does not account for the potential of multiplicative effects of multiple 
exposures. Resolving this issue is currently intractable and resolving it will require further 
research. Future work should consider other methods for combining chemical releases and the 
importance of looking at mixtures. 
Third, TRI facilities tend to be larger and must handle specific chemicals required to be 
reported; thus, our findings do not characterize all manufacturers but are generalizable to the 
sectors included here and for facilities that report to TRI. We recommend that future analyses 
look at linking contractors in other industries and to other environmental legislation such as the 
Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and Toxic Substances Control Act. Improvement of green 
purchasing policy should take all environmental legislation into account as well as a more data 
driven method for helping procurement officials identify the best actors for new awards. This 
will provide environmental, economic, and health benefits that green purchasing policy is meant 
to contribute. Beyond understanding the variation in contractor facility level environmental 
releases, we also apply Bourdieu’s concept of habitus to elaborate and further understand the 
mechanisms that create disproportionality. 
Despite the policy recommendations derived from research in disproportionality (Marron, 
2004; Wang et al., 2020), most scholarship stops at observation of the inequality and statements 
that support Freudenburg’s double diversion framework. While empirical support of this 
framework is important, there is room for deeper development of the political, economic, and 
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power relations contributing to these observations. There has been some work done on how 
certain aspects of company activity can predict this kind of inequality (Perrow & Pulver, 2015) 
but less so on how the double diversion is linked to power. Some scholars have pointed this out 
with regards to power and coupled human-natural systems (Rudel, 2013) and the links between 
the double diversion to power relations in the energy sector (Cheyenne Harvey & Varuzzo, 2014; 
Shearer et al., 2013). Not many, however, have expanded upon Freudenburg’s original calls for 
examining how embedded power creates inequality and is taken for granted as the status quo, 
which supports the privileged accounts (rhetorical strategies for justifying inequality) with 
diversionary reframing (Freudenburg & Gramling, 1993). Freudenburg’s call for research was to 
"devote far more attention to the analysis of powerful yet previously unseen connections in other 
contexts -- specifically including attention to the possibility of discovering other connections 
between resources and discourses, and between nature and the naturalized" (Freudenburg, 2005, 
p. 108). There may be utility, then, in building upon the disproportionality framework through 
inclusion of sociological metatheory from such scholars as Bourdieu whose concept of habitus 
helps understand why defense contracting is disproportionately linked to greater hazardous 
releases in the US. Further, applications of Freudenburg’s work should continue to build out the 
framework of environmental disproportionality as we continue to increase our understanding of 
the sources and mechanism of environmental inequality.  
 
Conclusion 
Understanding how the US Federal Government impacts the environment via exercise of 
its procurement powers is an essential component of the mechanisms that create and perpetuate 
socio-environmental inequality. Enduring policy goals of greening purchasing have persisted 
107 
 
during the years studied but have also occurred alongside exemptions allowing some agencies to 
ignore new policy and continue “business as usual.” This habitus of the US Federal Government 
supports a persistent dynamic between agencies and contractors where, so long as minimum 
criteria are met, the agency will award the contract to the facility it chooses with new green 
purchasing criteria having limited impact. Using the framework of Bourdieu’s habitus, we 
propose an explanation for why some agencies continue to be exempt from green purchasing 
standards, how these exemptions result in habitual contracting, and has led to defense spending 
being linked to most of the hazardous releases associated with US Federal procurement. In 
addition, this framework supports observations of sustained disproportionality over time (Collins 
et al., 2020), with our findings directly supporting observations of the US Federal Government’s 
role in subsidizing polluters via contracts (Hill et al., 2020), which underscores the need for 
changes in US Federal procurement practices. Further, the potential benefits of even small 
changes in government purchasing can be large given that government agencies are 
disproportionately contributing to toxic releases in the US and abroad (Jorgenson & Clark, 
2009).  
The rigidity of the purchasing/contract field creates a stronghold resistant to change and 
protects relationships amongst a network of bad actors that are known to be able to supply what 
is needed to the agencies in question but are often inefficient compared to peer facilities.  While 
the defense exemptions seem path dependent, habitus provides us with a way to change this path. 
Bourdieu wrote that habitus changes with continued experience and that means this systemic 
activity can change with new circumstances leaving us with an avenue for altering this seemingly 
deterministic course by introducing new guidance for agencies (Bourdieu, 1971; DiMaggio, 
1979). Results help to understand the persistence of environmental disproportionality, the role of 
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government in perpetuating socio-environmental inequality, and why defense agencies are 
disproportionately linked to manufacturers’ toxic releases with findings supportive of changes in 
policy particularly for regulation of defense spending. 
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 Chapter 4: Competition for US Federal Government Contracts and Chromium (Cr) 
Releases: A Bayesian Multi-level Modelling Approach for Examining Facility 
Environmental Pollution3 
Abstract: The impact that industrial facilities have on the environment is influenced by 
competition for US Federal Government contracts. In our analysis, we use a Bayesian 
hierarchical model to examine the association between environmental pollution of one chemical, 
chromium (Cr), from manufacturers bidding for government contracts. We analyze whether 
competition leads to reduced pollution as the Porter Hypothesis argues, or whether increased 
competition leads a “race to the bottom” where overhead costs are reduced by limiting pollution 
control technology investment. We find that competition leads to greater releases of Cr at 
facilities that have been awarded contracts, but that this relationship is reversed when Cr is used 
as a component in the manufacturing process as opposed to it being a reactant or impurity. This 
suggests that the use of the chemical is an important factor in how it is managed from input to 
end of pipe with facilities reducing releases of component Cr more than facilities that do not use 
Cr as a component. Findings support a more complex association between competition and 
pollution releases from manufacturers than a simple one direction association, posited by either 
the Porter Hypothesis or the “race to the bottom” hypothesis. We connect our results to growing 
research showing that both the Porter Hypothesis and the “race to the bottom” are needed to 
understand the contextual relationship between competition and the environment. 
Keywords: Bayesian model, industrial pollution, manufacturing, bids, contracts, procurement, 
chromium 
 
3 Authored by Dustin Hill and Mary B. Collins. A version of this manuscript is in preparation for submission to the 




Competition between industrial facilities creates pressure to act in environmentally 
friendly and harmful ways. For example, competition is linked to both reducing waste (Hart & 
Dowell, 2011) and cost saving actions that are linked to increases in pollution releases (Hill et 
al., 2020). These dueling explanations are supported in the literature (López-Gamero & Molina-
Azorín, 2016), but often researchers use aggregate data summaries such as examining nations 
(Rasli et al., 2018), administrative units (Sjöberg & Xu, 2018), and facilities (Hill et al., 2020). 
While these approaches aid in the understanding of general trends at national and international 
levels, there are abundant, more granular data (S.-R. Lim et al., 2010). We contend that more 
fine grained, micro-scale analyses contribute more nuanced understanding of both 
environmentally friendly and harmful facility activity, particularly, related to individual 
chemicals because new policies are often focused at the chemical level (Stretesky et al., 2017).  
We are particularly interested in understanding how competition between industrial 
actors impacts management decisions of toxic chemicals. We focus our analysis on 
manufacturing firms and the facilities they operate; manufacturing firms are organizations that 
operate in a for-profit way and produce products at physical locations known as facilities. This 
inter-firm competitiveness might impact operation at firm facilities. For clarity’s sake, when we 
refer to the firm, we are discussing the owner of manufacturing facilities (could be single, private 
owner or corporate owner) and when we refer to facility, we are discussing the physical location 
where production occurs. Over 650 toxic chemicals, their uses, and their management are 
reported annually in the United States (US) via the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) 
Toxics Release Inventory (TRI). The TRI, discussed in greater detail later, has abundant 
information. While regulators and researchers are most likely to use these data to assess chemical 
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releases (EPA, 2019) and pollution control technology (EPA, 2020c), data also include 
information about how chemicals are used at the facility. Specifically, we propose an expanded 
use of these data to assess facility environmental activity in the context of manufacturing 
processes, regulatory pressures, and in the competitive environment that facilities participate.  
To support expanded use of these data, we undertake a case analysis of one chemical, 
Chromium (Cr), and how its use as a component is associated with variation in facility pollution 
releases. Our case study question is: As competition for US Federal contracts increases between 
potential awardees, do releases of Cr increase because competition may be driving investment in 
pollution control downward? We are interested in firms that have been awarded US Federal 
Government contracts that they are fulfilling at TRI facilities (hereafter referred to as contractors 
or contractor facility) because their proportion of environmental releases has been shown to be 
disproportionate (Hill et al., 2020), and the number of reported bids for each award is a readily 
available metric for estimating competition between these actors (Aznar et al., 2017; McAfee & 
McMillan, 1986). We hypothesize that as competition increases, releases of Cr will increase 
because there is a “race to the bottom” for short term gains from contracts awarded each year. 
However, we also hypothesize that this association would be weaker for facilities that use Cr as a 
component in their manufacturing process because these facilities would have different 
production processes and management options to better control Cr recovery to reduce waste for 
one of their inputs.  
Our objective is to evaluate the relationship between bids made by industrial actors for 
contracts and pollution releases of chromium reported by those same actors to see if more bids 
(greater competition intensity) lead to more pollution as the “race to the bottom” argues. Cr is a 
chemical that has serious human health effects and is a component in many different 
120 
 
manufacturing processes which might be managed differently when firms face greater 
competition intensity. We accomplish this task by fitting a Bayesian hierarchical model to 
answer the research question demonstrating its use for answering complex questions about 
facility environmental activity to support both expanded use of this method and these data.  
Our manuscript proceeds as follows: we begin with a review of the two competing 
hypotheses that are most pertinent to competition and environmental activity. The first is the 
Porter Hypothesis that states that more efficient firms are greener and these firms are also more 
competitive (M. E. Porter & Van der Linde, 1995a). The second hypothesis, known as the “race 
to the bottom,” states that greater competition pushes environmental regulation in a downward 
direction to avoid potential harm to economic activity (Millimet & List, 2003). This is followed 
by a discussion of our methods, a case justification, a section that describes the data used, and 
specifications about our modelling approach. We discuss the results of our analysis in the context 
of both scholarly hypotheses, as well as the broader uses of this method in terms of its utility for 
future studies. We conclude with several recommendations for expanding the model we use here, 
suggestions for regulators, and an agenda for further research.  
 
Literature review 
 The relationship between inter-firm competition and the impact it has on the environment 
is characterized by two leading hypotheses: The Porter Hypothesis and the “race to the bottom” 
hypothesis. Below, we explain each hypothesis as well as review the supporting and contrasting 
literature to show that the competition-environment relationship is more complex than each 
hypothesis argues.  
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Competition and contracts: The Porter Hypothesis  
One hypothesis regarding regulation and competition was proposed by Michael Porter 
who argues that stringent environmental regulation encourages firms to innovate and develop 
more cost-effective methods of achieving regulatory compliance (M. E. Porter, 1991; M. E. 
Porter & Van der Linde, 1995a). The Porter Hypothesis argues that when firms are able to meet 
or surpass environmental regulatory standards, they become more competitive due to the 
lowering of operational costs and leads to more efficient production processes (M. E. Porter, 
1991; M. E. Porter & Van der Linde, 1995b). A key feature of the Porter Hypothesis is this 
interconnection between regulatory pressure and competition; regulations push pollution 
downward reducing waste at a firm’s facilities with the reduction in waste translating to more 
efficiency and also more competitive advantage (Ramanathan et al., 2017). Thus, the more 
competitive facilities have to be, the greener they become (Zameer et al., 2020). 
Industry response to environmental regulation has been studied extensively, revealing 
that government is the most important source of environmental pressure (Delmas & Toffel, 2008; 
Donnan et al., 2005; May, 2005). This pressure is strongly felt from command-and-control 
regulation, which Porter and Van der Linde (1995b) argue is an important component of the link 
between reducing waste and increasing firm efficiency. The Porter Hypothesis presents several 
explanations for why firms would become more competitive with more regulation. One is that 
regulation is a sign that there is some resource inefficiency in need of technological improvement 
(Rubashkina et al., 2015). This would result in rewards for firms that can meet the new 
technological demands and firms would increase their competitive ability and overall efficiency 
(Albrizio et al., 2017). Regulation also increases information gathering, reduces uncertainty in 
environmental management investments as firms work harder to meet environmental standards, 
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and the overall pressure by government to alter performance leads to innovation and a dynamic 
field for competition (Ambec et al., 2013). Porter (1991) and others argue that the outcome is 
greater competition and a stimulated economy (Ambec et al., 2013; M. E. Porter & Van der 
Linde, 1995a). Competition between firms occurs on the open market but also within the market 
for government contracts. 
Public procurement in the US is frequently fulfilled through government contracts that 
are awarded via a competitive bidding procedure with awards going to the lowest bidder (Edquist 
et al., 2015; Khan, 2018). Competition can affect a firm where greater competition leads to a 
firm striving to decrease costs to keep prices of goods low to outcompete peer firms (Lewis & 
Bajari, 2014). Pressure to reduce or replace chemical inputs also comes from government 
regulation as there is evidence suggesting that reductions in pollution can make a firm more 
competitive (Delmas & Toffel, 2008; Donnan et al., 2005; May, 2005). It is possible that firms, 
and the facilities they own, might strive to reduce this pollution to save costs, increase efficiency, 
and be more attractive for government contracts (Hart & Ahuja, 1996; Wong et al., 2020). 
Reductions in pollution are likely stronger for chemicals that are inputs in the production process 
because reductions of wasted inputs can save the firm more money than reductions of other 
waste like byproducts (Barrows & Ollivier, 2018). On the other hand, it is possible that the 
reverse is true where firms might reduce spending on pollution control technology to achieve a 
short-term gain and thereby be awarded a contract, as some scholars have suggested (Hill et al., 
2020). Some studies have found that competition has no effect on pollution releases (Hull & 
Rothenberg, 2008; Link & Naveh, 2006). If the reverse is observed and “brown” competitors are 
winning contract awards, then these actors are avoiding environmental controls to lower costs, 




Contracts as pollution havens: The “race to the bottom” 
One alternate perspective that relates environmental regulation to environmental 
performance among industrial actors is that strict laws will encourage firms to “race to the 
bottom.” This hypothesis posits that actors will be incentivized to complete minimal 
environmental controls with regards to limiting pollution releases, resulting in lower short-term 
costs and a lower bottom line (Gray & Shadbegian, 1995; Henderson & Millimet, 2007). 
Proponents argue that the high cost of pollution control technology can hurt a firm’s ability to 
compete (Jaffe et al., 1995) and that firms cannot invest in this technology and be more 
competitive at the same time (Hull & Rothenberg, 2008). The “race to the bottom” hypothesis 
has been studied extensively within the context of where firm-based inquiry shows that that firms 
will prioritize investment in countries or regions with lower environmental regulatory standards 
(Rasli et al., 2018). In addition, movement from areas with high regulatory standards to areas 
with lower regulatory standards, such as changing regions, countries, or even continents is a key 
aspect of the pollution haven hypothesis (PHH), one of the leading arguments in the “race to the 
bottom” literature (see Cole, Elliot, & Zhang, 2017 for a review). At its root, the PHH is the idea 
that dirty industries will relocate to regions or other countries with the lowest environmental 
costs and lowest standards resulting it the creation of “pollution havens.” Factors like 
infrastructure and technology level within a region also influence such decisions in the context of 
environmental laws. While any one factor can be a motivator for location change, it is more 
likely that a multitude of factors influence firm decisions on how they manage their facilities 
(Gonzalez-Benito & Gonzalez-Benito, 2010). 
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Some argue that strict environmental regulation may discourage foreign direct investment 
(FDI) because investors are deterred by the potentially high operating costs of the host country 
(Cai et al., 2016). Cole, Elliot, and Zhang (2017) argue that attempts to reduce pollution via 
domestic regulation will influence FDI with investors wishing to avoid the perceived competitive 
disadvantage of stricter regulations. In addition to impacts on FDI and potential creation of 
pollution havens, some have found that the “race to the bottom” may actually be a “stuck at the 
bottom” situation, where developing nations have weaker political will and institutions to 
enforce greater restrictions (G. Porter, 1999). Similar to the Porter Hypothesis, findings for the 
PHH and “race to the bottom” concepts are mixed, with some studies showing limited impact of 
regulation on firm movement (Bartik, 1988; McConnell & Schwab, 1990; Sjöberg & Xu, 2018). 
One explanation for why the empirical models do not support the PHH is the use of aggregate 
data between states or countries masking smaller, more localized changes that can be revealed 
through micro-scale studies (S.-R. Lim et al., 2010). Overall, evidence is mixed for the “race to 
the bottom” hypothesis, meaning that investigations into competition for US Federal contracts 
could add to this growing area of research. 
Hill et al. (2020) found that contractors had higher hazardous release than noncontractors 
and that the trend was consistent across multiple sectors. Further, US Federal contractors in the 
US have a long history of being associated with environmental damage (J. M. Davidson, 2011; 
Seymour, 1992) especially within the Department of Defense (DOD) and military operations that 
are associated with known human health impacts (Hooks & Smith, 2004). Notably, such 
associations have led to a smattering of policy proposals and some changes to procurement 
practice to make purchasing greener (D. J. Davidson & Grant, 2012; D. Marron, 2004; D. B. 
Marron, 1997; Testa et al., 2016) with success in some sectors (Flammer, 2018; Li & Geiser, 
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2005) and less success in others including DOD spending (Ramos et al., 2007; Reno, 2020). 
There very well might be associations between higher releases of contractors that are in sectors 
with varying green purchasing pressure (Yen & Yen, 2012) and as winning the bid is the goal of 
the firm, reduced spending on pollution control may save costs in the short-term (Liu et al., 
2020; Wang, 2018). Therefore, we expected to find greater Cr releases from facilities facing 
greater competition in the awarding of US Federal contracts. 
In summary, there continues to be a debate over the relationship between competition and 
the environment. While more competition might lead to more efficient production activity 
among manufacturers as the Porter Hypothesis claims, competition might also lead to more 
pollution as manufacturers reduce investment in pollution control technology to avoid short-term 
costs of this technology. Both sides have support with recent research suggesting that these 
hypotheses co-exist with an emphasis on context (Zhou et al., 2017) and a contingent lens be 
used for interpreting results (Aragón-Correa & A. Rubio-López, 2007). In the next section we 
conduct an analysis of manufacturer activity in the context of competition intensity for US 
Federal Government contracts with results connecting to both hypotheses and supporting 
nuanced interpretation of the environment/competition relationship. 
 
Methods 
 Our analysis uses data from secondary sources, including publicly reported management 
data on Cr pollution releases. We first synthesize these data and connect to facility-level business 
statistics and government contract awardee data. Our study is operationalized at the facility level 
with reported Cr releases for each facility in each year of the study. The process of selecting and 
combining the data as well as the description of our Bayesian model are described below. 
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Case selection: Chromium and the Toxics Release Inventory 
Cr is naturally occurring in the environment as chromite (FeCr2O4) and as a pollutant 
from industrial activity. Cr has three stable valence states: chromium 0 (Cr (0)), chromium III 
(Cr (III)), and chromium VI (Cr (VI)). Both Cr (III) and Cr (VI) are common pollutants and Cr 
(VI) has significantly higher toxicity. Cr can also occur with other metals (i.e. crocoite, PbCrO4) 
forming Cr compounds (Shadreck & Mugadza, 2013). We selected Cr for our case analysis 
because of the high toxicity of Cr relative to other chemicals (Costa & Klein, 2006), its 
widespread use across a variety of different manufacturing processes including the making of 
dyes, stainless steel, leather tanning, and electroplated materials, and its importance as a 
component material in those processes (Shadreck & Mugadza, 2013). Limiting releases of Cr is 
important for protecting human health, but there is also economic benefit to limiting releases of 
Cr in manufacturing processes that use the chemical as a component. Such processes rely on Cr 
as an input at the start of the manufacturing process so limiting releases can save costs at both 
ends of the product’s life cycle (Nishitani et al., 2011). 
We use data from the US EPA’s TRI to identify facilities reporting Cr usage and releases 
in the US from 2001 to 2012. The TRI is a database of annually reported chemical management 
and release data from qualifying facilities (EPA, 2019). TRI data have been used extensively to 
understand the disproportionate impact of aggregate releases on segregated communities 
(Charette et al., 2021; Collins et al., 2016), as well as to understand the relationship between 
facility size and pollution releases. Recent findings suggest that economic activity does not 
explain disproportionate pollution outcomes (Collins et al., 2020). Most studies utilize these data 
at aggregate levels summing releases at the facility (Collins et al., 2020; Hill et al., 2020; 
Stretesky et al., 2017) or chemical-level (Koehler & Spengler, 2007; S. R. Lim et al., 2011). 
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There are no studies, however, which examine the “use codes” reported under TRI currently 
collected in File Type 1B (EPA, 2019).  
As part of the reporting requirements for the TRI, each chemical reported includes 
indicators for whether the chemical is manufactured, processed, or otherwise used and the 
general nature of these activities forming a set of chemical “use codes” (EPA, 2015). Our study 
is one of the first to apply these use codes to understand how chemical use might impact 
management of that same chemical by a facility. We include the use code for whether Cr was 
used as a formulation component, and is defined as the chemical being added to a product or 
mixture “prior to further distribution of the product” and includes uses such as dyes and solvents 
(EPA, 2015, p. 50). In our data, 308 facility-years representing 46 facilities report using Cr as a 
formulation component only. The second code we include is for whether Cr was used as an 
article component, and is defined as the “chemical [becoming] an integral component of an 
article to be distributed for industrial, trade, or consumer use” (EPA, 2015, p. 50). In our data, 
3,464 facility-years representing 451 facilities report using Cr as an article component only. We 
also have 160 facility-years representing 13 facilities that report using the chemical in both ways. 
There are 478 facility-years representing 73 facilities that use Cr in other ways. If not a 
component in the production process, the TRI includes other use options for facility managers to 
report such as use as a reactant and non-incorporative activities (activities that use the chemical, 
but it does not end up in the final product). It is important to note that Cr is reported in two 
categories: one is for Cr and the other for Cr compounds. We use the former because its identity 
is clear whereas Cr compounds could be any of several chemicals with even more varied uses. In 
total, our study includes 26,636 facility-years from 2001-2012, covering Cr-specific releases. We 
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then analyze these data to determine the facilities we would need business statistics and 
government contract data for. 
 
Facility business statistics 
Longitudinal, facility-level business data on TRI facilities are from the National 
Establishment Time Series (NETS) 2013 version (Walls and Associates, 2015). These data 
include facility-level data on annual sales and employment from 2001 to 2012, facility 
ownership, and firm size characteristics. Ownership is characterized in our analysis as bivariate 
dummy variables for corporate or private (single) ownership and foreign or domestically owned. 
Number of years reporting is estimated by taking the last year the facility reported as being “in 
business” and subtracting the first year the facility reported to the TRI, which began in 1987. 
Sales and employment are kept at the annual level and matched to the reporting year for each 
facility. Firm size is determined by the number of establishments with the same parent company 
(see Lannelongue et al., 2015; Lenox & Nash, 2003 for example use) and is an indicator of firm 
complexity (Perrow, 1986). Merging with TRI is completed using a NETS Duns Number to TRI 
Facility ID crosswalk. Of our original TRI facilities reporting Cr, 24,889 facility-year records are 
matched to the NETS data resulting in a match success of 93.4 percent. We use a subset of these 
data to only include government contractors by merging in data on US Federal spending. 
 
US Federal contract data 
The US maintains a public record of spending via the US Federal Procurement Data 
System and these data are available at the level of annual totals, award, and transactions from 
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USASpending.gov (USASpending, 2020). We use transaction level data from 2001 to 2012 for 
all contract type payments and then selected records that were issued to facilities with matching 
Duns Numbers to our TRI-NETS merged data for facilities reporting Cr. In total, our final 
dataset consists of 4,410 facility-year records for contractors that reported Cr to the TRI for 583 
unique TRI facilities. (See Table 10 for descriptive statistics).  
Table 10: Descriptive statistics and vague priors for parameters 
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The USASpending data provides our key predictor for competition: the reported number 
of bids per award. We aggregate the transaction data to the facility-level per year, averaging 
number of bids per facility per year. In addition, other covariates include the total contract 
dollars paid to the facility each year, the proportion of sales from contracts derived by dividing 
the annual award total by the total annual sales from the NETS data, the number of awards the 
facility received, the contract payment type the awards used (incentive, cost-plus, or fixed price), 
and the number of awards that included requirements for use of EPA products. We also include 
other covariates on regulatory management. 
 
Additional covariates 
Data about facility-level regulatory pressure is garnered from the Enforcement and 
Compliance History Online (ECHO) (EPA, 2020a). These data include the number of 
inspections at the facility from 2001 to 2012 as an integer variable and whether the facility is 
within 10 miles of a Native American Tribe coded as a Yes/No indicator variable (Table 11). We 
also include whether the facility is an EJScreen facility. EJScreen is the EPA’s environmental 
justice (EJ) screening tool. The EJScreen tool is used to assign an EJ index to each Census block 
group. This index is internally consistent and block groups are compared regarding the percentile 
they are in. If a facility is in a block group of the 80th or higher national percentile of one of the 
primary environmental justice indexes that the EPA has established, then the facility receives a 
flag indicating it is an EJScreen facility (EPA, 2020b). This is an indicator variable in our 
analyses flagging facilities as Yes or No regarding whether they are EJScreen facilities (Table 
11). Environmental justice research continues to support the notion that the worst polluters are in 
segregated communities (Collins et al., 2016; Mohai et al., 2009) and that Native American 
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communities are also disproportionately impacted (Hooks & Smith, 2004). Therefore, inclusion 
of these covariates controlled for different facility and regulatory actions.  
We do not examine the role of parent companies in our analyses because 86.4 percent of 
our facilities are single establishment firms and model diagnostics indicate no benefit of their 
inclusion as fixed or random effects. Sensitivity analysis of single facility firms alone did not 
yield significantly different results; therefore, all data are included in the final model. All 
descriptive statistics are collected in Tables 10 and 11.  
 
Table 11: Counts for categorical variables and groups 
Used as a formulation component No: 3942 Yes: 468      Facility-year 
(β) 
Used as an article component No: 786 Yes: 3624      Facility-year 
(β) 
Cost-plus No: 4362 Yes: 48      Facility (γ) 
Incentive No: 4134 Yes: 276      Facility (γ) 
Foreign Owned No: 3722 Yes: 688      Facility (γ) 
Corporately owned No: 2811 Yes: 1599      Facility (γ) 
         
Proximate to Native American 
tribe 
No: 3468 Yes: 942      Facility (γ) 
EJScreen facility No: 2955 Yes: 1455       Facility (γ) 
Facilities 583       ψ 
Industries (6-digit NAICS) 138       τ 
Years 12       ρ 
 
Statistical analyses 
We specify a Bayesian hierarchical model with a nested data structure for each year, 
grouped by facilities and industries. We include a fixed effect for year. Our model is outlined in 
the directed acyclic graph in Figure 15. The complete model statement we use is: 
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[𝜷𝑖𝑗𝑘 , 𝝆𝑖𝑗𝑘 , 𝜎
𝟐, 𝝍𝑗𝑘 , 𝜸𝑗𝑘 , δ









× 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(𝝍𝑗𝑘| 𝑔(𝜸𝑗𝑘 , 𝝉𝑘 , 𝒘𝑗𝑘), δ
2) 
× 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(𝜷𝑖𝑗𝑘|0, 100) 
× 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(𝝆𝑖𝑗𝑘|0, 100) 
× 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚(𝜎𝟐|0, 200) 
× 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(𝜸𝑗𝑘|0, 100)  
× 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚(ζ 2|0, 200) 




Our response variable, log (𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘) is the log +1 transformed Cr releases for each i year for each j 
facility within each k industry.  Log + 1 is used so that facilities reporting zero Cr releases could 
be included. The deterministic model for log (𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘 ) is a linear function of the predictors and 
random intercepts for industry represented by this equation: 
 
log (𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘) = 𝝍𝑗𝑘 + 𝛒𝑖𝑗𝑘 +  𝜷𝑖𝑗𝑘 𝒙𝑖𝑗𝑘  [2] 
 
𝜷𝑖𝑗𝑘  is a vector of facility-year coefficients and 𝒙𝑖𝑗𝑘  is a matrix of predictor variables at the 
facility-year level. 𝛒𝑖𝑗𝑘  is a vector of year fixed effects (entering the model as random 
intercepts).  𝝍𝑗𝑘  is the vector of facility intercepts. We use data at the facility level to model the 
facility random intercepts using this equation: 
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 𝝍𝑗𝑘 =  𝝉𝑘+𝜸𝑗𝑘𝒘𝑗𝑘  [3] 
 
𝜸𝑗𝑘  is the vector of facility coefficients and 𝒘𝑗𝑘  is the matrix of facility predictor variables. 𝝉𝑘  is 
the vector of industry random intercepts. In equation [1], 𝜎𝟐 is the variance for the mean of 
log (𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘) and ζ 
2 is the variance for the mean facility intercept.  
 
Figure 15: Directed acyclic graph representing the hierarchical structure of our model (created 
using Barrett, 2021; Textor et al., 2016).  
 
Priors are specified in our model statement (equation 1). We use appropriately vague 
priors as a starting point and because our outcomes are most likely going to be within a range of 
zero to one, we selected a mean of zero and standard deviation of 100 for the coefficient vectors. 
Vague priors with means of zero and standard deviations of 100 ensure sufficiently flat priors 
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without impeding computation (see Gelman & Hill, 2009  for more discussion of this). We have 
a high number of zero values in our data (Figure 16) and therefore we also fit a zero-inflated 
hurdle model to our data as well. The zero-inflated model is better at predicting zero values, but 
there is greater evidence of lack of good model fit compared to the model we present in our main 
results. Therefore, we do not report results of the zero-inflated model in the main portion of the 
paper, but it is instead reported in Appendix B. 
Our model is fit using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) with 10,000 iterations for 
three chains. Convergence of the MCMC chains was assessed using the Gelman-Rubin 
diagnostic. Model fit is evaluated using Bayesian p-values and a posterior predictive check 
comparing our model predictions to the underlying data distribution. The “rjags” package is used 
for analysis along with the “actuar” and “MCMCvis” packages for model summaries and 
visualization (Dutang et al., 2008; Plummer, 2019; Youngflesh, 2018). Plotting and data 
summaries are further completed using the “tidybayes” and “ggmcmc” packages (Fernandez-i-
Marin, 2016; Kay, 2020). All analyses and visualizations are completed using R statistical 
software version 4.0.3 (R Core Team, 2020).  
 
Results 
Convergence and model checking 
MCMC convergence for most parameters occurs after 1000 iterations in our model with 
the random variables for facility and industry group taking the entire 10,000 to sufficiently 
converge. Gelman-Rubin statistics range from 1 to 1.04 showing convergence of the three 
chains. Bayesian p-values for the mean, standard deviation, and discrepancy of our response 
variable are used to assess model fit. A Bayesian p-value is calculated by simulating new data at 
135 
 
each iteration of the converged chain sampling from the likelihood of means and addresses 
whether the model can “give rise to new observations that properly resemble the original data” 
(Hobbs & Hooten, 2015, p. 188). Values are close to 0.5 for each suggesting our model is good 
at predicting our data (Table 12).  
Table 12: Bayesian p-values for predicted mean, standard deviation, and discrepancy of yijk. 
Values between 0.1 and 0.9 indicate the model is good at predicting the data with no evidence 
of lack of fit. 
 
Mean Standard Deviation 
Predicted standard deviation 0.6564 0.4749 
Predicted mean 0.4985 0.5000 
Predicted discrepancy 0.5074 0.5000 
 
In addition, we plot the predicted values against our data (Figure 16) and the visualization 
suggests good model fit. While the model might be underpredicting zero values, the zero-inflated 
model had several indicators of lack of fit suggesting it is not superior to the model presented 
here. Parameter estimates are not substantially different in the zero-inflated model; therefore, we 
restrict our presentation of results in the main paper to the original model and report the zero-




Figure 16: Probability of the posterior mean for the simulated data shown with the density of the 
observed data. The simulated data closely follows the observed data suggested good model fit 
although the model might be underpredicting zero values. 
 
Competition and components  
Our predictor of interest is competition intensity for government contracts measured in 
average bids each year for awards a facility received. The average effect of bids on total Cr 
releases is positive with a posterior mean of 0.1604 (Table 13), however, the Bayesian credible 
interval (BCI) of 95 percent contains zero suggesting that mean bids does not contribute 
significantly to an increase in Cr releases among contractors (Figure 17). The average effect was 











95% BCI Parameter 
Log bids 0.1604 0.1379 (-0.1138, 0.4267) Facility-year 
(β) 
Log total award 
dollars 
0.0102 0.0078 (-0.0052, 0.0253) Facility-year 
(β) 
Proportion of sales 
from contracts 
0.7631 0.2437 (0.2777, 1.2362) Facility-year 
(β) 
Number of awards -0.0007 0.0006 (-0.0018, 5e-04) Facility-year 
(β) 
Log sales 0.1439 0.0561 (0.0278, 0.2535) Facility-year 
(β) 
Log employment -0.0702 0.0649 (-0.197, 0.0563) Facility-year 
(β) 
Number of awards 
with EPA 
requirements 




0.9959 0.1821 (0.6478, 1.3608) Facility-year 
(β) 










-0.2915 0.1344 (-0.555, -0.0208) Facility-year 
(β) 
Cost-plus -0.1289 100.2808 (-195.8798, 194.8546) Facility (γ) 
Incentive 0.2727 1.0469 (-1.7818, 2.3021) Facility (γ) 
Corporation size 
and complexity 
0.0425 0.0444 (-0.0437, 0.1282) Facility (γ) 
Number of 
reporting years 
0.2085 0.1658 (-0.1137, 0.5692) Facility (γ) 
Foreign Owned -0.4163 0.9222 (-2.236, 1.3913) Facility (γ) 
Corporately owned -0.3638 0.4737 (-1.282, 0.5774) Facility (γ) 
Number of 
inspections 




-0.7658 1.0065 (-2.7369, 1.21) Facility (γ) 
EJScreen facility -0.4919 0.5603 (-1.5956, 0.599) Facility (γ) 
Notes: Coefficient means can be interpreted on their original scales using percent changes. If 
the variable was not log transformed, interpretation is: for every one unit change in x, y 
increases by (eβ – 1) *100percent (γ for facility covariates). If the variable was log 
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transformed, interpretation is adjusted by a factor of 10. For example, for every 10% change in 
w, y increases by ((1.1β) – 1) *100 percent. 
 
 
Figure 17: Density of the posterior mean value for log bids centered around 0.16 as the most 
likely effect of log bids on Cr releases. Values for each chain are close to one another indicating 
convergence. 95 percent BCI is indicated by the dashed lines.  
 
The other predictors of interest are chemical usage as a formulation or article component 
in the manufacturing process. The average effect of Cr being used as a formulation component in 
the process is positive with a posterior mean of 0.9959 (Table 13). The 95 percent BCI does not 
contain zero, suggesting that contractors using Cr as a formulation component report 
significantly higher releases of Cr than facilities that do not use Cr as a formulation component 
(Figure 18). On average, facilities that use Cr as a formulation component release 170 percent 
more Cr than facilities that do not use Cr as a formulation component. The effect was similar for 
facilities using Cr as an article component where releases are higher than facilities that did not 
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use Cr as an article component. The posterior mean of this effect is 0.9763 (Table 13) and the 
BCI does not contain zero suggesting this variable is significant in predicting greater Cr releases 
(Figure 19).  
 
Figure 18: Density of the posterior mean value for facilities that use Cr as a formulation 
component centered around 0.99 with those facilities releasing more Cr on average. The average 
effect for the interaction with log bids is centered around -0.34. Both values’ 95 percent BCI do 
not include zero suggesting significant contribution as predictors for total Cr releases in the 
model.  
The interaction between bids and Cr being used as a formulation component has a 
negative effect on Cr releases with a posterior mean of -0.3463 (Table 13) and the BCI did not 
contain zero meaning this effect contributed to significantly lower Cr releases (Figure 18). This 
interaction was interpreted by comparing the interaction mean of bids and formulation 
component to the effect of bids alone, which was positive, by subtracting the interaction mean 
effect from the bids mean effect (0.1604 – 0.3463). The average effect was that with every 10 
percent increase in mean bids, facilities using Cr as a formulation component have decreasing 
releases by 1.8 percent and this decrease is significant. We can see this bivariate interaction in 
Figure 19 where facilities using Cr as a formulation component have initially higher releases 
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when log(bids) is equal to zero, but as bids go up, Cr releases decline for facilities using Cr as a 
formulation component.  
 
Figure 19: The bivariate interaction between log bids and Cr being used a formulation 
component is negative with more bids leading to less Cr releases.  
 
A similar association is observed for the interaction between facilities reporting Cr as an 
article component and bids with a posterior mean of -0.2915 (Table 13). The BCI does not cross 
zero meaning that this interaction contributed a significant negative effect on Cr releases (Figure 
20). The average effect is that with every 10 percent increase in mean bids, if a facility uses Cr as 
an article component their releases decrease by 1.3 percent as seen in the bivariate association in 




Figure 20: Density of the posterior mean value for facilities that use Cr as an article component 
centered around 0.97 with those facilities releasing more Cr on average. The average effect for 
the interaction with log bids is centered around -0.29. Both values’ 95 percent BCI do not 
include zero suggesting significant contribution as predictors for total Cr releases in the model. 
 
Figure 21: The bivariate interaction between log bids and Cr being used an article component is 




Some additional covariates contribute to significant changes in Cr releases from 
contractors. The proportion of sales from contracts for a facility is positively associated with 
greater Cr releases with a mean effect of 0.7631 (Table 13) meaning that on average, holding 
other variables constant, a one unit rise in proportion of sales in contracts equals an average 
increase in Cr releases of 114 percent. The large rise is due to this predictor’s range being from 0 
to 1; rescaled the association can be interpreted as a 1 percent rise in sales from contracts results 
in a 2 percent rise in Cr releases. Sales also are associated with a rise in Cr releases with a 
posterior mean of 0.1439 (Table 13) and does not include zero in the BCI (Figure 22). The 
average effect is that every 10 percent increase in sales resulted in an average increase in Cr 
releases of 1.3 percent.  
 
Figure 22: Parameter posterior means and 95 percent BCI’s. Beta group parameters were at the 
facility-year level and gamma parameters were at the facility level. Note the effect of cost-plus 
contracts was left out of this figure because its BCI width was too large to display visually with 




Our model results also show positive associations for total award dollars and Cr releases, 
but these results are not significant (Figure 22). In addition, number of awards, employment, 
foreign ownership, and corporate ownership are negatively associated with Cr releases, but the 
BCI for these predictors contained zero suggesting the associations are not significant (Figure 
22). Our inspection and environmental justice variables are also not significantly associated with 
Cr releases as are our results for contract type (cost-plus and incentive). Number of years 




The results of our analysis support the hypothesis that more contract competition (more 
bids) is associated with more Cr releases, but this association does no contribute significantly to 
our model of Cr releases reported by contractors. On its own, the probability of bids having a 
positive effect on Cr releases is higher than the probability of a zero or negative effect when 
examining the density of the posterior mean of the log(bids) parameter (Figure 17). This supports 
other observations of a “race to the bottom” regarding the impact of competition on 
environmental performance (Rassier & Earnhart, 2010). We also find, however, that the 
interaction of bids and chemical use significantly influences Cr releases. The interaction effect of 
bids and whether Cr is used as a formulation or article component weakens the positive 
relationship between Cr releases and bids supporting our hypothesis. Further, there is a 
significant negative association between bids and Cr releases if Cr is used as a component in the 
manufacturing process (Figures 4.6 and 4.7). These findings suggest that as competition 
increases, facilities will release more Cr unless it is used as a component in the production 
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process. Therefore, this finding supports the Porter Hypothesis and other scholarship observing 
similar effects of competition on environmental performance (Wang, 2018; Wong et al., 2020). 
Therefore, while a “race to the bottom” regarding contract competition intensity and pollution 
releases may be occurring as some scholars suggest (Hill et al., 2020), that association is 
influenced by the specific operating practices and uses of the chemicals reported by the facility. 
These results are more in line with the proposition made by Aragon-Correa and Rubio-
Lopez (2007) that a contingent lens be used with variation in production processes leading to 
findings that support both the Porter Hypothesis and the “race to the bottom.” Therefore, our 
results fall within the more recent calls by Zhou et al. (2017) and Wu et al. (Wu et al., 2019) for 
both of these hypotheses on competition and environmental performance to coexist and be 
contextualized in different situations. Our findings suggest greater complexity in the relationship 
between competition intensity and pollution particularly with single-chemical associations. Thus, 
further studies looking at individual chemical associations might have more to contribute to the 
understanding of competition and environmental pollution than aggregate studies. Future work 
should also work to improve on limitations of our study. 
An important limitation of our study is that the power of our findings is limited by the 
small sample we restrict our study to, namely the choice to examine contractors only. While this 
decision allows integration of important data on US Federal contracting and takes advantage of 
the bidding magnitude as an indicator of competition intensity, our sample is greatly reduced. 
Future studies could simulate data to address this issue or expand to examine competition using 
another indicator. The fact that we do find some associations indicates the importance of more 
studies like ours examining disaggregated releases and more chemicals. One other limitation of 
our study is that we examine releases of Cr only whereas future studies could look at multiple 
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management options for Cr including transfers and recycling that are also reported in the TRI. 
Despite these limitations, findings do hold important regulatory implications. 
Regulators of Cr may use these results to refine standards for Cr, knowing that 
competition may have a negative effect on Cr releases but only for facilities using Cr as a 
component. This could mean that new policy standards for Cr and other chemicals should 
consider the uses of the chemical at the facilities with knowledge that how the chemical is used 
impacts management. These findings are also relevant to regulators looking at the relationship 
between facilities that are government contractors and their toxic waste management. Current US 
Federal procurement policy supports decreasing purchases of products with high toxic materials 
(Federal Acquisition Regulation Subpart 23, 2021) and our study shows that there might be 
benefits to green procurement with greater competition intensity. In addition, our covariate 
finding that facilities with more of their sales from contracts also having greater Cr releases 
supports other research that government contractors are associated with higher pollution (Hill et 
al., 2020) and procurement officials should consider updating green purchasing standards to 
increase procurement from vendors with lower hazardous releases. Integrating purchasing 
practices with open data and publicly available data sources, like the TRI, could help this 
procedure by providing a way to assess vendor’s toxic materials footprint. This was outside the 
scope of this paper, but the methods to link the datasets could be replicated and have potentially 
significant regulatory uses such as providing an index for comparing potential vendors 
environmental performance. 
Future studies could expand upon our Bayesian model by bringing in additional 
chemicals as fixed effects or random effects, modelled with chemical-level data from other 
sources (e.g., the price of the chemical and chemical specific regulatory standards). In our study, 
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the fixed effect for year is useful in controlling for the average decline in Cr releases over time as 
seen in Appendix B but studies using time as a predictor might consider bringing year into the 
model a random slope term by industry, which may enable additional understanding about 
changes over time. In our study, inter-industry variation is not observed as a significant factor 
because we did not have many observations in each industry to draw industry level conclusions 
(see Appendix B). Expanding our sample to include more chemicals or to look at noncontractors 
could provide more data to inform industry-level conclusions about environmental pollution. 
Also, industry-level covariates could be added into the model. In summary, the Bayesian method 
has many opportunities for future researchers to build upon work presented here. 
 
Conclusion 
Competition between contractors leads to more Cr releases supportive of a “race to the 
bottom” regarding inter-firm competition for US Federal agency awards. Less releases are 
observed for facilities that use the facility as a component in the manufacturing process 
suggesting that specific manufacturing processes are important and need to be considered 
alongside other factors. In terms of both the “race to the bottom” hypothesis and the Porter 
Hypothesis, we do not find stable support for consistently directed relationships between 
competition intensity and pollution releases – in other words it’s not as simple as supporting or 
rejecting either of these hypotheses as other researchers have proposed (Zhou et al., 2017). 
Rather, the relationship between competition and environmental performance is complex and 
situationally driven. How chemicals are used differently by facilities and how this impacts 
management should be studied more particularly related to firm environmental activity. Lastly, 
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the Bayesian modelling approach is effective at and it has much to offer for future investigations 
of this kind.  
 
References 
Albrizio, S., Kozluk, T., & Zipperer, V. (2017). Environmental policies and productivity growth: 
Evidence across industries and firms. Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management, 81. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2016.06.002 
Ambec, S., Cohen, M. A., Elgie, S., & Lanoie, P. (2013). The Porter hypothesis at 20: can 
environmental regulation enhance innovation and competitiveness? Review of 
Environmental Economics and Policy, 7(1), 2–22. 
Aragón-Correa, J. A., & A. Rubio-López, E. (2007). Proactive Corporate Environmental 
Strategies: Myths and Misunderstandings. Long Range Planning, 40(3), 357–381. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lrp.2007.02.008 
Aznar, B., Pellicer, E., Davis, S., & Ballestros-Perez, P. (2017). Factors Affecting Contractor’s 
Bidding Success for International Infrastructure Projects in Australia. Journal of Civil 
Engineering and Management, 23(7), 880–889. 
https://doi.org/10.3846/13923730.2017.1341955 
Barrett, M. (2021). ggdag: Analyze and Create Elegant Directed Acyclic Graphs (R package 
version 0.2.3). https://cran.r-project.org/package=ggdag 
Barrows, G., & Ollivier, H. (2018). Cleaner firms or cleaner products? How product mix shapes 
emission intensity from manufacturing. Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management, 88, 134–158. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2017.10.008 
Bartik, T. J. (1988). The effects of environmental regulation on business location in the United 
148 
 
States. Growth and Change, 19(3), 22–44. 
Cai, X., Lu, Y., Wu, M., & Yu, L. (2016). Does environmental regulation drive away inbound 
foreign direct investment? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China. Journal of 
Development Economics, 123. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.08.003 
Charette, A. T., Collins, M. B., & Mirowsky, J. E. (2021). Assessing residential socioeconomic 
factors associated with pollutant releases using EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory. Journal of 
Environmental Studies and Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-021-00664-7 
Cole, M. A., Elliot, R. J., & Zhang, L. (2017). Foreign direct investment and the environment. 
Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 42, 465–487. 
Collins, M. B., Munoz, I., & Jaja, J. (2016). Linking ‘toxic outliers’ to environmental justice 
communities. Environmental Research Letters, 11, 1–9. 
https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/11/1/015004 
Collins, M. B., Pulver, S., Hill, D., & Manski, B. (2020). Characterizing disproportionality in 
facility-level toxic releases in US manufacturing, 1998–2012. Environmental Research 
Letters, 15(6), 064002. https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ab7393 
Costa, M., & Klein, C. B. (2006). Toxicity and Carcinogenicity of Chromium Compounds in 
Humans. Critical Reviews in Toxicology, 3, 155–163. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10408440500534032 
Davidson, D. J., & Grant, D. (2012). The double diversion: mapping its roots and projecting its 
future in environmental studies. Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences, 2(1), 69–
77. 
Davidson, J. M. (2011). Polluting Without Consequence: How BP and Other Large Government 
Contractors Evade Suspension and Debarment for Environmental Crime and Misconduct. 
149 
 
Pace Environmental Law Review, 29(1), 257–288. 
Delmas, M. A., & Toffel, M. W. (2008). Organizational responses to environmental demands: 
Opening the black box. Strategic Management Journal, 29(10), 1027–1055. 
Donnan, J., Lanoie, P., & Laplante, B. (2005). Determinants of environmental performance in 
the Canadian pulp and paper industry: An assessment from inside the industry. Ecological 
Economics, 55(1), 73–84. 
Dutang, C., Goulet, V., & Pigeon, M. (2008). actuar: An R Package for Actuarial Science. 
Journal of Statistical Software, 25(7), 38. http://www.jstatsoft.org/v25/i07 
Edquist, C., Vonortas, N. S., Zabala-Ituriagagoitia, J. M., & Edler, J. (2015). Public Procurement 
for Innovation. Edward Elgar Publishing. 
EPA. (2015). Toxic Chemical Release Inventory Reporting Forms and Instructions (Revised 
2015 Version). https://ofmpub.epa.gov/apex/guideme_ext/f?p=104%3A41 
EPA. (2019). Toxics Release Inventory. Environmental Protection Agency. 
https://www.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-program 
EPA. (2020a). All data results guide. Enforcement and Compliance History Online. 
https://echo.epa.gov/help/facility-search/all-data-search-results-help#results 
EPA. (2020b). EJSCREEN: Environmental Justice Screening and Mapping Tool. United States 
Environmental Protection Agency. https://www.epa.gov/ejscreen 
EPA. (2020c). Pollution prevention law and policy. Environmental Protection Agency. 
https://www.epa.gov/p2/pollution-prevention-law-and-policies 
Fernandez-i-Marin, X. (2016). ggmcmc: Analysis of MCMC Samples and Bayesian Inference. 
Journal of Statistical Software, 70(9), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v070.i09 
Flammer, C. (2018). Competing for government procurement contracts: The role of corporate 
150 
 
social responsibility. Strategic Management Journal, 39(5), 1299–1324. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2767 
Gelman, A., & Hill, J. ennifer. (2009). Data Analysis Using Regression and 
Multilevel/Hierarchical Models (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. 
Gonzalez-Benito, J., & Gonzalez-Benito, O. (2010). A study of determinant factors of 
stakeholder environmental pressure perceived by industrial companies. Business Strategy of 
the Environment, 19, 164–181. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1002/bse.631 
Gray, W. B., & Shadbegian, R. J. (1995). Pollution abatement costs, regulation, and plant-level 
productivity. In NBER Working Paper (No. 4994). 
Hart, S. L., & Ahuja, G. (1996). Does it pay to be green? Business Strategy and the Environment, 
5, 30–37. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207239908711219 
Hart, S. L., & Dowell, G. (2011). A natural-resource-based view of the firm: Fifteen years after. 
Journal of Management, 37(5), 1464–1479. https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206310390219 
Henderson, D. J., & Millimet, D. L. (2007). Pollution Abatement Costs and Foreign Direct 
Investment Inflows To U . S . States : a Nonparametric Reassessment. The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 89(February), 178–183. 
Hill, D. T., Vidon, E. S., & Collins, M. B. (2020). Public money and private interests: United 
States government contract awardees’ contribution to industrial pollution production. 
Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-020-00614-
9 
Hobbs, N. T., & Hooten, M. B. (2015). Bayesian Models: A Statistical Primer for Ecologists. 
Princeton University Press. 
Hooks, G., & Smith, C. L. (2004). The treadmill of destruction: national sacrifice areas and 
151 
 
Native Americans. American Sociological Review2, 69(4), 558–575. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177%2F000312240406900405 
Hull, C. E., & Rothenberg, S. (2008). The Effect of Firm Compensation Structures on the 
Mobility and Entrepreneurship of Extreme Performers. Strategic Management Journal, 29, 
781–789. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj 
Jaffe, A. B., Peterson, S. R., Portney, P. R., & Stavins, R. N. (1995). Environmental regulation 
and the competitiveness of US manufacturing: what does the evidence tell us?. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 33(1), 132–163. 
Kay, M. (2020). tidybayes: Tidy Data and Geoms for Bayesian Models (R package verions 
2.3.1). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1308151 
Khan, N. (2018). Public Procurement Fundamentals: Lessons From and For the Field. Emerald 
Publishing Limited. 
Koehler, D. A., & Spengler, J. D. (2007). The toxic release inventory: Fact or fiction? A case 
study of the primary aluminum industry. Journal of Environmental Management, 85(2), 
296–307. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2006.09.025 
Lannelongue, G., Gonzalez-Benito, J., & Gonzalez-Benito, O. (2015). Input, output, and 
environmental management productivity: Effects on firm performance. Business Strategy 
and the Environment, 24(3), 145–158. https://doi.org/10.1002/bse.1806 
Lenox, M. J., & Nash, J. (2003). Industry self-regulation and adverse selection: A comparison 
across four trade association programs. Business Strategy and the Environment, 12(6), 343–
356. https://doi.org/10.1002/bse.380 
Lewis, G., & Bajari, P. (2014). Moral hazard, incentive contracts, and risk: evidence from 




Li, L., & Geiser, K. (2005). Environmentally responsible public procurement (ERPP) and its 
implications for integrated product policy (IPP). Journal of Cleaner Production, 13(7), 
705–715. 
Lim, S.-R., Lam, C. W., & Schoenung, J. M. (2010). Quantity-based and toxicity-based 
evaluation of the US Toxics Release Inventory. Journal of Hazardous Materials, 178(1–3), 
49–56. 
Lim, S. R., Lam, C. W., & Schoenung, J. M. (2011). Priority screening of toxic chemicals and 
industry sectors in the U.S. toxics release inventory: A comparison of the life cycle impact-
based and risk-based assessment tools developed by U.S. EPA. Journal of Environmental 
Management, 92(9), 2235–2240. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2011.04.008 
Link, S., & Naveh, E. (2006). Standardization and discretion: Does the environmental standard 
ISO 14001 lead to performance benefits? IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 
53(4), 508–519. https://doi.org/10.1109/TEM.2006.883704 
Liu, H., Owens, K. A., Yang, K., & Zhang, C. (2020). Pollution abatement costs and technical 
changes under different environmental regulations. China Economic Review, 62(December 
2018), 101497. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2020.101497 
López-Gamero, M. D., & Molina-Azorín, J. F. (2016). Environmental Management and Firm 
Competitiveness: The Joint Analysis of External and Internal Elements. Long Range 
Planning, 49(6), 746–763. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lrp.2015.12.002 
Marron, D. (2004). Greener Public Purchasing as an Environmental Policy Instrument. OECD 
Journal on Budgeting, 3(4), 71–105. https://doi.org/10.1787/budget-v3-art23-en 
Marron, D. B. (1997). Buying green: government procurement as an instrument of environmental 
153 
 
policy. Public Finance Review, 25(3), 285–305. 
May, P. J. (2005). Regulation and compliance motivations: Examining different approaches. 
Public Administration Review, 65(1), 31–44. 
McAfee, R. P., & McMillan, J. (1986). Bidding for Contracts : A Principal-Agent Analysis. The 
RAND Journal of Economics, 17(3), 326–338. 
McConnell, V. D., & Schwab, R. M. (1990). The impact of environmental regulation on industry 
location decisions: The motor vehicle industry. Land Economics, 66(1), 67–81. 
Millimet, D. L., & List, J. A. (2003). A natural experiment on the “race to the bottom” 
hypothesis: Testing for stochastic dominance in temporal pollution trends. Oxford Bulletin 
of Economics and Statistics, 65(4), 395–420. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0084.t01-1-
00054 
Mohai, P., Pellow, D., & Roberts, J. T. (2009). Environmental Justice. Annual Review of 
Environment and Resources, 34, 405–430. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-
environ-082508-094348 
Nishitani, K., Kaneko, S., Fujii, H., & Komatsu, S. (2011). Effects of the reduction of pollution 
emissions on the economic performance of firms: An empirical analysis focusing on 
demand and productivity. Journal of Cleaner Production, 19(17–18), 1956–1964. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2011.06.021 
Perrow, Charles. 1986. Complex Organizations: A Critical Analysis. Random House. 
Plummer, M. (2019). rjags: Bayesian Graphical Models using MCMC (R package version 4-10). 
https://cran.r-project.org/package=rjags 
Porter, G. (1999). Trade competition and pollution standards: “Race to the bottom” or “Stuck at 




Porter, M. E. (1991). America’s Green Strategy. Scientific American, 264(4), 168. 
Porter, M. E., & Van der Linde, C. (1995a). Green and competitive: ending the stalemate. In E. 
F. M. Wubben (Ed.), The Dynamics of the eco-efficient economy: environmental regulation 
and competitive advantage,. Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Porter, M. E., & Van der Linde, C. (1995b). Toward a new conception of environment-
competitiveness relationship. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(4), 97–118. 
R Core Team. (2020). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R Foundation 
for Statistical Computing. 
Ramanathan, R., He, Q., Black, A., Ghobadian, A., & Gallear, D. (2017). Environmental 
regulations, innovation and firm performance: A revisit of the Porter hypothesis. Journal of 
Cleaner Production, 155. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2016.08.116 
Ramos, T. B., Alves, I., Subtil, R., & Joanaz de Melo, J. (2007). Environmental performance 
policy indicators for the public sector: The case of the defence sector. Journal of 
Environmental Management, 82(4), 410–432. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2005.12.020 
Rasli, A. M., Qureshi, M. I., Isah-Chikaji, A., Zaman, K., & Ahmad, M. (2018). New toxics, race 
to the bottom and revised environmental Kuznets curve: The case of local and global 
pollutants. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 81(August 2017), 3120–3130. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2017.08.092 
Rassier, D. G., & Earnhart, D. (2010). Does the porter hypothesis explain expected future 
financial performance? The effect of clean water regulation on chemical manufacturing 




Reno, J. (2020). Engineering Military Rubbish: The Ethics of Waste in and around a Lockheed 
Martin Facility in New York State. Ethnos. https://doi.org/10.1080/00141844.2020.1796736 
Rubashkina, Y., Galeotti, M., & Verdolini, E. (2015). Environmental regulation and 
competitiveness: Empirical evidence on the Porter Hypothesis from European 
manufacturing sectors. Energy Policy, 83. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2015.02.014 
Seymour, J. F. (1992). Liability of Government Contractors for Environmental Damage. Public 
Contract Law Journal, 491–571. 
Shadreck, M., & Mugadza, T. (2013). Chromium , an essential nutrient and pollutant : A review. 
African Journal of Pure and Applied Chemistry, 7(9), 310–317. 
Sjöberg, E., & Xu, J. (2018). An Empirical Study of US Environmental Federalism: RCRA 
Enforcement From 1998 to 2011. Ecological Economics, 147. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.01.024 
Stretesky, P. B., Lynch, M. J., Long, M. A., & Barrett, K. L. (2017). Does the Modernization of 
Environmental Enforcement Reduce Toxic Releases? An Examination of Self-policing, 
Criminal Prosecutions, and Toxic Releases in the United States, 1988–2014. Sociological 
Spectrum, 37(1), 48–62. https://doi.org/10.1080/02732173.2016.1227288 
Testa, F., Grappio, P., Gusmerotti, N. M., Iraldo, F., & Frey, M. (2016). Examining green public 
procurement using content analysis: existing difficulties for procurers and useful 
recommendations. Environment, Development and Sustainability, 18(1), 197–219. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-015-9634-1 
Textor, J., Van der Zander, B., Gilthorpe, M. S., Liskiewicsz, M., & Ellison, G. T. H. (2016). 
Robust causal inference using directed acyclic graphs: the R package “dagitty.” 
156 
 
International Journal of Epidemiology, 45(6), 1887–1894. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ije/dyw341 
Federal Acquisition Regulation Subpart 23, (2021). https://www.acquisition.gov/far/part-
23#FAR_Subpart_23_1 
USASpending. (2020). USA Spending. USA Spending. https://www.usaspending.gov/#/ 
Walls and Associates. (2015). National Establishment Time-Series (NETS) Database: Database 
Description. www.youreconomy.org/nets/NETSDatabaseDescription.pdf 
Wang, D. D. (2018). Unravelling the effects of the environmental technology portfolio on 
corporate sustainable development. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental 
Management, 25(4), 457–472. https://doi.org/10.1002/csr.1472 
Wong, C. Y., Wong, C. W. Y., & Boon-itt, S. (2020). Effects of green supply chain integration 
and green innovation on environmental and cost performance. International Journal of 
Production Research, 58(15), 4589–4609. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2020.1756510 
Wu, J., Wei, Y. D., Chen, W., & Yuan, F. (2019). Environmental regulations and redistribution 
of polluting industries in transitional China: Understanding regional and industrial 
differences. Journal of Cleaner Production, 206, 142–155. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.09.042 
Yen, Y. X., & Yen, S. Y. (2012). Top-management’s role in adopting green purchasing standards 
in high-tech industrial firms. Journal of Business Research, 65(7), 951–959. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2011.05.002 
Youngflesh, C. (2018). MCMC:vis: Tools to visualize, manipulate, and summarize MCMC 
output. Journal of Open Source Software, 3(24), 640. https://doi.org/10.21105/joss.00640 
Zameer, H., Wang, Y., Yasmeen, H., & Mubarak, S. (2020). Green innovation as a mediator in 
157 
 
the impact of business analytics and environmental orientation on green competitive 
advantage. Management Decision, 71873064. https://doi.org/10.1108/MD-01-2020-0065 
Zhou, Y., Zhu, S., & He, C. (2017). How do environmental regulations affect industrial 





















Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 Examining environmental performance of industrial firms by studying the manufacturing 
facilities they operate provides insight into what sets some firms apart from others as better 
environmental actors. Using integration of public and private data to build statistical models, 
results of this dissertation inform upon the characteristics of firms with US Federal contracts and 
their environmental performance. These results inform upon three primary conclusions. 
Regarding government incentives, results suggest they may be leading to improved 
environmental performance demonstrating the role of regulators in greening industry which 
ecological modernization theorists argue. Secondly, exemptions in contracting have led to 
disproportionate outcomes with defense spending linked to most of the pollution from federal 
agency contractors. This habitus also has led to facilities declining in pollution more slowly with 
different environmental performance and greater potential hazard of releases. 
Third, the relationship between competition and the environment is complex. The Porter 
Hypothesis and “race to the bottom” both explain aspects of chemical management and pollution 
with results of this dissertation supporting other findings where both hypotheses contribute to our 
understanding of firm environmental performance. Each of these conclusions links back to the 
overall research question of this dissertation. 
The key question I address in this dissertation is: How are government contractors that 
mange toxic materials different in their environmental management than noncontractors? This 
question is answered in three separate investigations yielding important results regarding 
differences between government contractors and other facilities. The first difference is that 
contractors are paid differently than noncontractors for the products they produce with incentive-
type contract awardees outperforming other facilities, both contractors and noncontractors alike. 
The second difference is that contractors engage in specialized manufacturing processes for the 
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defense sector, which receives exemptions from following environmental procurement standards; 
these exemptions are linked to disproportionate environmental pollution attributable to the 
defense sector. The third and last difference identified in this dissertation is competition for 
agency contracts where greater environmental releases are coming from contractors facing 
greater competition intensity. The research presented explores these differences in detail and 
contributes to the three primary objectives of this dissertation, which are: 
1. Link purchasing data from US Federal Government agencies to Toxic Release 
Inventory (TRI) facilities, 
2. Evaluate activity of contractor TRI facilities by comparing the number of 
reported pollution control technology, its effectiveness at reducing toxic waste, 
and comparing total toxic releases between contractor facilities, and 
3. Apply socio-environmental theory to: explain motivations for contractor 
environmental actions, understand exemptions granted to defense agencies from 
following green purchasing, and contribute to theory on competition and the 
environment. 
The first objective, linking purchases to TRI facilities is, achieved via the methods for 
data synthesis applied to each research question. These methods show that linking these disparate 
data sources is possible and provides support for their linkage in the future for answering 
complex environmental questions about government spending and associated environmental 
impacts. Further, these methods may inform future policy making and creation of open data 
driven decision tools. 
The second objective, evaluating environmental performance activity of contractor TRI 
facilities, is achieved in the analysis and discussion of each manuscript. Manuscript one (Chapter 
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2) examines environmental activity of facilities regarding their pollution control technology and 
how these voluntary actions are linked to incentive contract awards. This lends support to 
incentive-based policies for achieving environmental goals and is explored more below. 
Manuscripts two and three (Chapters 3 & 4) link toxic releases of contractors to the US Federal 
agencies that issued the award identifying how contractors release more relative to their peers but 
that this dynamic is influenced by competition and chemical usage. Results of all three 
manuscripts include important implications for contracting officials and environmental 
regulators. 
Objective three, applying socio-environmental theory to understand the results of each 
manuscript, is achieved through in-depth exploration of the complex problems studied via three 
theoretical frameworks. Ecological modernization theory explains why contractors receiving 
incentive awards are better actors regarding their pollution control success and this connection 
can inform new policies going forward (discussed below). In addition, agency activity linked to 
contracting has long been connected to policy exemptions routinely justified by fears that new 
environmental standards may impact the national security of the nation. This has allowed for 
formation of a serious problem: most environmental pollution associated with US Federal 
procurement is attributable to these exempt agencies meaning that future policy to address this 
problem must scrutinize whether these exemptions should continue or be modified. Critical 
application of Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus helps explain why this has happened in the 
past and that addressing this issue requires a reframing of purchasing guidance along with a 
reevaluation of purchasing norms. Lastly, the ongoing theoretical debate surrounding the link 
between competition and the environment is contributed to in Chapter 4. Findings support the 
growing idea that this association is more complex and contextual integration of the different 
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hypotheses on the topic is needed (López-Gamero & Molina-Azorín, 2016). The findings of each 
manuscript are reviewed below, followed by a discussion of the broader theoretical implications 
of the dissertation. Policy recommendations are made along with a discussion of the limitations 
shared by each manuscript with ideas for improving upon the analyses and methods. Future 
research projects are also outlined. 
 
Summary of findings 
 The first manuscript’s (Chapter 2) research question was: Do US Federal contractors 
receiving contract awards with additional incentives to reduce costs have different waste 
management practices than contractor facilities without these incentives? Findings indicate that 
incentives in government contracting led to greater reporting of pollution control technology 
(greater pollution prevention) and more successful efforts to reduce pollution. In addition, the 
association is not equal for all subsectors analyzed. Incentive contracts lead to more pollution 
control technology being reported by the transportation manufacturing subsector and computer 
and electronic product manufacturing subsector. Fabricated metal manufacturing shows a weak 
association between incentive contracts and more pollution control reporting while chemical 
manufacturing shows no effect. Overall, the results of Chapter 2 inform three primary 
conclusions. The first is: when incentivized by US Federal Government procurement contracts, 
manufacturing facilities are increasing their efficiency by implementing more pollution 
prevention technology. Second, support is found for key concepts of ecological modernization 
theory including how government policy can guide industry toward positive environmental 
practices via incentives. Third and last, when linked to incentives, voluntary pollution prevention 
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leads to more successful pollution control actions being implemented even when the incentives 
are not tied to pollution control technology but rather to the entire operating costs of the facility.  
 The second manuscript’s (Chapter 3) research question was: Do firms with facilities that 
fulfill US Federal Government contracts from green purchasing exempt agencies (e.g., the DOD) 
have greater hazardous releases than other contractor facilities? The findings of Chapter 3 
show that agencies receiving green purchasing exemptions are linked to the greatest amount of 
pollution produced by manufacturers handling toxic materials. Agencies engaged in defense 
policy such as the Department of Defense (DOD) are the most tied to this inequality with defense 
spending accounting for over 80 percent of all procurement from contractor TRI facilities and 
linked to over 90 percent of all hazardous releases from these facilities. In addition, DOD spends 
very little on contracts that include environmentally preferred purchasing. Also, the facilities that 
DOD purchases from are among the highest polluters individually suggesting that continued 
purchasing with them may produce more pollution going forward. The primary conclusions of 
the second manuscript are that exemptions for defense agencies should be reexamined because 
they are currently linked to the most environmental pollution of all agencies. In addition, these 
exemptions continue to occur because of the habitus of US Federal purchasing where 
exemptions are carried over with each policy change without careful consideration of why the 
exemptions are granted and what impact they could have on human health and the environment. 
Lastly, the disproportionality in US defense contractor releases linked to government 
procurement lends support to strengthening future policies regarding green purchasing to address 
environmental problems.  
 In the third and final manuscript (Chapter 4), the question was: As competition for US 
Federal contracts increases between potential awardees, do releases of Chromium (Cr) increase 
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because competition may be driving investment in pollution control downward? Chapter 4’s 
findings include three primary conclusions. First, competition for government contracts leads to 
a small increase in Cr releases from government contractors using Cr in their manufacturing 
processes. Second, this association is reversed when examining how Cr is used at the facility 
with manufacturers reporting Cr used as a formulation or article component reporting lower Cr 
releases into the environment as competition for contracts increased. This ultimately informs the 
third conclusion of Chapter 4, which is how these results connect to the literature on industrial 
competition and the environment. The Porter Hypothesis argues that as competition increases, 
firms and their facilities become more efficient leading to lower environmental impact. Findings 
of Chapter 4 suggest that the association between competition and the environment is more 
complex and subject to situational influence. More nuanced understanding of competition and 
environment is needed falling in line with recent calls for the Porter Hypothesis and the “race to 
the bottom” to be considered together and be contextualized (Wu et al., 2019; Zhou et al., 2017). 
Findings suggest that the uses of hazardous materials and specific production processes are 
associated with a more dynamic association between competition and environment. 
Findings from each of these studies contribute to three primary areas of research: 
ecological modernization, environmental disproportionality, and environment/competition 
theory.  
 
Theoretical and policy implications  
  Each of the sub-research questions and their respective manuscript connect with different 
theories and areas of inquiry in socio-environmental science. Connections offer insights on the 
role of incentive-based procurement policies as effective tools within the framework of 
164 
 
ecological modernization theory. Further, contributions are made to the theoretical development 
of the field of environmental disproportionality via use of Bourdieu’s concept of habitus. Lastly, 
findings regarding the link between competition and environmental management contribute to 
the ongoing debate regarding the Porter Hypothesis.  
 
Incentive contracting and ecological modernization 
 Ecological modernization theory envisions the advancement of industrial production 
toward cleaner, more harmonious processes with reduced environmental impact and more 
socially sustainable practices (Gibbs, 2006; Mol & Sonnenfeld, 2014). Key to this process is the 
guiding role of government, with the findings in this dissertation contributing to the idea that 
incentive-based policies can lead to ecologically modern outcomes (Lemprière, 2016). Incentive 
contracting is associated with more voluntary technology additions to manufacturers’ production 
processes that reduced environmental externalities and these innovations were more successful 
among incentive contractors. This contribution supports the idea that government policy can act 
as a guide for industry along the movement toward cleaner production (Hausknost, 2020) and in 
addition to technical support (Bartholomew et al., 2008; Bierma & Waterstraat, 2008), regulatory 
guidance (Ambec et al., 2013), and policy (Xie et al., 2019), government purchasing has a key 
role to play in this process. 
 Green purchasing by government agencies, public institutions, and others is a policy tool 
that ecological modernization theory recognizes as important for industry to make changes 
(Conway, 2012). The nuances of purchasing, particularly those related to contracts and the 
different payment types, has been examined before (Goldsmith & Basak, 2001). The findings 
contribute to this area of study by connecting incentive contracts to their potential environmental 
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benefits like the benefits of other incentive-type policies such as green taxes (Andersen, 1999) 
and results support their place in ecological modernization theory and as a part of green 
purchasing policy (Huber, 2004; Hausknost 2020).  
In addition, findings add to the literature on how economic principles such as efficient 
use of resources and cost versus benefit are applied by private actors in ways that impact the 
environment. Specifically, the industrial actors examined in the first manuscript (Chapter 2) 
include waste management and environmental improvements in their efforts to make their 
production processes more efficient and reduce costs even though the incentive contract did not 
specify these changes. These results show that policies focused on efficiency may not have to 
include environmental standards to result in positive environmental outcomes because firms may 
already include their own environmental activity (pollution control, waste management, resource 
use, etc.) in evaluation of their operating practices.  
This has important implications for ecological modernization because government can 
guide industry toward more efficient environmental operation with incentive-based policies in 
addition to environmental standards. The economic motivator of the incentive contract shows 
potential environmental benefit in transportation manufacturing and computer and electronic 
manufacturing. This deserves further investigation and consideration within other theoretical 
frameworks not explored in this dissertation including ecological economics. The investigation 
presented here provides a contribution for which future research can further build upon to better 
understand the potential synergism of economic-based policies like incentive contracts and their 




Habitus, disproportionality, and defense spending: Lessons for future policy changes 
 Each update to US Federal green purchasing policy including the executive orders of 
President Bill Clinton in 1999 (OFEE, 1999), President George W. Bush in 2007 (Executive 
Order 13423 - Strengthening US Federal Environmental, Energy, and Transportation 
Management, 2007), and President Barrack Obama in 2015 (Brookhaven National Laboratory, 
2020) included exemptions to the procurement standards for military and defense spending. 
Inclusion of these provisions has become the established policy and this continuing policy can be 
understood through Bourdieu’s concept of habitus (Bourdieu, 1990). Habitus is a set of “durable, 
transposable dispositions…principles which generate and organize practices and representations 
that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53). Habitus allows for 
these exemptions to continue because they are embedded in procurement norms established over 
time by of the powerful link between industry and the military (Jorgenson & Clark, 2009, 2016); 
policy makers exempt defense spending because it has always been exempted. This creates a 
fertile environment for disproportionate environmental impact from defense agencies to continue 
to grow. 
Disproportionate spending and pollution releases linked to exempt US Federal agencies 
are indicative of William Freudenburg’s (2005) socio-environmental concept of 
disproportionality and the double diversion. The first diversion, which is of resources, occurs 
where privileged access to pollute more heavily is granted to contractors that receive awards 
from exempt agencies. The second diversion, which is a reframing of the issue, is the argument 
that these exemptions are necessary for national security. Though the validity of this argument is 
not examined, the second manuscript (Chapter 3) examines how these exemptions have led to 
disproportionate environmental pollution being linked to US Federal Government purchases by 
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defense agencies. The lack of strong updates to the policy, particularly inclusion of exemptions 
for defense spending, has perpetuated this inequality creating a difficult situation. On the one 
hand, arguments for exemption today may be valid because if a change is made to require new 
spending practices by defense agencies, bringing these agencies up to current green purchasing 
standards might be too much in too short a time (Ramos et al., 2007). The exemptions prevented 
gradual change over time leading to the situation today where new policy will require careful 
implementation. 
Chapter 3 does not answer what the consequences would be if green purchasing policy 
were to become more stringent for defense agencies. It does, however, lend support to an 
evaluation of the exemptions and for new policy written specifically for defense spending. 
Defense spending is linked to unequal pollution production from manufacturers’ releases and, 
therefore, unequal potential impacts to human health. This is evidence that current policy 
covering US Federal procurement and green purchasing is no longer enough to address the issue 
of government contribution to environmental pollution. While it might be tempting to use 
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus to justify why change cannot happen, it is quite the opposite. 
Bourdieu argued that habitus is constantly changing over time with new experience and 
situations (Bourdieu, 1971; DiMaggio, 1979). Therefore, Bourdieu’s concept can help us 
understand the problem and inform the solution that will require reexamination of the current 
policies that have led to this problem. New policy will be needed going forward with specific 
and clear requirements designated for defense agencies. This is not a new concept; defense 
spending has its budget voted each year with the National Defense Authorization Act that 
includes allocation of funds and outlines of the policies for how the money is to be spent. The 
law empowers the current version of the US Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which 
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governs US Federal procurement, but could be a starting point for introducing new standards. 
Any changes could be brought in phases with this dissertation supporting the need for more 
detailed policy evaluation, spending assessment, and innovation of standards to reorient US 
Federal procurement to address environmental pollution and inequality.  
 
Complexity of the environment/competition relationship 
The link between competition among private firms and their environmental management 
decisions is debated in the literature. Two leading arguments are the Porter Hypothesis with 
proponents arguing that more competition leads to reduced negative environmental externalities 
(Porter & Van der Linde, 1995), and the opposing view that competition creates a “race to the 
bottom” (Cole et al., 2017). Growing evidence, however, indicates that strict interpretation of 
these hypotheses leads to a lack of consensus with neither position completely answering the 
question of how competition and the environment are related (López-Gamero & Molina-Azorín, 
2016).  
The research presented in manuscript three (Chapter 4) takes this latter position finding 
support for both hypotheses and contributing to the literature by adding support to the idea that 
the competition/environment link is more complex (Aragón-Correa & A. Rubio-López, 2007; 
Lasisi et al., 2018; Wu et al., 2019; Zhou et al., 2017). The contribution of the Chapter 4 to this 
ongoing debate is that situation, context, and nuance are needed to understand how competition 
between firms impacts their environmental activity, following work done by Aragon-Correa and 
Rubio-Lopez (2007) as well as others (Wu et al., 2019; Zhou et al., 2017). This does not differ 
with the Porter Hypothesis or the “race to the bottom” hypothesis, but rather argues against strict 
interpretation of either argument as these other scholars recommend. Instead, each hypothesis 
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may find support in empirical settings depending on the situation studied. Further, both 
hypotheses aid in understanding these different situations and help explain what is observed in 
the real world. Continued research need not seek to prove or disprove either hypothesis, but 
perhaps take the approach of applying the hypothesis to the situation and understand the nuances 
of different possible outcomes.  
 That is one point that cannot be stressed enough in this dissertation. The context of the 
study is key to interpretation of the findings, connection to other research, and avoiding 
generalization beyond the scope of the data and analysis. This leads to some final thoughts on the 
limitations of the research presented in this dissertation. 
 
Limitations 
 Several limitations are addressed in each of the respective manuscripts that this 
dissertation includes, but it is worth revisiting some limitations the manuscripts share and others 
that may have been overlooked. Firstly, I focus on manufacturing industries in the US and the 
facilities within them. This provides a clear set of industrial actors that recommendations could 
be made (and to the regulators with oversight over these types of industry) but leaves out many 
other sources of environmental externalities including the energy sector, resource extraction 
industries such as mining and fossil fuels, as well as waste management industries. These other 
sectors also engaging in US Federal contracting and are deserving of future investigation but are 
left out of the analyses presented in this dissertation. Therefore, the findings presented might 
apply to these sectors, but there is not support for generalizing findings to industrial sectors 




 The focus on manufacturing as an industry is a limitation because manufacturing has so 
many subsectors within it that findings in this dissertation do not apply equally to all 
manufacturers. This is highlighted in the Chapter 2 examining incentive contracts where only 
four subsectors are examined with results suggesting an association in two of the four subsectors. 
Therefore, generalization of results to all manufacturing subsectors should be done with care and 
with application of the findings in each chapter to their respective units of analysis. For example, 
the findings of Chapter 2 fit best with the four subsectors studied, Chapter 3’s findings are most 
relevant for defense industries, and Chapter 4’s findings are most relevant for manufacturers 
using Cr as a component in their production processes. Again, the point that context matters is 
evident and worth remembering when connecting the findings in this dissertation to additional 
research. 
 Another limitation of this dissertation is the focus on quantitative methods. While 
excellent for generalizing results across thousands of facilities, there are limits to the conclusions 
derived from statistical models. The findings contribute toward greater understanding between 
the linkages of US Federal procurement and toxic releases with ample support for future mixed 
methods and qualitative work. The latter could be particularly useful because of the ability to 
study the people making purchasing decisions through in-depth interviews or focus groups to 
learn why procurement officials make the decisions they do and how those decisions might lead 
to the outcomes studied in this dissertation.  
 A related limitation of the study methods is the focus on facility as the unit of analysis. 
Facilities often are individual establishments with single owners and places of operation, but 
there are also many that are part of larger conglomerates with parent companies overseeing their 
operations. Future work should seek to categorize facilities within their parent firms and connect 
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these larger companies to US Federal spending to identify if the same patterns of pollution 
production exist or if new variation is observed. 
 In relation to the firm/facility issue, I focus on facilities that receive government contracts 
with only the Chapter 2 including noncontractors in the analysis. Contractors are a relatively 
small group of industrial actors in the US that often have very specialized industries. While many 
of the findings can be generalized to noncontractors, much of the work presented here would not 
be relevant to businesses outside of the contractor arena. Particularly the findings in Chapter 3 
related to defense industries are most relevant to facilities engaged in those activities. This is a 
very specific group of industrial actors meaning that interpretation of the findings beyond actors 
engaged in defense acquisition is limited.  
 Another limitation regarding the results of this dissertation is that an alternate explanation 
for behavior was not considered: liability of firms for environmental damages. While facility 
inspections were included as a covariate which might cover legal liability, the possibility of civil 
cases against polluting firms was not considered. Future projects could look at this perhaps by 
considering the case history of certain industries or chemicals which have faced civil cases 
regarding potential links between the hazards of industrial pollution and health impacts. Firms 
might treat some chemicals differently based on legal precedents and established links between 
hazard and health outcome. Management of the chemicals might be more stringent, then, and is 
worth future research efforts. 
 Two final limitations worth noting include the lack of investigation into the role of 
different political administrations during the years studied and the limited evaluation of 
purchasing policies. Both were included in the dissertation in very limited ways. Chapter 3 
highlights that not much has changed regarding US procurement policy between administrations 
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from 2001 to 2012 with the same policy updates being made, but more in-depth examination of 
the FAR and the executive orders may be worth examining. In addition, this dissertation provides 
a roadmap for future work to address differences between administrations and to conduct more 
formal policy evaluations.  
The answers to the questions we ask in academic research are situated within past and 
current projects each with their own contribution and limitations. Situating research within the 
appropriate context and being upfront about limitations is important particularly when making 
recommendations for future investigations. Related to future work, the primary question of this 
dissertation regarding what is different about government contractors and their pollution is not 
entirely answered. Some differences are explored in this dissertation with close examination of 




 In addition to the future recommendations mentioned above that address the limitations 
of this dissertation, there is also support for other areas of inquiry to expand on the findings 
presented. This section will focus on three general categories of future research: projects directly 
linked to the dissertation methods representing next steps on this research path, other research 
questions that could use the methods presented here, and ideas for expanding the Bayesian 
hierarchical model presented in Chapter 4. 
 A next step of the research in this dissertation is to prepare a more formal presentation of 
the methods used for obtaining and combining the data sources used in this project with specific 
interest in providing an open data process that is reproducible. Combining the TRI data with the 
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USASpending data is a novel approach with many potential benefits to research and policy. The 
method presented here uses a proprietary data source to link the two datasets: The National 
Establishment Time Series (NETS) TRI to Duns Number crosswalk. The proprietary nature of 
the NETS data prevents this method from becoming open source, however, methods to link the 
TRI to the USASpending data could be devised using machine learning and character string 
matching methods. One future project will be to devise a reproducible method for downloading 
and synthesizing the TRI data and the USASpending data and then using a string-matching 
algorithm to link TRI facilities to the contract data by matching different identifiers such as 
geocoordinates, street addresses, and phone numbers. The objective is to use the public TRI data 
and the public USASpending data to devise an open-source TRI to Duns Number crosswalk. 
Granted, these data would be limited to TRI facilities that receive government contracts but 
would provide a robust dataset on facility characteristics for future research. In addition, a 
reproducible method would be valuable to policy makers seeking to utilize the results of this 
dissertation by providing a method for matching prospective vendors for contract awards to their 
TRI releases. Further, connections could be made to other regulatory data including Clean Air 
and Clean Water Act reporting. Other future projects can also make use of the research presented 
in this dissertation. 
 I focus on three research questions, but in addition to leaving answering some questions, 
it is the genesis of other questions as well. Future research might seek to investigate the specific 
products that contractors produce and how they are associated with variations in firm and facility 
environmental performance. The USASpending data includes details on the products purchased 
with each transaction that, once linked to TRI facilities, provides an interesting data source for 
learning information like: what chemicals might have been used to make this product? What 
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processes are involved with the manufacture of this item? What waste is produced in the 
product’s manufacture? Such questions would benefit life-cycle focused research (Egilmez et al., 
2013), consumer products regulation (Brekken et al., 2017), and also increase the understanding 
of the link between product mix and environmental performance, which is a growing area of 
interest (Barrows & Ollivier, 2018). In addition, the spatial factors related to environmental 
releases are not explored in this dissertation and could be studied to understand distribution of 
pollution burden (Bouvier, 2014) and risk burden from an environmental justice perspective 
(Ard, 2015; Collins et al., 2016; Mohai et al., 2009). Also, additional policy analysis could take 
the methods presented here and apply them to associated regulations such as the Toxics 
Substances Control Act (TSCA) with a focus on identifying the chemicals that might need 
updated regulatory information due to their prolific use and release. While other methods can be 
used to answer these questions, increased use of the method presented in Chapter 4, the Bayesian 
model, is encouraged. 
 The Bayesian hierarchical model in Chapter 4 is increasing in popularity among scholars 
in similar socio-environmental analyses. The model included nested grouping of data with years 
of releases grouped by facilities and facilities grouped by industry. This is a foundation for 
adding industry level covariates that are not included, other facility level covariates, and other 
yearly data. In addition, random intercepts are used in the analysis, but random slopes are not. 
Future work could add random slopes very easily to this model. In addition, the model could be 
used as a basis for a multi-chemical investigation that could provide specific results for any 
number of TRI chemicals to test for the same associations and new ones as well. This could be 
extremely useful for policy makers by providing insight into how to regulate specific chemicals, 
what industries those effects might be beneficial for, and where improvements might have the 
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most benefit. Lastly, the Bayesian approach uses prior knowledge to inform the model estimation 
making the posterior results of this dissertation useful as informed priors in future models. New 
models could test for similar effects of Cr releases by industries not studied here as well as other 
chemicals to see if effects of competition on Cr releases are the same or different for other 
chemicals. These are just a few examples of ways the Bayesian model could be improved and 
expanded upon. 
 In scientific inquiry there are infinite research questions and avenues to investigate. The 
few suggestions provided here are some in a collection of ideas that this dissertation will 
hopefully inspire.  
 
Closing remarks 
 I began with the goal of determining the differences between government contractors and 
noncontractors with regards to their toxic waste management practices. Throughout this 
dissertation, the results of this inquiry are presented with detailed methods and theoretical 
connections to situate this project within the appropriate literature. While many differences are 
identified and investigated in detail, the original research question remains salient as there are 
more differences to explore. There are still many unknowns about firm and facility 
environmental activity related to government contracting. The limitations of the research 
presented above, and future recommendations, provide context and paths forward in seeking to 
further knowledge and understanding of the original research question. Findings of this 
dissertation are a contribution toward understanding the differences between government 
contractors and noncontractors with regards to their toxic waste management practices. It 
provides support for changes in policy, revisiting exemptions granted to US Federal agencies 
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when contracting, and supports the theoretical implications of environmental disproportionality 
research and its connection to several areas of inquiry including ecological modernization theory 
and the Porter Hypothesis. The last thoughts I want to leave you with are that there are ways to 
encourage reduction of pollution among facilities without restricting business profitability. Green 
purchasing guidelines need to be updated in a meaningful way that will address inequality in past 
policy implementation particularly reviewing defense spending. Lastly, environmental 
performance requires a contingent lens from researchers where we consider the context and 
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Supplementary Table A1: Descriptive statistics for quantitative variables 
Variable Median Mean SE of the mean Standard deviation 
Mean bids 0 0.229 0.013 1.264 
Corporation size 
and complexity 
0 1.142 0.083 8.294 
Mean sales 11947350 33551077.853 814581.535 81090763.273 
Mean employment 92 217.975 5.207 518.327 
Number of 
reporting years 




0 0.018 0.001 0.092 
Proportion EPA 
required 
0 0.065 0.002 0.25 
Number of 
chemicals 
15 31.666 0.533 53.087 
Number of 
inspections 




Supplementary Table A2: Descriptive statistics for factor variables 
Variable     
Contract type Incentive Cost-plus Fixed-price No 
contracts 
111 106 1479 8214 
DOD contractor DOD contractor Other agency No 
contracts 
 
581 1115 8214  
Corporate 
ownership 
Single owner Corporately 
owned 
  
7068 2842    
   
Foreign owned Domestic Foreign   
8240 1670   






9063 847   
Tribe proximity Within 10 miles of a 
Native American 
Tribe 
Further than 10 




1754 8156   
EJScreen Yes No   















Supplementary Table A3: Marginal mean results for Chemical manufacturing and contract 
type interaction 
Model name Contrast Est. marginal 
mean 
SE 95% CI 
Total actions (Cost-plus) - (Fixed-price) -0.023 0.663 (-1.322,1.276) 
(Cost-plus) - Incentive 0.312 0.955 (-1.56,2.185) 
(Cost-plus) - No Contracts 0.068 0.655 (-1.215,1.352) 
(Fixed-price) - Incentive 0.335 0.713 (-1.062,1.732) 
(Fixed-price) - No 
Contracts 
0.091 0.134 (-0.171,0.353) 
Incentive - No Contracts -0.244 0.707 (-1.63,1.141) 
1yr reduction (Cost-plus) - (Fixed-price) 0.254 0.969 (-1.645,2.153) 
(Cost-plus) - Incentive 0.371 1.406 (-2.385,3.127) 
(Cost-plus) - No Contracts 0.312 0.952 (-1.555,2.179) 
(Fixed-price) - Incentive 0.117 1.062 (-1.965,2.198) 
(Fixed-price) - No 
Contracts 
0.058 0.219 (-0.371,0.487) 
Incentive - No Contracts -0.059 1.049 (-2.114,1.997) 
5yr reduction (Cost-plus) - (Fixed-price) 0.821 1.186 (-1.504,3.146) 
(Cost-plus) - Incentive 0.921 2.024 (-3.046,4.888) 
(Cost-plus) - No Contracts 0.617 1.148 (-1.633,2.866) 
(Fixed-price) - Incentive 0.100 1.706 (-3.244,3.444) 
(Fixed-price) - No 
Contracts 
-0.204 0.345 (-0.879,0.472) 
Incentive - No Contracts -0.304 1.681 (-3.599,2.991) 
25% reduction (Cost-plus) - (Fixed-price) 0.844 1.028 (-1.171,2.859) 
(Cost-plus) - Incentive 0.994 1.834 (-2.6,4.588) 
(Cost-plus) - No Contracts 0.544 0.990 (-1.395,2.484) 
(Fixed-price) - Incentive 0.150 1.579 (-2.946,3.246) 
(Fixed-price) - No 
Contracts 
-0.300 0.317 (-0.921,0.321) 











Supplementary Table A4: Marginal mean results for computer and electronic products 
manufacturing and contract type interaction 
Model name Contrast Est. marginal 
mean 
SE 95% CI 
Total actions (Cost-plus) - (Fixed-
price) 
0.439 0.309 (-0.167,1.045) 
(Cost-plus) - Incentive -0.352 0.381 (-1.099,0.395) 
(Cost-plus) - No 
Contracts 
0.890 0.306 (0.291,1.49) 
(Fixed-price) - Incentive -0.791 0.308 (-1.395, -0.187) 
(Fixed-price) - No 
Contracts 
0.451 0.172 (0.114,0.788) 
Incentive - No Contracts 1.242 0.314 (0.627,1.857) 
1yr reduction (Cost-plus) - (Fixed-
price) 
0.291 0.426 (-0.544,1.125) 
(Cost-plus) - Incentive -0.496 0.523 (-1.52,0.528) 
(Cost-plus) - No 
Contracts 
0.792 0.423 (-0.038,1.622) 
(Fixed-price) - Incentive -0.786 0.412 (-1.595,0.022) 
(Fixed-price) - No 
Contracts 
0.501 0.222 (0.067,0.936) 
Incentive - No Contracts 1.288 0.421 (0.462,2.114) 
5yr reduction (Cost-plus) - (Fixed-
price) 
0.596 0.395 (-0.178,1.37) 
(Cost-plus) - Incentive -0.298 0.484 (-1.248,0.651) 
(Cost-plus) - No 
Contracts 
1.007 0.392 (0.239,1.775) 
(Fixed-price) - Incentive -0.894 0.409 (-1.695, -0.093) 
(Fixed-price) - No 
Contracts 
0.411 0.232 (-0.043,0.865) 
Incentive - No Contracts 1.305 0.420 (0.482,2.128) 
25% reduction (Cost-plus) - (Fixed-
price) 
0.657 0.321 (0.028,1.287) 
(Cost-plus) - Incentive -0.147 0.405 (-0.941,0.648) 
(Cost-plus) - No 
Contracts 
1.054 0.320 (0.426,1.682) 
(Fixed-price) - Incentive -0.804 0.351 (-1.492, -0.116) 
(Fixed-price) - No 
Contracts 
0.396 0.195 (0.015,0.778) 






Supplementary Table A5: Marginal mean results for fabricated metal manufacturing and 
contract type interaction 
Model name Contrast Est. marginal 
mean 
SE 95% CI 
Total actions (Cost-plus) - (Fixed-
price) 
0.537 0.694 (-0.824,1.898) 
(Cost-plus) - Incentive -0.495 0.824 (-2.111,1.12) 
(Cost-plus) - No 
Contracts 
0.470 0.687 (-0.876,1.816) 
(Fixed-price) - Incentive -1.032 0.499 (-2.009, -0.055) 
(Fixed-price) - No 
Contracts 
-0.067 0.154 (-0.369,0.235) 
Incentive - No Contracts 0.965 0.491 (0.004,1.927) 
1yr reduction (Cost-plus) - (Fixed-
price) 
0.400 1.028 (-1.616,2.415) 
(Cost-plus) - Incentive -0.013 1.363 (-2.683,2.658) 
(Cost-plus) - No 
Contracts 
0.345 1.018 (-1.651,2.34) 
(Fixed-price) - Incentive -0.412 0.947 (-2.269,1.444) 
(Fixed-price) - No 
Contracts 
-0.055 0.212 (-0.47,0.361) 
Incentive - No Contracts 0.358 0.938 (-1.482,2.197) 
5yr reduction (Cost-plus) - (Fixed-
price) 
0.169 1.260 (-2.302,2.639) 
(Cost-plus) - Incentive 0.223 1.793 (-3.291,3.738) 
(Cost-plus) - No 
Contracts 
0.034 1.249 (-2.414,2.482) 
(Fixed-price) - Incentive 0.055 1.324 (-2.54,2.65) 
(Fixed-price) - No 
Contracts 
-0.134 0.242 (-0.609,0.34) 
Incentive - No Contracts -0.189 1.315 (-2.767,2.389) 
25% reduction (Cost-plus) - (Fixed-
price) 
-0.000 1.116 (-2.187,2.186) 
(Cost-plus) - Incentive 0.024 1.507 (-2.931,2.978) 
(Cost-plus) - No 
Contracts 
0.091 1.107 (-2.08,2.261) 
(Fixed-price) - Incentive 0.024 1.058 (-2.049,2.097) 
(Fixed-price) - No 
Contracts 
0.091 0.208 (-0.318,0.499) 






Supplementary Table A6: Marginal mean results for transportation manufacturing and 
interaction with contract type 
Model name Contrast Est. marginal 
mean 
SE 95% CI 
Total actions (Cost-plus) - (Fixed-
price) 
0.087 0.463 (-0.821,0.995) 
(Cost-plus) - Incentive -0.616 0.478 (-1.553,0.321) 
(Cost-plus) - No 
Contracts 
0.276 0.458 (-0.621,1.173) 
(Fixed-price) - Incentive -0.703 0.241 (-1.176, -0.231) 
(Fixed-price) - No 
Contracts 
0.189 0.158 (-0.121,0.499) 
Incentive - No Contracts 0.893 0.236 (0.429,1.356) 
1yr reduction (Cost-plus) - (Fixed-
price) 
-0.102 0.663 (-1.402,1.198) 
(Cost-plus) - Incentive -0.556 0.696 (-1.919,0.808) 
(Cost-plus) - No 
Contracts 
0.285 0.658 (-1.005,1.576) 
(Fixed-price) - Incentive -0.454 0.345 (-1.13,0.223) 
(Fixed-price) - No 
Contracts 
0.387 0.209 (-0.022,0.797) 
Incentive - No Contracts 0.841 0.344 (0.166,1.516) 
5yr reduction (Cost-plus) - (Fixed-
price) 
0.108 0.640 (-1.147,1.363) 
(Cost-plus) - Incentive -0.081 0.683 (-1.42,1.258) 
(Cost-plus) - No 
Contracts 
0.549 0.636 (-0.697,1.795) 
(Fixed-price) - Incentive -0.189 0.375 (-0.923,0.546) 
(Fixed-price) - No 
Contracts 
0.441 0.219 (0.011,0.871) 
Incentive - No Contracts 0.630 0.377 (-0.11,1.369) 
25% reduction (Cost-plus) - (Fixed-
price) 
0.442 0.522 (-0.58,1.464) 
(Cost-plus) - Incentive 0.010 0.553 (-1.073,1.093) 
(Cost-plus) - No 
Contracts 
0.635 0.513 (-0.371,1.64) 
(Fixed-price) - Incentive -0.432 0.324 (-1.068,0.204) 
(Fixed-price) - No 
Contracts 
0.193 0.201 (-0.202,0.587) 







Appendix B: Supplemental Material for Chapter 3 
 
Supplemental Figure B1: Coefficient estimates for each model compared to one another. 




Supplemental Figure B2: Comparison of coefficient estimates for the full linear model with 
agency fixed effect (with all data) and the same model for single facility firms. In our data, 1637 
facilities are the only TRI facility the firm operated at the time of analysis. Since larger parent 
companies with multiple facilities might have different environmental performance, a sensitivity 
analysis was completed to ensure these facilities were not driving any underlying relationships. 




Appendix C: Supplemental Material for Chapter 4 
 
We also fit a zero-inflated hurdle model using Bayesian methods as part of the statistical 
analyses for Chapter 4. The model statement for the zero-inflated version was very similar to the 
original model but adds a mixture model component to the estimate of 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘. The full model 
statement was: 
[𝜷𝑖𝑗𝑘 , 𝜽𝑖𝑗𝑘 , 𝝆𝑖𝑗𝑘 , 𝜎
𝟐, 𝝍𝑗𝑘, 𝜸𝑗𝑘 , δ









× 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(𝝍𝑗𝑘| 𝑔(𝜸𝑗𝑘 , 𝝉𝑘 , 𝒘𝑗𝑘), δ
2) 
× 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(𝜷𝑖𝑗𝑘|0, 100) 
× 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(𝝆𝑖𝑗𝑘|0, 100) 
× 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚(𝜎𝟐|0, 200) 
× 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(𝜸𝑗𝑘|0, 100)  
× 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚(ζ 2|0, 200) 




With the zero-inflation component being added to the linear function estimating  𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘 by: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘 =  {
= 0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑖 = 0
~ normal(𝑔(𝜷𝑖𝑗𝑘 , 𝝍𝑗𝑘,, 𝒙𝑖𝑗𝑘), 𝜎




Where the probability of 𝑆𝑖 being equal to 1 was determined by an inverse logit model to predict 
when 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘 is equal to 0 or a value other than 0 using the following equation: 
Pr(𝑆𝑖 = 1) = 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝒙𝑖𝑗𝑘 ∗ 𝜽𝑖𝑗𝑘) [3] 
 
𝜽𝑖𝑗𝑘  is the vector of coefficients for the inverse logit model. The inverse logit formed the first 
part of the mixture model, the second part was a linear model used to predict values other than 
zero when 𝑆𝑖 was equal to 1 and took on the following form: 
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log (𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘) = 𝝍𝑗𝑘 + 𝛒𝑖𝑗𝑘 +  𝜷𝑖𝑗𝑘 𝒙𝑖𝑗𝑘  [4] 
 
The mixture model took the product of the probability of a value being zero and the probability 
of a value being other than zero to make the final estimation for the parameters. The zero-
inflated model was better than the original model at predicting zero values in the data as 
evidence in Supplemental Figure B1. 
 
Supplemental Figure B1: The simulated data follow the real data well with better prediction of 
zero values than the original model. However, there does appear to be some underpredicting of 
low values other than zero. 
The visual representation of the simulated versus real data was one check for model fit with the 
second being an examination of Bayesian p-values. There was evidence of lack of fit of the zero-
inflated model for the predicted standard deviation of the data with a Bayesian p-value = 1 and 
for the predicted mean with a Bayesian p-value < 0.001 (Supplemental Table B1).  
Supplemental Table B1: Bayesian p-values for predicted mean 
 
mean sd 
SD 1.0000 0.0000 
Mean 0.0000 0.0000 




Therefore, despite the zero-inflated model’s improved prediction of zero values, it had greater 
evidence of lack of fit than the original model. This led to our decision to not report the results of 
the zero-inflated model in the main results of the paper. Examination of the parameter estimates 
did not reveal any new inference about our data, except that the association between average bids 
and Chromium releases became more significant with a Bayesian credible interval that no longer 
included zero (see Supplemental Table B2).  





95% BCI Parameter 
Log bids 0.4680 0.1662 (0.1728,0.8269) Facility-year 
(β) 
Log total award dollars 0.0001 0.0070 (-0.0141,0.013) Facility-year 
(β) 
Proportion of sales from 
contracts 
0.6915 0.2038 (0.2811,1.0696) Facility-year 
(β) 
Number of awards -0.0008 0.0005 (-0.0018,4e-04) Facility-year 
(β) 
Log sales 0.0492 0.0596 (-0.0766,0.1408) Facility-year 
(β) 
Log employment 0.0195 0.0702 (-0.0914,0.1701) Facility-year 
(β) 
Number of awards with 
EPA requirements 
0.0065 0.0037 (-6e-04,0.0138) Facility-year 
(β) 
Formulation component 0.7692 0.1984 (0.3761,1.138) Facility-year 
(β) 




-0.5652 0.1912 (-0.9579, -0.205) Facility (γ) 
Log bids-article component 
interaction 
-0.5921 0.1613 (-0.9167, -0.2878) Facility (γ) 
Cost-plus -0.7725 100.7231 (-
199.71,192.7021) 
Facility (γ) 
Incentive 0.8685 1.2133 (-1.472,3.4173) Facility (γ) 
Corporation size and 
complexity 
0.0284 0.0548 (-0.0739,0.1433) Facility (γ) 
Number of reporting years 0.6593 0.3998 (0.0805,1.2715) Facility (γ) 
Foreign Owned -1.0499 1.1735 (-3.3529,1.2973) Facility (γ) 
Corporately owned -0.3995 0.5270 (-1.4316,0.6131) Facility (γ) 
Number of inspections 0.0683 0.0894 (-0.1126,0.2312) Facility (γ) 
Proximate to Native 
American tribe 
-0.9395 1.2843 (-3.3793,1.5467) Facility (γ) 





Additional supplemental figures are below showing no significant difference in year-to-year 
chromium releases (Supplemental Figure B2) and no significant difference between the industry 
random intercepts (Supplemental Figure B3).  
 
Supplemental Figure B2: Fixed effect intercepts for year. No significant difference in average 





Supplemental Figure B3: Fixed effect intercepts for industry. No significant difference between 
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